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This capstone report describes the expected mine countermeasures (MCM) performance 
of the Avenger class MCM ship (MCM 1), landing helicopter deck (LHD) support ship, 
and MH-53E helicopter legacy systems and Increment 1 of the littoral combat ship (LCS) 
and MH-60S helicopter future systems. The study focused on two measures of effective-
ness (MOEs): area coverage rate sustained (ACRS) and percent clearance of mines. The 
systems engineering (SE) approach used to address stakeholder needs identified founda-
tional requirements and developed functional and physical architectures for simulation in 
conducting the comparative technical analysis. A design of experiments (DOE) method-
ology was used to determine which factors have the greatest influence on the MOEs. The 
significant factors’ values were varied to develop a set of recommended improvements to 
the future MCM systems. The study found that maintaining a constant search speed of 10 
knots, improving the stream and recover time to 15 minutes, and improving the sortie 
time to 24 hours for the remote minehunting system (RMS) would provide a future 
ACRS performance greater than that provided by the legacy systems. When factoring in 
risk and operating and sustainment (O&S) costs, the future capability and recommended 
improvements provide better performance per cost than the legacy capability. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the Second World War, the U.S. Navy has lost four times as many ships from sea 
mines than from all other forms of attack (Program Executive Office (PEO) Littoral and 
Mine Warfare (LMW) 2009, 8). This makes effective mine countermeasures (MCM) crit-
ical to the safety of personnel and equipment, as well as for the unimpeded ability to op-
erate in any region in the world. MCM is extremely challenging and dangerous to the 
personnel conducting the mine clearance operations (PEO LMW 2009). Currently, the 
U.S. Navy uses specially designed ships, the Avenger class MCM ships (MCM 1), to 
hunt for and destroy mines within minefields (PEO LMW 2009). Presently, the Navy is 
moving towards a safer approach to conduct MCM using ships that can remotely control 
unmanned equipment to clear areas of mines (PEO LMW 2009) thereby keeping MCM 
ships and crew out of the minefield. This involves installing equipment on the new litto-
ral combat ships (LCS) (PEO LMW 2009).  
This study began with an extensive literature review to understand MCM systems 
and operations. The review was conducted concurrently with a stakeholder analysis to 
develop the study’s problem statement, project scope, and project requirements. This was 
necessary to define and limit the problem space to one that was both needed and realiza-
ble within the capstone project constraints.  
The primary research questions that guided the reviews of the literature and pre-
vious studies centered around the current and planned MCM capabilities, gaps in desired 
capabilities, systems and functions required or planned to provide a capability, the con-
cept of operations (CONOPS) that is followed by each of the MCM platforms, and the 
evaluation metrics that the U.S. Navy uses to assess the effectiveness of the MCM capa-
bilities. 
MCM is a complicated endeavor due to the impacts of multiple elements: types 
and locations of mines, size and density of the minefield, sea and environmental condi-
tions, and the mission requirements of clearance time and effectiveness allocations (Er-
ickson et al. 2009; PEO LMW 2009; Truver 2012). The conduct of this comparative 
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analysis project was further complicated due to the requirement to complete it using only 
unclassified data, which prevented the study from using actual performance values for the 
MCM systems. 
The stakeholders need quantitative data for evaluating the effectiveness of future 
MCM capabilities, the core of which is the LCS, as compared to the legacy MCM capa-
bilities, the core of which is the Avenger class MCM ship (MCM 1) (DON 2010). In or-
der to address the stakeholders’ need, it was important to gain an understanding of func-
tional and physical architectures that characterize both the legacy and future MCM capa-
bilities. A functional and physical analysis of MCM capabilities provided the basis for 
developing the configurations modeled in this study. Four different configurations were 
examined for the legacy capability (LT Andrew Watts, personal communication, 10 July 
2014) and one for the future capability (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Operational Scenario Configuration 
Configuration Ship Helicopter Subsystems 
1A MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SLQ-48
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24 
Hunt Method: Serial 
1B MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SeaFox
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24 
Hunt Method: Serial 
2A MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SLQ-48
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24, SeaFox 
Hunt Method: Parallel 
2B MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SeaFox
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24, SeaFox 
Hunt Method: Parallel 
3 LCS MH-60S LCS: RMS with AN/AQS-20
MH-60S: Archerfish 
Hunt Method: Serial  
 
Of the four legacy configurations studied, two utilize the older AN/SLQ-48 mine 
neutralizer systems for 5th fleet and two utilize the newer SeaFox mine neutralizer system 
for 7th fleet (LT Andrew Watts, personal communication, 10 July 2014). The legacy con-
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figurations consider MCM operations in two ways: one uses a serial search and neutralize 
approach and the other operates with a more parallel approach (LT Andrew Watts, per-
sonal communication, 10 July 2014). The future configuration consists of systems operat-
ing in a serial fashion. 
Since each configuration results in a MCM mission being executed in a different 
manner, the comparative analysis was based on a common mission scenario profile: mine 
clearing a rectangular area (10 nautical miles (NM) by 10 NM) that would be within a 
deep water sea line of communication (SLOC) containing bottom mines. In collaboration 
with the MIW subject matter experts (SMEs) and the advisors, the MIW Team focused 
the study on comparing the effectiveness of the different MCM systems in completing a 
minehunting operation against bottom mines in deep water (200 feet) in a predefined rec-
tangular area (Admiral Richard Williams III, personal communication, 16 May 2014). 
The evaluation was based on two measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to provide a compar-
ison between the configurations in both the time to conduct the mission and the mission 
effectiveness. These were the area coverage rate sustained (ACRS), calculated for the en-
tire clearance mission, and the percentage of mines cleared. 
Models were developed to represent both legacy and future MCM performance in 
accordance with the relevant activities and components characterized by the functional 
and physical analysis. There were 65 input parameters included in each model, which al-
lowed for sufficient flexibility in the comparative study analysis and for the evaluation of 
capability improvements. These parameters included characteristics of the various sys-
tems found in each of the four configurations, such as search and transit speeds of the 
platforms, the stream and recover times for the various systems, and the probabilities of 
the search, classify, reacquire, and neutralization systems and sensors. These parameters 
were used as the factors in the subsequent design of experiments (DOE). As discussed 
previously, the responses were the two MOEs: ACRS and percent clearance. The initial 
DOE was developed using wide ranges for each variable, based on recommendations 
from MIW SMEs (Brett Cordes, personal communication, 29 July 2014, 12 August 2014, 
25 September 2014, and 2 October 2014). Actual performance data was classified, so in 
order to keep this report unclassified, wide variable ranges were used and then pared 
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down based upon what factors significantly impacted ACRS and percent clearance. The 
factors that were found not to be significant were then set to constant values during the 
development of a second DOE to allow more scrutiny of the results and the interactions 
between the significant factors. Additionally, some of the ranges were refined to smaller 
intervals based on the simulation results from the first DOE and consultation with the 
MIW SME (Brett Cordes, personal communication, 25 September 2014, and 2 October 
2014). 
A sensitivity analysis was run on the second DOE to determine which factors had 
the greatest impact on ACRS and percent clearance. Furthermore, all two-factor interac-
tions were analyzed to see which ones were impactful on the MOEs. The factors found to 
be significant at α = 0.05 (that is, having a p-value of less than or equal to 0.05) for 
ACRS include the speed of the surface search systems, the time to deploy and recover the 
reacquisition, identification, and neutralization (RI&N) equipment, the percentage of the 
minefield to be searched by the surface systems, and the airborne systems’ probability of 
classifying a non-mine like contact (MILCO) as a non-MILCO. Table 2 provides the per-
formance comparison between the configurations that resulted from the simulation analy-
sis and Figure 1 displays the results graphically using the mean values for ACRS and 
percent clearance. 
Table 2. Summary of MCM Performance Results for Each Baseline Configuration 
 






Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Configuration 1A 4.32 4.25 4.39 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 1B 4.28 4.21 4.35 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 2A 5.35 5.25 5.45 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 2B 5.30 5.20 5.40 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 3 4.80 4.71 4.89 0.33 0.32 0.34
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Figure 1. Baseline Configuration Performance 
The mission costs for each configuration were also compared using point esti-
mates for operations and sustainment (O&S) and neutralizer costs. A key result from the 
cost analysis was that the per-mission O&S costs for the future systems are lower than for 
the legacy systems.  
Figures 2 and 3 contain the MOE performance and mission cost for each configu-
ration studied (note that the configurations are described in the tables above; configura-
tion 3 (LCS 1) is the United States Ship (USS) Freedom class ship and configuration 3 
(LCS 2) is the USS Independence class ship—both have the same performance but each 














































Figure 2. ACRS MOE vs. Mission Cost for Each Configuration 
 
Figure 3. Percent Clearance MOE vs. Mission Cost for Each Configuration 
Based on the analysis performed within this study, several recommendations were 
developed to improve the performance of the LCS in clearing an area within a SLOC of 
 xxix
bottom mines in deep water (greater than 200 feet) to match that of legacy MCM 1 sys-
tems evaluated by the MOEs. Three of the recommendations improve the ACRS and one 
recommendation is provided for improving the mine clearance effectiveness in terms of 
the percent of mines cleared. These recommendations are: 
1. Operate the remote minehunting system (RMS) at its maximum search speed of 
10 knots. This provides an increase in ACRS of approximately 27 percent over 
the current capability. 
2. Decrease the time required to stream and recover the RMS to 15 minutes each. 
This provides an increase in ACRS of over 15 percent from the current capability. 
3. Increase the RMS sortie time to 24 hours. This provides an increase in ACRS of 
over 15 percent over the current capability.  
4. Enhance the sensors’ performance to 0.95. This provides an increase in mine 
clearance effectiveness of over 58 percent. 
These modifications and improvements would result in the LCS MCM perfor-
mance capability exceeding that of the best performing legacy system configuration. As 
identified, recommendation one is not an improvement in capability, but rather a recom-
mendation to operate the RMS at 10 knots instead of varying the speed from one to 10 
knots. Therefore, it is very likely that additional incurred development costs would be 
minimal.  
Figure 4 shows the normalized performance in ACRS per estimated O&S mission 
cost for the improvements listed above as compared to the baseline performance of the 
future (shown in dark blue) and legacy systems (shown in green). The values are normal-
ized to the best performing configuration. As shown, the performance per cost of the 
baseline LCS exceeds all legacy configurations and the recommended improvement to 
the RMS search speed provides the best performance per cost ratio of all other configura-
tions (note that due to project constraints, the cost analysis was based on point estimates 
and not probability distribution functions). 
 xxx
 
Figure 4. Normalized ACRS per Total Estimated O&S Cost for Baseline and Im-
proved Configurations 
Recommendations for future, follow-on studies in this area are proposed to allow 
for the analysis described within this report to be extended to provide more utility to the 
stakeholders. The future study recommendations involve expanding the operational sce-
nario from the one used within this project and expanding the models to allow for addi-
tional analyses. Specifically, modifying the models to allow the simulation to run until a 
defined mine clearance level to determine the ACRS with respect to that clearance level 
 xxxi
would provide data that more closely represents how missions are planned for different 
MCM mission scenarios. Additional modifications involving the incorporation of envi-
ronmental and sea factors as well as accommodating surface mines would extend the 
analysis described within this report. Finally, using actual cost element distributions to 
develop the cost analysis for each configuration is recommended to account for uncer-
tainty. These analyses could not be conducted within this project due to the constraints 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This report is intended to provide the results of the defensive mine countermeas-
ures (MCM) capabilities study of the current, legacy system and the planned, future sys-
tem. The legacy system is based on the Avenger class mine countermeasures ship (MCM 
1) as each is configured to support 5th Fleet and 7th Fleet operations. The future system is 
based on the littoral combat ship (LCS) that will be incrementally updated in four stages 
to fully develop the MCM capabilities. According to LT Andrew Watts, the MCM Tacti-
cian MCMRON Five, the United States Ship (USS) Independence (LCS-2), is slated for 
5th Fleet and the USS Freedom (LCS-1) class is to be deployed with 7th Fleet (personal 
communication, 10 July 2014). Additionally, as this study was conducted to satisfy the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Masters of Systems Engineering (MSSE) and Mas-
ters of Engineering Systems (MSES) requirements, the processes followed in the comple-
tion of this study and the development of the included recommendations are detailed 
herein. 
To conduct this study, a thorough review of the mine warfare (MIW) literature 
was conducted to gain an understanding of the complexity of MCM. A stakeholder analy-
sis was performed concurrently to develop the stakeholders’ needs so that the project 
could be scoped in a manner to best satisfy the needs within the constraints. A systems 
engineering (SE) approach was developed for the conduct of the study, which framed the 
processes of transforming the stakeholders’ needs into requirements. These requirements 
were the foundation of the functional and physical architecture that was developed. Ulti-
mately, the process concluded with this product that contains recommendations and anal-
ysis of the minehunting capabilities of the different platforms. As described within the 
report, the problem statement and project scope had to be refined several times to develop 
the appropriate plan to satisfy the stakeholders. A simulation was then built as a tool for 
the comparative analysis and a structured design of experiments (DOE) approach was 
developed and followed to produce results. Finally, a cost and risk analysis was per-
formed and recommendations were developed. 
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Nine MSSE and MSES students collaborated on this project, which began in 
April 2014 and concluded in December 2014. Three NPS advisors and a primary consult-
ant guided the team through the execution of the project. Due to the tight schedule and 
the small, disparately located team, the project had to be scoped so that a meaningful set 
of analyses could be completed. Recommendations for follow-on studies are included in 
Chapter X. 
This section presents the summary of MIW and the associated challenges, the 
problem statement, project constraints, and analytical approach. The background infor-
mation includes the historical use of sea mines, the types of mines, the challenges associ-
ated with different MCM operations, and the basic functions involved in MCM. Addi-
tionally, these descriptions draw from previous MCM studies and research, which enable 
a more comprehensive understanding of MCM operations and requirements. The sum-
mary included in this section highlights the complex nature of conducting defensive 
MCM operations as the processes employed and the effectiveness of the mission are af-
fected by many variables. These variables include the state of the MCM technology and 
systems available, the mission parameters, the types and locations of the sea mines, the 
sea state and type of sea bottom, the level of intelligence of the minefield area, and the 
level of proficiency of the forces operating the MCM systems. The information derived 
from the literature review enabled the MIW Team to develop the problem definition and 
define the project scope, as well as the SE approach and analysis plan. 
A. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
The use of mines to impede an enemy naval attack is a warfare tactic employed 
concurrent with an adversary’s ability to engage in a naval offensive. MIW includes de-
fensive mine laying, offensive mine laying, and MCM. MCM include those activities in-
volved with locating and destroying mines. According to the Program Executive Office 
(PEO) Littoral and MIW (LMW), mines are those “‘weapons that wait’ [and] are the 
quintessential global asymmetric threat, pitting our adversaries’ strengths against what 
they perceive as our naval and maritime weaknesses” (PEO LMW 2009, 1). Figure 1 un-
derscores the importance of effective defensive MCM, as it illustrates that since the sec-
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ond World War, more ships (by a factor of four) have been damaged or sunk by mines 
than by any other threat (PEO LMW 2009, 8). 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Navy Mine Casualties (from PEO LMW 2007, 8) 
The MIW Team, comprised of NPS students in the MSSE and MSES program, 
were tasked to conduct a study to develop a comparison between the U.S. Navy’s current 
and planned MCM capabilities. The MIW Team had members located in California, Ari-
zona, Maryland, and Rhode Island, which made communication and collaboration very 
challenging. The study had to be scoped so that the team could accomplish a meaningful 
analysis that would both satisfy the stakeholders’ needs and be accomplished within the 
NPS timeline. This study involved the evaluation of the current MCM capabilities, as 
they exist on the MCM 1 platforms, against those of the planned MCM capabilities, 
which are to be installed on the LCS as part of Increment 1. 
B. PROBLEM 
The Department of the Navy (DON) needs to have an effective defensive MCM 
capability that can be conducted in a manner that improves safety for sailors and the ships 
they operate (PEO LMW 2009). The DON stakeholders need quantitative data for evalu-
 
 4
ating the effectiveness of future MCM capabilities, the core of which is the LCS, as com-
pared with the legacy MCM capabilities, the core of which is the MCM 1 (DON 2010). 
Since each ship conducts the MCM mission differently, the MIW Team based the com-
parative analysis on a common mission scenario profile: clearing bottom mines from a 
rectangular area in deep water (greater than 200 feet) that would be within a sea line of 
communication (SLOC). This evaluation is primarily based on the area coverage rate sus-
tained (ACRS) metric for each ship type over a 24-hour period as well as the mine clear-
ance effectiveness in terms of percent of mines cleared (percent clearance). Although the 
LCS MCM capabilities are increased through four MCM mission module increments, the 
MCM comparison scenario chosen for this study dictated that only the first MCM module 
increment on the LCS be compared to MCM 1. 
C. APPROACH 
The MIW Team performed a comparative analysis the MCM systems of the two 
ship platforms with respect to one key operational mission scenario. This operational 
scenario focused on the ability of these ship systems to clear a relatively small rectangu-
lar area as if part of a mission to perform SLOC clearance in key choke points during 
times of conflict. An example of the need for this type of scenario is in the Straits of 
Hormuz (SOH), a key strategic waterway (U.S. Energy Information Association 2012), 
which ranges in water depths averaging “25 meters to 250 meters [82 to 820 feet]” (Rob-
ert S. Strauss Center 2008). 
As there are many systems that perform the various functions that contribute to 
the overall mine clearing operations, this study focused primarily on the evaluation of one 
aspect of MCM operations. According to the stakeholders from Naval Surface Warfare 
Center (NSWC), Panama City (PC), in a meeting on 6 May 2014, the two areas of inter-
est are the ACRS metric and residual risk of mines in the area after clearing operations. 
Due to the lack of accessible, unclassified performance metrics and the limited time in 
which to conduct this study, the MIW Team chose to focus this study on evaluating and 
comparing the ACRS and percent clearance metrics in the conduct of minehunting opera-
tions during an area-clearing scenario. This involved a comparative analysis of the ACRS 
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and mine clearance effectiveness between the MCM systems currently deployed on the 
MCM 1 with the planned MCM baseline of Increment 1 on the LCS. This comparative 
analysis considered both performance and cost metrics. 
Through the performance of sensitivity analysis and simulation-based testing in 
accordance with (IAW) a DOE approach, the study identified key features that have the 
greatest impact on the ACRS of the MCM systems on the two primary platforms. Using 
the key features identified in the analysis, recommendations for optimizing the effective-
ness of the MCM systems were developed. A secondary evaluation of mine clearance ef-
fectiveness (in terms of percent clearance) was also performed using a parametric ap-
proach to the performance capabilities of the systems found on each platform. Finally, 
some recommendations are provided. 
This analysis study was conducted within certain constraints and with the assump-
tions as identified. The constraints and assumptions that guided this study are described 
in the following sections. 
D. PROJECT CONSTRAINTS 
A group of nine MSSE and MSES students from the NPS conducted this research 
and analysis effort over a nine-month period as part of the NPS Systems Engineering 
graduation requirements. This study was conducted within the following environment 
and under the following constraints: 
 The study had to meet all graduation requirements by December 2014. 
 The study had to be conducted and completed at the unclassified level. 
 No specific software, tools, or funding was provided for this study. 
 Due to the direction provided by the MIW Consultant, Admiral Richard 
Williams III, on 16 May 2014, only SLOC operations conducted in deep 
water (> 200 feet) were evaluated and included in this study. 
 The sea mine characteristics used in the analysis were generalized; actual 
data on sea mines was not precisely modeled. The study used generalized 
types and characteristics of sea mines in the analysis. 
 Only minehunting operations were studied; minesweeping functions be-
tween the various MCM platforms were found to be very different and 
were therefore excluded from this study. 
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To fully apply the problem statement above and to appropriately define the pro-
ject scope, extensive research and stakeholder interaction and analysis had to be conduct-
ed. The next section describes the assumptions used to frame the study. 
E. PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS 
The MIW Team developed the following assumptions to scope and bound the 
project. The team used experience, research, and sponsor provided information to devel-
op these assumptions. The list evolved throughout the project as information and facts 
were established. The final assumptions used are: 
 Actual performance metrics were unavailable at the unclassified level and 
were not used within this study. The MIW Team developed notional per-
formance parameter values and ranges based on research. These values 
were evaluated by some project sponsors and determined to be reasonable. 
Chapter VII contains the methodology and assumptions used to derive the 
notional parameter values used within this study. 
 This study only focused on a simplified geometry for the area clearance 
operation; it did not use the complicated geometries as would be found in 
actual SLOC clearance operations. A fixed rectangular mine field area of 
10 nautical miles (NM) by 10 NM was used for the analysis. 
 Minesweeping and shallow mines were not included in the study due to 
the constraints listed in Section D. 
 The study only evaluated time to clear and effectiveness in clearing bot-
tom mines. 
From the problem statement, the MIW Team developed the project scope, which 
is defined in the following section. This provided additional refinement and focus of the 
problem set studied. 
F. PROJECT SCOPE 
While it would be desirable to evaluate the operational effectiveness of the com-
plete spectrum of defensive MCM operations in multiple scenarios and under a variety of 
conditions, this comprehensive study could not be accomplished given the constraints 
listed in Section D. After discussions with the MIW Consultant, SMEs, and advisors, it 
was determined that a focused study of the ACRS and percent clearance of the legacy and 
future MCM systems suites in a single operational scenario would result in a more satis-
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factory outcome. Therefore, this project focused on the elements that contribute to the 
ACRS and mine clearance effectiveness metrics for each platform and associated MCM 
system suite as they pertain to the completion of a 10 NM by 10 NM area of a SLOC 
MCM mission in deep water of greater than 200 feet. Where actual performance parame-
ter values were not available, the MIW Team used estimated values based on research 
and consultation with the MIW Consultant, MIW subject matter experts (SMEs), and 
stakeholders. These assumptions and estimates are documented and described in this re-
port in Chapter VII. 
As specified in the PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A (PEO LMW 2008), the ACRS 
must be “qualified by the level of coverage attained within the area covered” (72). This 
level of coverage pertains to “the percent clearance level and the level of detec-
tion/classification” (72). As indicated in the PEO LMW Instruction (PEO LMW 2008), 
the ACRS of each platform is a result of several parameters as described below. 
The calculation for ACRS as described in Equation A-47 of the PEO LMW In-
struction 3370.1A (PEO LMW 2008, 72) is 
 
ACRSP  AreaTTotal  (1) 
where, 
ACRSP = the area coverage rate sustained to level p, 
Area = the area covered, and 
Ttotal = the total mission time. 
As indicated in the PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A (PEO LMW 2008), there is a 
clear distinction between the ACRS and the area coverage rate instantaneous (ACRI). 
The ACRI is the “area coverage per unit time” of a “single pass along one track” (72). 
This involves the following performance metrics: 
 The speed of the system as it conducts search, sweep, cutting, actuation, 
and/or neutralization functions. 
 The mine hunting or mine sweeping subsystems’ search, sweep, and/or actua-
tion width. 
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 The mine hunting or mine sweeping subsystems’ search, cutting, and/or actua-
tion probability. 
The calculation as described in Equation A-48 of the PEO LMW Instruction 
3370.1A (PEO LMW 2008, 72) is 
 ACRI  (A * B)*V  (2) 
where,  
ACRI = the area coverage rate instantaneous, 
A = the characteristic search/sweep/actuation width, 
B = the characteristic search/cutting/actuation probability, and 
V = the system speed. 
Although the area to be covered in a single pass per unit of time is incorporated 
indirectly into the ACRS calculation, the MIW Team did not have access to actual char-
acteristic width, probability, or speed data for the MCM systems under evaluation, so 
these values were generalized and incorporated into the ACRS evaluation. 
To determine the ACRS, the total time necessary to complete the mission is re-
quired. This total time includes the duty cycle (DC), which is defined in the 3370.1A In-
struction (PEO LMW 2008) as the descriptor for the “operational constraints” involving 
operations, crew availability, and equipment availability (46–47). Therefore, the DC in-
cludes the launch-recovery time of the subsystems used to sweep, search, detect, classify, 
identify, and neutralize. The DC can be found through the following equation, which is 
identified as Equation A-17 (PEO LMW 2008, 47): 
 
DC  Ton
Ton Toff   (3) 
where, 
DC = Duty Cycle, 
Ton = platform on-duty time, and 
Toff = platform off-duty time. 
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Other factors, including the speed of the platform and mission vehicles as well as 
the turn radius, rate of turning, and the amount of time required to return to the platform 
and/or staging area to be refueled, reconfigured, and repaired, contribute to the time re-
quired from mission initiation until mission completion. Usually, the level of residual risk 
that mines still exist in the area determines mission completion, as achieved by the mine 
clearing operation. 
Non-MCM system elements will also affect the performance capabilities of the 
platform-based systems. These variables were not accounted for within the simulation or 
this study due primarily to the complexity these elements have on the MCM performance 
and operations and the limited time and resources available within which to conduct the 
study. For the purposes of this study, only deep water operations in a steady-sea-state en-
vironment and bottom mines were evaluated. 
The project scope was further detailed in order to derive the appropriate problem 
definition and study focus. It was important to succinctly state these to enable effective 
communication with the stakeholders as to the goals of this analytical study project. 
G. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following questions for research were used to scope and define the problem 
in order to provide a solution for the stakeholders. This section includes a top-level list of 
research questions, which was refined as the research was conducted and the MIW Team 
developed a better understanding of the problem space. 
1. What are the critical capabilities required for successful MIW/MCM? 
In order to identify and address the capability gap in MIW, there must be an un-
derstanding of the critical functions that need to be performed and the capabilities that 
must exist. Preliminary research indicated that detection, classification, identification, 
reacquisition, neutralization, and sweeping (including release and actuation) of mines, as 
well as communication, and transit to the area of operations are critical tasks in MIW op-
erations. 
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The answers to this question, as uncovered by research and stakeholder input, 
were verified through the modeling efforts as they address the next two questions. 
2. What are the gaps and limitations in meeting these capabilities with the 
current (legacy) force? 
The current platform for the MCM mission is the MCM 1. In order to identify 
gaps in the MCM capability of the U.S. Navy, it was important to understand the capabil-
ities of the Avenger. The Avenger’s defensive MCM operational performance metrics 
and operating costs were required to provide a basis of comparison for the new LCS that 
is the core of the future capability. 
Capabilities were considered in the context of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) 
and measures of performance (MOPs) in a particular operational scenario. Some example 
measures include search speed, detection and classification capabilities, neutralization 
effectiveness, operating costs, etc. A more comprehensive list of MOEs and MOPs are 
contained within Chapter IV. As discussed in the project constraints, due to the classifica-
tion of much of the specific data about each ship’s MCM system capabilities, this re-
search question was primarily addressed by modeling, using reasonable ranges for the 
parameters (factors) that directly impact the MCM capability. Reasonable ranges were 
determined from research and input from SMEs. 
Once the required set of system parameters and their values were defined, models 
were used to identify those most critical to performance of the MCM mission. 
3. What capabilities and limitations does the projected future force have? 
The future platform for the MIW and MCM mission is the LCS. In order to com-
pare the capability of the legacy and future MCM systems, it was important to understand 
the capabilities of the LCS. Furthermore, as the MCM mission packages will be deployed 
in increments, the capabilities afforded the Navy with each delivery had to be examined. 
It was found that only the MCM capabilities to be delivered with Increment 1 would af-
fect the study within the constraints and assumptions as described (see Section D and 
Section E). The MIW Team did obtain concurrence of this decision from the SMEs. The 
LCS’ defensive MCM operational performance metrics and operating costs were required 
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to provide the basis of comparison against the Navy’s current MCM ship, the MCM 1. As 
with the legacy MCM systems, performance capability data was unavailable for the fu-
ture systems; therefore, reasonable ranges were developed and used. These were verified 
as reasonable by the SMEs. 
4. What are the MIW operational situations (OPSITs) of primary interest and 
what data and information are available for use within this study? 
To ensure applicability of the results of this study, it was necessary to identify the 
mission type and operational scenario that is of primary concern for the stakeholders and 
sponsors. The performance of the defined mission type, (e.g., minehunting or minesweep-
ing, time to conduct operations) is affected by several variables that are outside of the 
control of the MCM commanders; these include: the environment, objective, mine type, 
and threats or enemy forces. To be informative, it was necessary to select a mission type 
and scenario that would be particularly stressful to MCM capabilities, under the assump-
tion that this stress would make any capability gaps more apparent. 
In addition to the mission type, the MCM operating scenarios in which to study 
MCM effectiveness had to be identified. From the MIW Team’s research of the literature, 
mine trigger type, mine emplacement method(s), minefield density, water depth, naval 
objective, enemy objective, and geographic location greatly impact the method and effi-
cacy of the MCM operation. To conduct the comparative analysis, it was determined that 
once these conditions were defined, each MCM configuration would use the same opera-
tional scenario and environmental and minefield conditions. The chosen MCM mission 
scenario and conditions were defined by the MIW Team, in collaboration with the SMEs, 
to select the most relevant context for the modeling and analysis. 
In addition to the MIW and MCM research, it was essential to engage the stake-
holders, including the sponsors, consultants, and advisors. These discussions helped to 
determine their primitive and effective needs so that these could be transformed into ac-
tionable requirements. 
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H. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides a comprehensive summary of the research performed, re-
sulting in a detailed background of MCM history as well as an overall MIW history. Ap-
pendix A contains a detailed and comprehensive summary of the research conducted pri-
or to the development of the problem statement and project scope. 
1. History of Mine Countermeasures  
Tamara Melia, a Navy Department historian, produced a history of naval MCM 
(1991) at the request of the Director of Naval History. The extensive bibliography con-
tained in Melia’s report is only part of her research efforts, which also included access to 
a considerable body of original source material. In this historical summary, Melia (1991) 
observes that the U.S. Navy has “not sustained an effective interest in mine countermeas-
ures” (1). Typically, neglect of MCM during periods of peace has occurred, while mine 
technology has advanced. Then, with the next conflict there has been a hurried attempt to 
deal with specific threats followed by another period of peace and neglect. Lessons are 
continually relearned and this cycle has repeated several times. Melia’s work covers the 
period from 1777 to 1991 and is used as the primary source to explore the way in which 
MCM has changed over the years within the broader field of MIW. Although an attempt 
was made to cast the net wider for sources of historical information, this proved to be 
problematical because many other studies use Melia (1991) as their primary source of 
historical information. 
An example is Griner’s (1997) study of naval MCM. Looking through the lens of 
expeditionary warfare (deployed forces), identifying this as the future posture of the ser-
vice, Griner argues that the development of MCM, and the procedures to employ them, 
has been unfocused. In many cases, emphasis has been placed on technical solutions 
without the development of a coherent doctrine. The primary recommendation of 
Griner’s paper is to reverse this situation through “the development of a coherent doctrine 
to focus the integration of forces and the development of technology” (49). 
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2. Summary of Lessons Learned from History 
The research into the history of MCM and the current state of MCM capabilities 
highlights the need for the revolution in MCM operations. This revolution is driven by 
doctrinal changes that demand safer and more effective mine clearing operations. The 
lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm, in 1991, were the catalysts behind the defen-
sive MCM doctrinal shifts. A review of the MCM history highlights the need for sus-
tained focus on the area of MCM to protect the U.S. Navy as it performs its operations. 
Appendix A contains a summary of the MCM history from 1777 through 2014. As de-
tailed in the summary, the U.S. has continually had to quickly learn the best ways to con-
duct MCM during conflicts, as it has not maintained a systematic approach to increasing 
or maintaining its MCM competencies. At times, the systems employed have not been as 
effective as other defensive systems, putting the U.S. Navy at risk and impeding its abili-
ties to operate in regions containing sea mines. 
Although Melia (1991) indicates that capabilities have generally increased during 
times of conflict and then decayed during time of peace, it seems that the U.S. capabili-
ties reached a peak in the decade following the Korean War, both in terms of MCM sys-
tems and operational capability. Figure 77, in Appendix A, is a graphical representation 
of this evolving capability. The focus on riverine MCM during the Vietnam conflict and 
subsequent neglect of a surface MCM capability during the 1970s resulted in a significant 
decline in capability. Even though this trend was reversed, to some extent, with the intro-
duction of the MCM 1 at the end of the 1980s—the first new mine countermeasures 
command ship (MCS) since the 1950s (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 
1991)—that capability is now aging. The U.S. Navy needs a replacement system, current-
ly envisioned as the LCS with the MCM Mission Package, before its MCM capability 
can improve. 
I. TRANSITION TO REVOLUTION IN MIW 
Just as all warfare has changed and evolved, the history of MIW has been very 
dynamic, and has required forward thinking strategies to maintain effective methods to 
counter this effective method of warfare. 
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As embodied in the Navy-Marine Corps post-Cold War operational con-
cepts, ‘Forward…From the Sea’, and ‘Operational Maneuver From the 
Sea’, the primary objective of joint expeditionary operations is to provide 
unencumbered maneuver within all dimensions of the littoral battle space. 
This calls for a ‘(R)evolution in Mine Countermeasures’. Fortunately we 
are not starting from scratch, but we do need to elevate mine counter-
measures (MCM) to a top priority by evolving, in a measured fashion, new 
dimensions and applications of technology to defeat the mine threat, im-
prove the resources dedicated to this mission, and ensure that MCM war-
fare is integrated fully into the fleet. (Broughton and Burdon 1998,  
Para. 3) 
Based on the research and discussions with the stakeholders, the lack of persistent, in-
tense focus on MCM operations is insufficient for effective mine clearing that is required 
for safe transit. The new revolution that Broughton and Burdon (1998) reference requires 
new capabilities and a new way of thinking to ensure access to the vital littoral regions 
and safe SLOC transits that are the focus of U.S. naval power projection and sea basing 
operations in the future. The progression and development of the appropriate MCM ca-
pabilities that should ensure more reliable mine clearing of current sea mine technologies 
in a safer manner does appear to be slow, as this reference is 16 years old; however, the 
U.S. Navy appears to be moving in the right direction. 
1. New Threats 
Technological advances and the unrestricted proliferation of technologically ad-
vanced types of sea mines pose a significant threat to naval expeditionary forces, espe-
cially naval forces operating in the littorals. This is especially problematic as “the poten-
tial exists for non-state actors to acquire sea mines and subsequently employ mine war-
fare as a means,” of blocking, delaying or “crippling the Navy throughout the range of 
military operations.” (Bahr 2007, Abstract). Also according to Bahr (2007),  
[n]aval mine countermeasures warfare is a small but crucial element of 
operational warfare that influences the balancing of naval objectives 
against the operational factors of space, time, and force. Additionally, it is 
one of the few critical warfare disciplines that can enable unimpeded 
movement, maneuver, and operational logistics in the maritime environ-
ment. However, given its current status as a warfare specialty, its capabili-
ties, limitations, and training cycles, the Navy’s mine countermeasures 
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community may struggle to meet future warfare requirements as well as 
the challenges presented by an increasing asymmetric threat. (1) 
The advances and proliferation of mine technology, combined with the impacts on U.S. 
Navy operations, make the development and enhancement of MCM competencies an es-
sential part of U.S. Navy capabilities. 
2. Mine Warfare: a Neglected Mission 
The modern sea mine threat is sophisticated and deserves the diligent efforts of 
the DON to protect U.S. forces and commercial shipping. State actors, like China have an 
estimated “80,000 sea mines” (Rabirof 2011) that can be used to block approaches to its 
vital shorelines. It is also reported that North Korea is developing “nuclear sea mines,” 
(Rabirof 2011) which are intended to counter the U.S. naval superiority in the Pacific Re-
gion. Despite the fact that MIW has been the single most effective weapon enemies have 
used against U.S. Naval forces since World War II (WWII), MIW has become one the 
most misunderstood and neglected naval warfare missions. Based on the Department of 
Defense (DOD) funding obligations in 2007, Bahr (2007) states, “one might assume that 
naval mine warfare, particularly mine countermeasures, has ceased to exist as a core 
competency, concluding that international partners surely must bear the burden in ac-
complishing the mine countermeasures (MCM) mission.” (1). Bahr (2007) bases this 
claim after, 
[a] cursory glance at currently funded projects within the Department of 
Defense suggests that the only initiative of any importance related to naval 
mine warfare is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and even this program 
may be in jeopardy due to contract issues. (1) 
Bahr (2007) goes further in describing the importance of MCM and the apparent 
neglect of MCM capabilities. Based on research conducted in 2007, 
[t]hough it will likely never garner the attention of tactical aviation or Ae-
gis cruisers, U.S. Navy MCM can and likely will play a significant role in 
future naval operations and it is a specific capability that the 
Joint/Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (J/CFMCC) 
should expect at his disposal. Paradoxically, many operational command-
ers have little understanding of the complexities, limitations and im-
portance of fully integrating MCM into current operational plans and ex-
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ercises; instead treating it as an operational ‘afterthought’ or simply as-
suming it will be there when needed with little regard for its potential op-
erational impact. Generally seen as an inconvenience or, in many cases ig-
nored altogether during fleet exercises and routine deployments, Navy 
mine countermeasures may soon find itself unable to fulfill its operational 
roles pertaining to ‘full dimension naval power – from the stern gate, over 
water, across the beach, and to the objectives ashore.’ (Bahr 2007, 2) 
Bahr (2007) also evaluates the doctrinal publications published by the U.S. Navy,  
Joint Publication (JP) 3-15 and the current mine warfare doctrine in Naval 
Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-15 thoroughly describe naval mine warfare, 
but only in a very systematic and traditional sense. Both documents fail to 
address developing asymmetric threats and the operational considerations 
associated with them. (3) 
Although both of these instructions were updated in 2010 and 2011 (DON 2010; 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011), many of Bahr’s criticisms of the doctrines were not ad-
dressed in these updates. This failure to emphasize MCM operations may be overcome 
with the planned introduction of the LCS MCM-capable platforms to the fleet. 
As of 2014 a fleet of as few as 24 LCS ships is planned for acquisition (Secretary 
of Defense 2014; O’Rourke 2014). Despite being dependent on allied partnerships for 
MCM support, the United States (U.S.) does invest very heavily in a MCM capability. 
3. Technology and the Current Threat 
The current MIW trend that U.S. naval forces face is the intense proliferation of 
technologically advanced sea mines that are very affordable and available to state and 
non-state actors. The new sea mine systems are designed to make MCM more challeng-
ing.  
Advanced counter-countermeasures mechanisms such as ship counting, in-
ter-look/inter-count dormant periods and new mine-case geometries exac-
erbate an already difficult mission. Technical advancement in counter-
measures systems inherently exceeds that of the mines themselves. Mines 
employ many of the same basic principles with which they were devel-
oped over 200 years ago and it is their relative simplicity, in lieu of tech-
nological advances, that keeps production costs low and makes them a vi-
able weapon for use by small nations with limited budgets. Affordability 
and availability make sea mines particularly appealing to rogue states and 
terrorists looking to disrupt stability in keys parts of the world. They are 
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an economical force multiplier in the denial of sea control. Of particular 
concern to operational and theater commanders is technology proliferation 
from friendly and ‘other’ nations to unfriendly actors. While some coun-
tries (for example, China, Russia and Italy) sell high-tech mines on the 
open market, there is limited information to indicate the extent of the ex-
tent that advanced designs have been bootlegged and put into production 
indigenously by countries with less-than-desirable intentions. Proliferation 
can have as profound an effect on operational warfare and planning as it 
does on regional security cooperation and stability. (Bahr 2007) 
Current sea mines threaten naval expeditionary forces, and specifically the forces 
that would disembark from these expeditionary task forces and project power ashore. The 
very shallow water (VSW) area of less than 40 feet deep and surf zones are particularly 
dangerous places, due to the new, advanced mine systems that are currently being em-
ployed specifically for these areas. 
4. The Asymmetric Threat 
Asymmetric warfare in its simplest terms means not to fight fair. Given the avail-
ability, affordability, and ease of deployment of sea mines, there is a fear that state and 
non-state actors in the littoral regions of the United States could use these systems. 
This concern is specifically illustrated in the National Strategy for Maritime Secu-
rity, which recognizes that “mines are…an effective weapon because they are low cost, 
readily available, easily deployed, difficult to counter, and require minimal training” 
(Alperen 2011, 200). Though the U.S. Coast Guard bears most of the burden for port pro-
tection, there is little doubt that close coordination between the Navy and Coast Guard is 
required to meet the challenges in this unique environment. With the bulk of U.S. and 
international trade occurring via maritime shipping, any disruption within the industry 
from terrorist attacks could have severe economic fallout. Fortunately, the Department of 
Homeland Security has at least identified the potential mine threat to commercial vessels, 
which is the beginning of an effort to counter terrorist-planted sea mines near U.S. ports. 
Seaports are not the only areas vulnerable to terrorist attack from a foreign mine threat. 
International straits and strategic chokepoints also pose a hazard to navigation should 
they be mined to accomplish terrorist or wartime objectives. Nations at war with the 
United States are not likely to follow the guidelines of the 1907 Hague Conference and 
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the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea regarding the use of sea mines, and 
the only warning of presence might simply be a detonation. This assumes a defensive or 
“traditional” approach to laying a minefield, but what about the use of asymmetric meth-
ods? With remote detonation capability and an indefinite dormant time, unfriendly actors 
including terrorists might easily discriminate and attack U.S. or international vessels 
when the best opportunity presents itself (Bahr 2007, 8–9). 
The threat from MIW is exacerbated as terrorists and non-state actors routinely 
strike targets of opportunity. For example, non-state actors, or terrorist organizations 
might use sea mines as terrorist weapons, much like terrorist and insurgent militant 
groups did with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan against our 
forces. Sea mines can easily be deployed off any boat, ship, or low flying aircraft into 
sea-lanes or harbors, which makes persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance (ISR) the first line of defense for the U.S. Persistent ISR must then be backed up 
with a dedicated ability to counter such threats, in the form of MCM.  
J. DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITY AGAINST A NEW THREAT  
Just as the revolution in naval airpower during WWII made the battleships obso-
lete, new capabilities and requirements drive the operational need to execute MIW more 
efficiently and safely for the ships’ crew, and new technologies are driving new capabili-
ties for MIW. It is no longer considered advantageous or necessary to require personnel 
to venture into mine fields with wood and fiberglass ships in order to hunt and neutralize 
mines. The need to find and neutralize mines without jeopardizing the ship and crew has 
developed new MCM requirements, and these new requirements have been transformed 
into new capabilities. 
Operational factors of space, time, and force are closely tied to the operational ob-
jective but within each, there is little flexibility with the current capability. 
MCM exists on a linear scale with dedicated MCM on one end and [or-
ganic MCM] OMCM on the other, and this scale will only get wider as 
dedicated assets age and/or retire and OMCM assets are fielded with fewer 
and fewer capabilities. The Navy must quickly reconcile this issue with 
technology as well as changes in doctrinal-employment. For traditional 
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operations, the previous construct, even with its associated limitations, 
may still provide enough options to get the job done. But what about the 
ability to counter the already-recognized terrorist mine threat? No matter 
the forces, whether dedicated, organic, future, legacy or other, the ability 
to determine if a port entrance or chokepoint has been mined is extremely 
limited. Short of continuous exploratory MCM at every chokepoint and 
every harbor entrance around the world, defensive MCM is severely hand-
icapped. Preemption through aggressive intelligence, reconnaissance and 
surveillance (ISR) to stop the laying of mines may be the only real solu-
tion. The focus on new devices must not surpass the importance of doc-
trine and the use of offensive mine countermeasures. (Bahr 2007, 11–12) 
The threat of sea mines to U.S. interests is enormous, and is increasing in compar-
ison to investments in force capabilities to counter the threat. 
Fortunately, there are several prominent initiatives that might bring MCM 
out of its malaise and provide for not only new technological advance-
ments but also updated doctrine. These include development of the Litto-
ral Combat Ship (LCS), MCM participation in joint and interagency exer-
cises, and the merger of Mine Warfare Command with Fleet Anti-
Submarine Warfare Command to form Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Command (NMAWC). (Bahr 2007, 13) 
The LCS is a multi-mission platform, which is optimized for littoral operations. 
The LCS is fast; it can transit at over 40 knots, has a shallow draft of only 15 feet, and 
has the capability to upload different modular mission packages based on the particular 
mission. The three mission packages are anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surface warfare 
(SUW), and MCM (Ailes 2011). The LCS with applicable MCM mission package is pro-
jected to take over the MCM role from the current MCM 1 by FY25 (Amador 2011). 
The Littoral Combat Ship concept is the next step in fulfilling the organic 
mine countermeasures vision and is to be part of the eventual replacement 
for dedicated airborne and surface assets. The inherent flexibility of the 
platform opens new possibilities and helps to mitigate long lead times and 
decreased capability of dedicated and organic forces respectively. The 
concept blends many of the features of a dedicated MCM capability into 
an organic component of the fleet. As a multi-mission platform that re-
quires interchangeable force packages however, its technological ad-
vantages may ultimately be overshadowed by slow ‘real-time’ flexibility 
at sea when converting from one package to the next (e.g., ASW to 
MCM). This limitation could be overcome by designating specific ships in 
the class to perform a particular mission on routine deployments with a 
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strike group, but that would require several ships on each coast and a pre-
determined deployment cycle. (Bahr 2007, 13–14) 
The U.S. Navy has historically been focused on other warfare capabilities, such as 
ASW, anti-surface warfare (AsuW), and anti-air warfare (AAW); MCM is not normally a 
focal point unless there is a problem with sea mines, and at that point it then becomes a 
priority. 
With the offensive combat power of the carrier battle group established 
firmly as the bedrock of current naval warfare doctrine, it is unlikely that 
the less glamorous role of naval mine countermeasures can compete for 
funding and resources in a climate of constrained defense spending. The 
threat of mines to U.S. military and commercial interests, however, is not 
going away. Amid the increasing risk of terrorist-planted sea mines and 
the potential for conflicts in worldwide trouble spots, the mine counter-
measures community may struggle to meet future warfare requirements. 
Unless a fundamental shift in the perception of mine warfare occurs at the 
operational level of war, it is unlikely that the Navy and Marine Corps will 
be able to successfully execute littoral warfare against a competent enemy. 
As much as mine warfare, particularly mine countermeasures, has been 
neglected in the past, the loss of operational maneuver in the littorals is 
something the military cannot ignore. (Bahr 2007, 17–18) 
Littoral regions are the zones that the U.S. Navy must use, and be able to control 
in the future, in order to project naval power inland when necessary to achieve national 
strategic goals. The need for a countermine warfare strategy and a countermine warfare 
capability is clear. 
The primary difference between the current and new concepts in conducting MIW 
operations, especially MCM operations is the location of the countermine combatant dur-
ing these operations. Countermine ships have historically been made out of wood, with 
the most recent variant, the:  
Avenger class ships are designed as mine sweepers/hunter-killers capable 
of finding, classifying and destroying moored and bottom mines. The last 
three MCM ships were purchased in 1990, bringing the total to 14 fully 
deployable, oceangoing Avenger class ships. These ships use sonar and 
video systems, cable cutters, and a mine detonating device that can be re-
leased and detonated by remote control. They are also capable of conven-
tional sweeping measures. The ships are of fiberglass sheathed, wooden 
 21
hull construction. (Naval Sea Systems Command Office of Corporate 
Communication n.d.) 
In contrast to conducting countermine operations inside a mine field, the new 
concept of conducting these operations, as designed into the new line of LCS type naval 
warships, involves the ships staying outside of the minefield and conducting countermine 
operations by use of a MH-60s and the Remote Minehunting System (RMS), which is 
composed of the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), and the variable depth sensor 
(VDS), the AN/AQS-20A sonar (PEO LCS Public Affairs 2013). Details about how the 
LCS conducts MCM operations are discussed in Chapter IV, which covers physical ar-
chitectures. 
K. MINE TYPES 
In 2008, it was estimated that countries other than the U.S. have more than a quar-
ter-million sea mines in their inventories, comprised of over 300 different types of mines. 
This estimate includes only proper sea mines, and does not include underwater impro-
vised explosive devices (UWIEDs) (Truver 2008). These mines vary greatly in technical 
complexity: ranging from contact mines designed before World War I (WWI) to rocket-
propelled mines with advanced target-detection systems (Truver 2012). Mines have taken 
a wide variety of forms throughout the history of MIW, but most mines share some 
common traits. Sea mines consist of a housing, sensors, detonation mechanisms, and ex-
plosive payloads. Mines are most often classified by their activation method, although 
they may also be classified by their position in the water or their delivery method (Melia 
1991). Figure 2, taken from Amador (2011), illustrates many of the mines and their likely 
locations; these are discussed in detail following the illustration.  
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Figure 2.  Types and Locations of Mines (from Amador 2011) 
The four primary categories for classifying mines by their position in the water 
are bottom mines, moored mines, drifting mines, and limpet mines. Bottom mines lie on 
the sea floor; hence, they are often difficult to detect. Depth, sea floor clutter, amount of 
burial, and sediment type all affect bottom mine detectability. Bottom mines can be used 
in shallow water to target surface ships, or in deeper water to target submarines. Moored 
mines float below the surface of the water, and are tethered to an anchor to maintain their 
location. Moored mines are often limited to depths of less than 650 feet (200 meters) due 
to the lengths of the mooring cables (Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray 2009). Drifting 
mines float on or near the sea surface, and are carried freely by the sea currents. These 
mines are prohibited by international law, but they are still used (Erickson, Goldstein, and 
Murray 2009). Limpet mines are attached directly to a ship’s hull, generally by divers, 
and detonated by a delayed timer (Truver 2012). The primary methods for mine delivery 
are aircraft, surface ship, and submarine (Truver 2012). 
The two primary methods of mine activation are contact and influence sensing. 
The earliest sea mines were contact mines, which require physical contact with a target to 
actuate the detonation. Jarring physical contact may initiate a chemical trigger within the 
mine to initiate detonation, or an electric switch within the mine may initiate detonation 
(Truver 2012). Antenna mines are a type of contact mine with a copper wire floating up-
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ward from the mine housing that detonates upon contact with a ship’s steel hull (Melia 
1991). Contact mines are often moored below the sea surface. After initial detection, con-
tact mines are often cut from their moorings for easier neutralization (Melia 1991). Con-
tact mines are still used due to their low cost and relative effectiveness. In 1988, the USS 
Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), a guided-missile frigate, was almost sunk by a $1,500 con-
tact mine. The WWI era mine caused damage that resulted in $96 million in repairs 
(Truver 2008). 
Influence mines use sensors to detect a target’s magnetic, acoustic, seismic, or 
pressure signature (Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray 2009). When a ship moves through 
the water it has emissive characteristics that can be detected using these sensors. As tech-
nology has advanced, the sensors used in influence mines have been able to identify a 
target’s signatures with greater accuracy. The sensors allow for discrimination between 
targets. Moreover, mines may employ ship-counters or delay timers to confound MCM 
operations (Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray 2009). Ship-counters delay detonation until 
a set number of ships have been detected, while delay timers delay detonation until a set 
amount of time has passed after initial detection. These mines cost much more, but are 
able to distinguish real ship targets, making them more difficult to counter. MCM plat-
forms have to simulate a combination of ship signatures to neutralize modern influence 
mines effectively (Truver 2012). In addition to influence mines, which are moored or bot-
tom lying, they are also used on torpedoes and rockets and known as rising mines. The 
Russian PMK-2 is an example of a rising mine; it is an acoustic influence mine attached 
to a torpedo payload. These mines typically target submarines, can be laid at a depth of 
6,500 feet (2,000 meters), and fire their payload upward after a target has been detected 
(Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray 2009). These “smart” mines may also use sonar to lo-
cate and target ships (Melia 1991). 
Several types of mines have been developed to counter minehunting and mine-
sweeping operations. Stealth mines are designed to blend in with the underwater envi-
ronment. Command controlled mines are detonated by remote control and are not vulner-
able to influence minesweeping (Melia, 1991). Figure 3 was developed after the infor-
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mation contained within Melia (2009) illustrating the significant advances in mine tech-
nology since the first mines in the eighteenth century. 
 
Figure 3.  Advances in Mine Technology Since the 18th Century (after Melia 
1991) 
L. MCM CONCEPTS, CAPABILITIES, AND COMPENTENCIES 
MCM concepts are best described in the context of the broader MIW discipline. 
MIW encompasses both laying mines to deter an enemy’s warfare capability as well as 
countering enemy laid mines to allow friendly forces to operate freely. It is the counter-
ing of enemy mines to reduce the mines’ inherent danger and the potential damage they 
could cause that embodies the concepts of MCM. MCM competences include designing, 
producing, and deploying equipment used for both offensive and defensive purposes. The 
effectiveness of MCM capabilities is dependent on situational intelligence and mission 
planning as indicated in NWP 3-15 (DON 2010). 
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Offensive MCM involves addressing an enemy’s ability to pose a threat with 
mines. Offensive MCM activities include destroying an enemy’s mine production capa-
bility, nullifying an enemy’s mine laying ability, and targeting an enemy’s mine storage 
facilities. Offensive MCM attempts to reduce the risk of mine exposure to friendly forces 
by effectively minimizing the enemy’s ability to deploy mines (DON 2010). 
Defensive MCM can be passive or active. Passive defensive MCM involves de-
tecting enemy minefields and avoiding them so as to preclude interaction between enemy 
mines and friendly forces. The aim of passive defensive MCM is to reduce the chances of 
individual ships triggering a mine and to reduce the vulnerability of ships should a mine 
be triggered. When passive defensive MCM does not sufficiently reduce the risk of ene-
my mine interaction or when the minefield area cannot be avoided, active defensive 
MCM becomes necessary. Like passive defensive MCM, the aim of active defensive 
MCM is to reduce the risk of a mine damaging a friendly ship. Active defensive MCM, 
however, involves not only detecting the mines, but also neutralizing them to make safe a 
particular area. Active defensive MCM resulting in the neutralization of enemy mines is 
achieved through minehunting and minesweeping (DON 2010). Figure 4 shows a MCM 
concept hierarchy. 
 
Figure 4.  MIW Subdivisions and MCM Categories (from DON 2010) 
Mine hunting involves the use of sensors to detect, classify, identify, and possibly 
reacquire enemy mines leading to mine neutralization. Minesweeping involves the use of 
systems that either trigger mines to detonate or sever the cables that attach mines to the 
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sea floor so that the mines can be neutralized on the surface (DON 2010). Mechanical 
sweeping involves either cutting the tether of moored mines or damaging a mine to ren-
der the mine safe for neutralization or analysis. Influence sweeping involves simulating 
the acoustic, magnetic, electric, seismic, and/or pressure signature of a ship so that a mine 
detonates (PEO LMW 2009). 
There are several systems that provide MCM capabilities. This section will de-
scribe the basic capabilities of the MCM systems in general terms; they are described in 
detail in Chapter IV. The U.S. Navy performs MCM operations using airborne MCM 
(AMCM), surface MCM (SMCM), and underwater MCM (UMCM) assets (DON 2010). 
This MCM “triad” is often employed simultaneously to provide a complementary capa-
bility for detecting and neutralizing enemy mines (PEO LMW 2009). 
AMCM capabilities are provided by helicopters and their subsystems. The legacy 
AMCM capability consists of 28 MH-53E helicopters that can be deployed anywhere in 
the world within 72 hours (PEO LMW 2009). The next generation AMCM capability is 
provided by MH-60S helicopters that are able to embark on LCS ships for rapid MCM 
response (DON 2010). Both helicopters are configurable to support hunting, sweeping, 
and neutralization missions by carrying systems that provide detection, localization, and 
neutralization capabilities. Specifically, the helicopters can carry sonar, laser, mine-
sweeping, and mine neutralization systems (MNS) depending on the mission (PEO LMW 
2009). 
Two surface ships and their subsystems primarily provide SMCM capabilities. 
The legacy SMCM capability consists of MCM 1 ships. The U.S. Navy currently deploys 
13 MCM 1 vessels after the USS Guardian (MCM-5) ran aground in the Philippines in 
2013 (Craggs 2013). The MCM 1 ships are capable of performing minehunting and 
minesweeping missions using several different systems including towed sweep systems, 
towed sonar, and remote MNSs (PEO LMW 2009). The next generation SMCM capabil-
ity will be provided by the LCS ships. As of 2013, the U.S. Navy plans to award con-
tracts to procure 24 LCS ships and 24 MCM mission modules to provide MCM capabili-
ties (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2013). Like the MCM 1 ships, the 
LCS ships are projected to provide minehunting and minesweeping capabilities using 
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several different systems. The LCS will not have an onboard towed sweep capability but 
instead will have a towed magnetic and acoustic influence sweep capability provided by 
the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS), a remote unmanned surface vehicle. The 
LCS is also projected to have remote unmanned underwater vehicles to provide sensing 
functionality from inherent or towed sonar. Moreover, the LCS will provide additional 
minehunting and minesweeping capabilities from an embarked MH-60S helicopter (DON 
2010). 
UMCM capabilities are provided by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detach-
ments and Marine Mammal Systems (MMS). EOD detachments consist of personnel and 
systems that specialize in locating, identifying, neutralizing, recovering, exploiting, and 
disposing of enemy mines, torpedoes, and UWIEDs using non-magnetic and acoustically 
silent diving gear, handheld sonars, and specialized recovery or neutralization equipment 
(PEO LMW 2009). The MMS capability consists of trained dolphins and sea lions that 
are able to detect and neutralize mines. MMSs are also able to perform recovery opera-
tions and detect buried mines (PEO LMW 2009). 
M. MCM OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OVERVIEW 
MCM operations are determined by MCM missions, which in turn are described 
by MCM functions that are characterized by specific MOPs. MCM functions and MOPs 
are described in detail in Chapter IV and Chapter V, respectively, but are described at the 
top-level, as they pertain to the actual MCM operation, in this section to allow for a com-
plete understanding of MCM operations before the specific description of the study are 
introduced. In PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A (PEO LMW 2008), defensive active 
MCM MOPs are divided into four functional areas: sense, engage, control, and logistics. 
The sense function involves those sub-functions used in the non-neutralization as-
pect of mine hunting. Sub-functions include detection, classification, reacquisition, and 
identification of mines. These functions, as they apply to acquiring contacts and targets, 
are implemented with various sonar and laser MCM systems and described by several 
MOPs including probabilities of detection, classification, reacquisition and their associat-
ed execution times (PEO LMW 2008). 
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The engage function involves those sub-functions used in neutralization and 
minesweeping. Sub-functions include mechanical sweep, influence sweep, and neutrali-
zation of mines. These functions, as they apply to the direct conflict between sensors and 
mines, are implemented with various sweep and neutralization MCM systems and de-
scribed by several MOPs including probabilities of neutralization and neutralization time 
(PEO LMW 2008). 
The control function involves those sub-functions used in controlling whether a 
mine acquires a ship or a sensor acquires a mine. Sub-functions include ship acquisition, 
mine acquisition, and platform performance. These functions, as they apply to signature 
and maneuver control, are implemented with particular MCM platforms and described by 
several MOPs including transit times to minefields as well as the times to deploy and col-
lect gear (PEO LMW 2008). 
The logistic function involves those sub-functions relevant to the MCM systems’ 
ability to perform their intended purpose. Sub-functions include system availability and 
DC. These functions can sometimes be described through the application of other func-
tions and are described by several MOPs including platform availability and duty-cycle 
(PEO LMW 2008). 
Operational command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) functions are not explicitly addressed pending better 
functional need explanations (PEO LMW 2008). 
N. MIW CHALLENGES AND MISSIONS 
Every Navy mission has its own particular challenges and dangers, and MIW is 
no exception. As described in Section H, one of the most fundamental problems to date 
has been the relatively low level of sustained attention on MCM by the Navy. According 
to Melia (1991), one of the key trends in MIW has been the cyclical nature of its funding 
and the attention paid to it. During most of the major wars and conflicts since the advent 
of naval mining, the Navy has discovered that mines are a substantial threat to naval ac-
tions. For example, since WWII, naval mines damaged or destroyed more naval ships 
than all other forms of enemy attack, to include missiles and small boat swarms (Marine 
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Corps Combat Development Command and Naval Doctrine Command 1998) (see Figure 
1). In both Korea and Iraq, mines were the only type of attack to damage or sink a U.S. 
Naval ship (Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Naval Doctrine Com-
mand 1998). Yet, shortly after hostilities ended, the Navy reduced its funding and empha-
sis on MIW and mine clearing (Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Na-
val Doctrine Command 1998). 
Another challenge has been the diversity and complexity of threats. As discussed 
in Section K, there are numerous types of mines, each of which can be emplaced in sev-
eral ways and triggered in several more ways. The myriad potential combinations of mine 
type, triggering mechanism, and emplacement impact the ability to detect and neutralize 
the mines. This also affects how dangerous mine clearing operations are. 
Finally, there is the problem of actually detecting and neutralizing the mines. 
Mines are explosive devices capable of damaging ships and equipment and injuring sail-
ors. By their very nature, they are dangerous to handle. Historically, mine clearing efforts 
have required ships to physically enter a suspected minefield in order to bring their detec-
tion systems to bear. This places the mine clearing ship in danger of being destroyed by 
the very devices it hunts. Additionally, many historic methods of clearing required the 
use of divers or very lightly protected ships, usually made out of wood so as not to trip 
magnetic influence mines, and equipment to neutralize mines inside the minefield, plac-
ing personnel in danger. The LCS is the beginning of a shift away from putting Navy per-
sonnel directly in harm’s way for mine clearing operations inside minefields. The LCS 
achieves this goal through extensive use of aerial and unmanned assets; however, the 
problem still has not been completely solved. 
An additional complicating factor is the wide range of mine clearing missions the 
Navy has to perform. A partial list of potential missions includes: 
 Deep water mine clearing: this mission is difficult because of the large 
volume of water that must be cleared. This is partially mitigated by the 
difficulty miners have in deploying enough mines to adequately cover the 
area and prevent ships from passing through. One of the greatest examples 
of a deep water minefield was the “North Sea Barrage” in WWI (Melia 
1991). This field stymied German forces for several months. 
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 Opening a harbor: one of the historically common uses of mines has been 
to deny access to harbors. When an enemy force uses mines to either block 
U.S. force movements or to try to direct the ships through specific areas, 
the Navy may need to clear some or all of the mines in order to transit and 
maneuver as desired. Selective clearing may enable the Navy to accom-
plish its military objectives, but harbors and bays are often difficult envi-
ronments due to navigational hazards, non-combatants, and defensive em-
placements. A classic example of this type of mission occurred very early 
in the history of MIW at Mobile Bay during the American Civil War. (Me-
lia 1991) 
 Landing Marines: this mission combines the difficulties of maneuvering in 
shallow water, the hazards of being within observation and possibly firing 
range of enemy forces, and the increased danger presented by bottom 
mines. Bottom mines, as discussed, are particularly dangerous because 
they can have larger charges and may be more difficult to detect depend-
ing on bottom features of the area. The landings at Normandy on D-Day 
were planned around an assumed high likelihood of mines in the area. 
Several ships and landing craft were lost on the approach to the beaches, 
and it was primarily due to luck that the Allies managed to avoid most of 
the particularly dangerous mines. The Allies only discovered the extent 
and sophistication of the Axis minefields after the invasion was complete. 
(Melia 1991) 
 Shipping lane clearance: this mission may take place in very deep or fairly 
shallow water, but it is critical to note the presence of large amounts of 
non-combatant shipping in the area. Additionally, enemy forces may also 
be in the area, requiring mine clearing in conjunction with self-defense 
and defense of non-combatants. Because of the smaller volume of water 
that must be mined in order to be effective, minefields may be fairly dense 
and comprised of large numbers of mines of various types. Threats made 
by Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz would fall into this mission type. 
(Melia 1991) 
O. INTELLIGENCE IN MCM OPERATIONS 
Nearly every practical component of MCM operations is contingent upon the 
presence of high-quality ISR information prior to operations. According to PEO LMW 
(2009), “90 percent of all mine hunting and sweeping operations have been conducted in 
areas in which mines have not been deployed—underscoring the need for good actionable 
intelligence” (22). A 2001 report by the Committee for MIW Assessment stated, “Im-
provement in ISR for mine warfare can have a greater impact on naval forces mine war-
fare capability than any other step that might be taken” (Committee for Mine Warfare 
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Assessment 2001, 38). In their taxonomy of MCM ISR, PEO LMW (2009) provides a 
convenient conceptualization of intelligence and its unique functions: strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical intelligence. 
Strategic intelligence is coordinated and conducted at the national and interna-
tional levels. Specifically, strategic intelligence involves participation among the State 
Department, DOD, and the Intelligence Community. These national and joint organiza-
tions participate in information sharing among foreign and coalition partners who have an 
interest in creating safe seas (PEO LMW 2009). This involves the analysis of what poten-
tial threat countries are doing in the area of MIW, including the proliferation of MIW sys-
tems. Strategic intelligence may result in new indications of state-level adversaries that 
are engaging in MIW. 
Both the DOD and the DON conduct operational intelligence. These activities in-
clude monitoring “the development, acquisition, and sale of sea mines through intelli-
gence-collection activities and interaction with foreign militaries” (PEO LMW 2009, 23). 
The objective of operational intelligence activities as they pertain to MIW is to obtain 
scientific and technical intelligence regarding the technical characteristics of adversaries’ 
sea mines, such as mine types, firing methods, and explosive weights. This analysis is 
informed by the acquisition of foreign mines, which are studied for the purpose of devel-
oping specific countermeasure strategies (PEO LMW 2009). Operational intelligence also 
includes the analysis of doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); orders of 
battle; and the number of each specific system in a country’s inventory. 
Tactical intelligence is conducted by the Navy. The purpose of tactical intelli-
gence is to obtain information regarding the offensive and defensive mining strategies of 
adversaries. Specifically, tactical intelligence is used to understand whether an adver-
sary’s objective is to mine in order to engage in a blockade, area denial, or harassment. 
Moreover, tactical intelligence seeks insight into the specific complement of mines and 
their deployment state for a specific event (PEO LMW 2009). 
These varying types of intelligence generally result in two forms of actionable in-
telligence: predictive indications and warnings (I&W) and in situ intelligence. Predictive 
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I&W are produced by strategic and operational intelligence collection efforts. The ulti-
mate objective of predictive I&W are to collect tips and cues on mining activities before 
they occur. This level of predictive knowledge enables Navy forces to either prevent the 
mine laying efforts altogether or, if possible, to engage in strategic planning to avoid the 
minefields. In situ intelligence is produced by operational and tactical intelligence collec-
tion efforts. This level of intelligence equips Navy forces to engage in the MCM func-
tions of search, detect, identify, and neutralize with greater effectiveness (PEO LMW 
2009). 
A separate but related intelligence concern is the fusion of environmental consid-
erations into the common operating picture. PEO LMW (2009) wrote: 
[a] critical factor contributing to U.S. mine domain awareness is good 
knowledge of the physical, geographic, oceanographic, bathymetric, and 
environmental characteristics of potential mining areas and data of suffi-
cient quality and currency to support mine countermeasures operations. 
These factors will drive both the use and placement of mines and the tac-
tics and the choice of techniques used to counter them. (24) 
The Navy relies on an automated tool called the Mine Warfare and Environmental Deci-
sion Aids Library (MEDAL) to provide decision support services for MIW forces. The 
MEDAL fuses and synthesizes ISR information and local environmental conditions to 
create a common operating picture that enables the command and control of MIW and 
MCM forces. PEO LMW (2009) provides a thorough description of MEDAL, noting: 
MEDAL provides tactical decision aid functionality to the warfighter, in-
cluding integrated mission planning, evaluation, and situational awareness 
capability. MEDAL also provides the warfare commander and other sup-
porting commanders with coordinated mine warfare situational awareness. 
MEDAL integrates intelligence preparation of the environment data, mis-
sion planning and evaluation, situation awareness, and command-and-
control capabilities to support the Mine Countermeasures Commander, or-
ganic and dedicated mine countermeasures operators, and all naval and 
maritime forces requiring mine warfare situational awareness. (24–25) 
James Bahr (2007) describes a 1987 incident involving the mine laying activities 
of the Iranian vessel, Iran Ajr. Intelligence provided by the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) was 
acted upon and the Iran Ajr was engaged before it could deploy its full cargo of mines 
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within the Persian Gulf. This incident demonstrates how ISR is used to improve the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of MCM operations. Table 2 describes the importance of sev-
eral types of intelligence used during MCM operations. 
Table 1.   The Importance of Intelligence to MCM 
Intelligence Importance to MCM 
Activity levels at mine storage facilities or 
the presence of mines on transportation and 
deployment assets. 
Increased activity levels at mine storage 
facilities may indicate that mines are being 
prepared or transported for deployment. 
When rules of engagement permit, mine 
storage, transportation, and deployment 
assets can be attacked before mines are de-
ployed. MCM operations become much 
more difficult once mines are in the water 
(Truver 2008). 
The location of deployed mines. Knowing where mines are deployed makes 
it possible to avoid them and provides a 
starting point location for mine hunting and 
mine sweeping operations. 
Mining objectives, doctrine, tactics, and 
inventories. Technical details about mine 
sensors, firing criteria, and countermeas-
ures. Ocean terrain and presence of mine-
like objects (MLOs). 
This information greatly improves the ef-
fectiveness of mine hunting and mine 
sweeping operations, especially influence 
minesweeping (Truver 2008). 
 
The collection and transfer of intelligence data was not explicitly evaluated in this 
study, however, their impacts on successful MCM operations would be an interesting fu-
ture study that may provide valuable insights to the Navy. The portion of intelligence in-
volving MEDAL (or post mission analysis (PMA)) was modeled in a limited form to cap-
ture the effects on time to complete and mine clearance effectiveness. This included the 
time delay that contributes to the overall ACRS and the probability that the system will 
select and prioritize mine-like contacts (MILCOs) for RI&N. 
P. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND SUMMARY 
Before, during, and after the research of the information contained within pub-
lished material, the MIW Team developed and refined a list of research questions to 
 34
guide efforts in identifying the necessary information for the conduct of the study and for 
the formulation of the topics to discuss with the stakeholders. The focus was on systems 
used to perform each function of MCM operations, types of mines and the methods used 
to neutralize them, and the sequence of events for MCM operations. These focused areas 
of interest helped to shape the problem definition and project scope. The research was 
conducted to develop a baseline understanding of the MCM systems (legacy and 
planned), MCM operations and function, MCM systems and subsystems, mine threats, 
and operational requirements for MCM operations. The findings summarized within this 
section helped to shape the discussions with the stakeholders and SMEs to develop their 
needs and to formulate the project scope and plan for completion IAW with the project’s 
SE process. The research also scoped the MCM analysis study to compare MCM perfor-
mance of the legacy MCM 1 MIW ship to the new LCS ship. 
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
This section describes the SE approach and processes used to conduct the MCM 
comparative analysis study. The results and outcomes of each SE process are included in 
other sections within this report; the purpose of this section is to describe the SE process-
es and approach used for this study. The MIW Team selected the classic “Vee” process 
model and then tailored it to accommodate project specific objectives and constraints. 
This section describes the rationale for selecting and tailoring the “Vee” process model 
and identifies steps taken to conduct the analysis in a disciplined manner in which the 
stakeholders can have confidence. 
A. PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The objective of the MCM comparative analysis study was to use a model based 
systems engineering (MBSE) approach, where such an approach uses modeling tools to 
develop requirements and MOEs, as well as functional and physical architectures, to 
compare MCM performance of the legacy MCM 1 ship, and legacy MCM MH-53E heli-
copter, to the new LCS ship, with the MH-60S helicopter and incremental MIW packag-
es. To accomplish this objective, the MIW Team performed an analysis of alternatives 
(AoA) using scenario-based modeling and simulation (M&S). Based upon stakeholder 
feedback, an operational scenario was developed and ACRS was selected as the primary 
MOE for comparison. Lifecycle cost and risks were also considered, and are detailed in 
Chapter IX.  
The waterfall, spiral, and “Vee” process models were considered for the MCM 
comparative analysis study (Forsberg and Mooz 1991; Sikder 2009). The purely sequen-
tial waterfall model was not selected because it does not accommodate changes in the 
overall SE process or requirements changes that occur partway through the process. Con-
versely, the spiral process model was not selected because it was deemed excessively 
process-oriented and not well suited for the aggressive timeline of the MIW research pro-
ject. The classic “Vee” model was selected because it provides the required balance of 
flexibility and rigor. 
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The classic “Vee” model, originally developed by Forsberg and Mooz (1991, 5), 
is depicted in Figure 5. The process begins at the upper left side of the “Vee” with the 
refinement of stakeholder requirements into a system performance specification. Decom-
position and definition continue down the left side, resulting in “design-to” specifications 
and “build-to” documentation. Construction of system components begins at the base of 
the “Vee” and continues up the right side with the assembly of components into configu-
ration items (CIs) and integration of CIs into a coherent system. The scope of the MCM 
comparative analysis was to evaluate existing systems rather than to design and build a 
new system. For this reason, activities on the right side of the “Vee” were not included in 
the tailored SE process. 
 
Figure 5.  Classic Systems Engineering “Vee” (from Forsberg and Mooz 1991, 
Exhibit 5) 
Though the classic “Vee” model has long stood as the paragon of SE models for 
manufactured systems, a key criticism is the lack of intrinsic iteration offered by the 
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model (Mohammed, Munassar, and Govardhan, 2010). To overcome this shortfall, itera-
tive feedback was included in the tailored SE process. The practical effects of this itera-
tive feedback included: (1) the ability to adjust the model and simulation design as stake-
holder needs and system requirements were further refined and (2) the implementation of 
M&S changes with minimal effort. Figure 6 depicts the tailored SE process used for the 
MCM comparative analysis study. 
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Figure 6.  Tailored SE Process used for the MCM Comparative Analysis Study 
B. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
In order to produce an accurate and meaningful comparison of the current and 
planned MCM systems, the team had to first understand the functional and performance 
requirements for this type of system. A requirements analysis was conducted to obtain 
stakeholder requirements and translate them into system requirements to serve as a basis 
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for comparison. Figure 7 depicts the requirements analysis process used for the MCM 
comparative analysis study. 
 
Figure 7.  Requirements Analysis used for the MCM Comparative Analysis 
Study 
Inputs to the requirements analysis included information related to stakeholder 
objectives, current capabilities, and planned future capabilities. This information was ob-
tained through a literature study and during several conversations with SMEs in the field 
of MCM. To begin the requirements analysis, a stakeholder analysis was conducted to 
identify MCM stakeholders and their primitive needs. Although somewhat ambiguous 
and in need of further development, these primitive stakeholder needs provided an initial 
definition of the problem to be solved. 
Next, through a series of conversations with stakeholders and SMEs, primitive 
needs were refined into a less ambiguous effective need and an overarching capability 
need statement. Project constraints, such as the time and resources available to complete 
the study, were carefully considered and a problem statement was developed. This prob-
lem statement clearly defined the problem to be solved by conducting the MCM compar-
ative analysis study. A common operational scenario was created to allow for a fair com-
parison to be made in a small subset of the larger MCM problem set. The M&S efforts 
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were based upon this common operational scenario. The requirements analysis produced 
a set of high-level functional requirements describing functions that an MCM system 
must perform in order to satisfy stakeholder needs. For each high-level functional re-
quirement, one or more performance requirements were developed along with the associ-
ated MOEs and corresponding MOPs. 
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The high-level functional requirements identified during the requirements analysis 
did not provide sufficient detail for the upcoming physical synthesis. A functional analy-
sis was performed to decompose high-level functions into lower-level functions. Figure 8 
depicts the functional analysis process used for the MCM comparative analysis study. 
 
Figure 8.  Functional Analysis used for the MCM Comparative Analysis Study 
The input to the functional analysis was the high-level functional decomposition 
resulting from the requirements analysis. The team consulted available literature, stake-
holders, and SMEs to determine how best to decompose the high-level functional re-
quirements. This also resulted in the functional architecture that is described in Chapter 
IV. MOPs identified during the requirements analysis were likewise decomposed and as-
signed to the new lower-level functions. Iterative feedback led to minor revisions to 
products developed during the requirements analysis. 
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D. PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS 
A physical synthesis was performed to transform the functional architecture in or-
der to develop the physical architecture (see Chapter IV) and then develop a computer-
based model. Figure 9 depicts the physical synthesis used for the MCM comparative 
analysis study. 
  
Figure 9.  Physical Synthesis used for the MCM Comparative Analysis Study 
Inputs to the physical synthesis included the low-level functional decomposition, 
functional flow block diagrams (FFBDs), common operational scenario, and performance 
requirements in the form of MOEs and MOPs. Available literature and SMEs were con-
sulted to determine how best to model the MCM mission and to obtain performance pa-
rameters for use within the model. A simple proof-of-concept model was first created us-
ing Microsoft Excel; this was followed by a more complex model, developed using Imag-
ine That Inc.’s ExtendSim software. Iterative feedback led to minor revisions of products 
developed earlier in the SE process. 
E. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
An AoA was performed to compare the tools and methods available for use in as-
sessing the current and planned MCM systems. Platforms for both developing the model 
and performing the analysis on the simulation results had to be considered and analyzed 
to see what platforms were able to fulfill the requirements of the study. This AoA consid-
ered both ExtendSim and Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) software for 
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model platforms with which to simulate the MCM 1 and LCS. A description of each 
software tool is included in Chapter VI and the evaluation is extended in Appendix B. 
After carefully considering both ExtendSim and MANA as possible platforms for 
the models to be built on, it was determined that ExtendSim was the better platform for 
this project. MANA had numerous technical drawbacks for this application, and there 
was also a lack of familiarity in programming with MANA. Given the project constraints 
in resources (time and people) it was determined that ExtendSim was a better fit for the 
team involved. Furthermore, the scope of the project would use little of MANA’s ad-
vantages, and relies mostly on the sensitivity analysis, DOE, and subsequent performance 
analysis, where ExtendSim had the clear advantage over MANA. 
Figure 10 depicts the factors that were considered during the AoA used for the 
MCM comparative analysis study. 
 
Figure 10.  AoA used for the MCM Comparative Analysis Study 
Inputs to the AoA included the executable computer-based model, performance 
parameters for the current and planned systems, performance requirements, common op-
erational scenario, and life cycle cost information. ACRS and percent clearance were se-
lected as the primary MOEs for a quantitative system performance comparison based up-
on a common operational scenario. Life cycle cost and risk analyses were conducted by 
examining the risks associated with the various models, and the various systems, as well 
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as looking as cost as an independent variable (CAIV). Sensitivity analysis using a DOE 
was used to determine the impact of various mission-based and environmental parameters 
for performance analysis and overall comparison of the two models. Iterative feedback 
led to minor revisions of products developed earlier in the SE process. 
DOE was performed to characterize the performance of various MOEs and MOPs 
under a representative range of conditions for each input parameter (factor). The objec-
tive behind the DOE methodology was to (1) use a systematic method of varying input 
values into the architecture models, (2) maximize the yield of useful information as the 
output of model-based analysis, and (3) create a statistical model by which results could 
be analyzed for quantitative comparison (Hernandez 2013). 
Upon completion of the DOE, the sufficient information, including raw output da-
ta and statistical models, was available to perform quantitative comparison. 
F. MODEL BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
The SE team used a MBSE approach to develop the requirements, MOEs, and 
functional and physical architectures that drove the development of the tool and method-
ology used to compare current and planned MIW architectures in a scenario-based analy-
sis. The tailored SE process was in keeping with the International Council on Systems 
Engineering (INCOSE) definition of MBSE as “the formalized application of modeling 
to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification, and validation activities 
beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout the development and 
later life cycle phases” (Crisp 2007). 
In an MBSE framework, the following steps are followed: 
1. The system boundary is defined. 
2. The requirements are captured. 
3. The system logic is defined. 
4. The system logic is implemented. 
5. The model is tested (Scott 2011). 
In practical terms, the MIW Team worked with stakeholders to define an opera-
tional scenario, capture system requirements, and define system boundaries. A computer-
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based model was then built and simulations were conducted under a spanning set of vari-
ants. CORE was used to develop the physical and functional architectures for this project. 
G. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MANAGEMENT 
For planning purposes, the tasks described above were divided into three project 
phases. The first phase, planning and research, included the requirements analysis. This 
phase involved initial research, stakeholder analysis, needs definition, and problem defi-
nition development. Once the SE process was defined and the initial research was con-
ducted, the MIW Team focused on the development of the problem statement and project 
scope. The importance of clearly identifying the stakeholders’ needs and defining the 
problem allowed the MIW Team to focus on what needed to be built. This ensured that 
the final product met the stakeholders’ needs. Also during this phase, additional effort 
was devoted to the development of the preliminary functional analysis and architecture.  
The second phase, AoA, included the functional analysis, physical synthesis, and 
the beginning of the AoA. The functional and physical architectures were defined and the 
requirements were refined. These were then mapped to each other to ensure that all re-
quirements were being met. This phase also included activities required for planning, 
building, and exercising the computer-based model. 
The final phase, implementation, included completing the AoA, which involved 
exploring alternative architectures and analyses in addition to the cost, risk, and decision 
analysis tasks. As necessary, the MIW Team cycled back to previous tasks to refine the 
products and approach regardless of the phase in which the need was identified. 
H. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
The tailored version of the classic “Vee” process model worked well within the 
scope and constraints of the MIW research project. The MIW research team had no prior 
experience in the field of MIW and, unlike the waterfall process model, the classic “Vee” 
model with iterative feedback allowed products to be revisited as the team became more 
knowledgeable about the subject. The classic “Vee” model, unlike the excessively pro-
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cess-oriented spiral process model, was also well suited for the aggressive timeline of the 
MIW research project. 
I. SE PROCESS SUMMARY 
The team used a tailored SE process that best fit the scope of the project. The first 
step of the process evaluated the stakeholders’ needs and developed the problem state-
ment. Following that, a MBSE approach that developed the requirements, MOEs, as well 
as functional and physical architectures was then be used to develop the methodology for 
the comparative study. These products were then used as the foundation for the AoA 
phase, which was initiated by modeling the MCM configurations IAW the requirements. 
DOE was used to generate the run matrices that allowed for the factors to be screened and 
evaluated. 
The final output of the process were the recommendations, which are specified in 
this report in Chapter VIII and summarized in Chapter X. Cost and risk analyses were 
performed on the current and future MCM configurations and a cost-benefit analysis was 
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III. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Concurrent with the literature review and research into previous, related studies, 
the MIW Team worked with the stakeholders, advisors, and MIW SMEs to develop the 
problem definition and project scope. This process involved identifying the stakeholders 
and eliciting their primitive needs and then transforming those into an effective need 
statement and a detailed problem statement. The familiarization with the scope of the 
MCM problem domain’s challenges and the constraints within which the project had to 
be conducted assisted the MIW Team in its efforts to develop a relevant, useful, and real-
izable project scope.  
This section identifies and describes the stakeholders, their primitive needs, and 
their roles in MIW countermeasures development and then describes the transformation 
of those primitive needs into an effective need. Following that description, the definition 
of the problem statement and project scope is described. Additionally, the project’s con-
straints and the assumptions used in the definition of the project’s scope and approach are 
listed in this section. As summarized, the problem definition evolved throughout the ini-
tial planning and research phase of the project as the MIW Team and the key stakehold-
ers increased their knowledge of and appreciation for the environment within which the 
study had to be conducted. 
A. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 
For this project, the stakeholders included any individual, group, or institution 
with a vested interest in MIW. Conducting stakeholder analysis ensured the appropriate 
stakeholders’ needs were identified, analyzed, and addressed early in the SE process. The 
stakeholders’ needs drive the system requirements, so an attempt to thoroughly and accu-
rately identify all stakeholders and capture their needs was imperative to correctly form-
ing, scoping, and bounding the system architecture. The following steps were taken to 
perform the stakeholder analysis: 
1. Identify potential stakeholders and their interests in MCM. 
2. Classify potential stakeholders. 
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3. Determine key stakeholders and prioritize the needs of those stakeholders. 
4. Identify stakeholders’ primitive needs. 
5. Identify stakeholders’ effective need from the primitive needs. 
6. Transform stakeholders’ effective need into requirements and a problem 
statement. 
7. Communicate the captured needs and resulting requirements to the stake-
holders for feedback. 
8. Incorporate stakeholder comments into a final list of requirements. 
The initial list of stakeholders was developed from the initial project description 
in which the project sponsors were identified. Research into MIW and MCM systems 
identified additional, potential stakeholders as those organizations involved with the de-
velopment and operational use of MCM systems. Attention was given to the entire lifecy-
cle of the MCM system to ensure a comprehensive list of potential stakeholders was iden-
tified. After all potential stakeholders were identified, classification to define the roles of 
each of the potential stakeholders began. 
The first step in classifying potential stakeholders was determining the level of 
involvement in the MCM systems and operations for the identified stakeholders. Internal 
stakeholders are those who have direct interaction with the MCM systems. Stakeholders 
identified as having direct contact with the system, but no direct interaction with internal 
stakeholders were classified as first-order stakeholders. Stakeholders whose only connec-
tion to the MCM systems is through interaction with first-order stakeholders were identi-
fied as second-order stakeholders. The first-order and second-order stakeholders com-
prise the boundary stakeholders. After the internal and boundary stakeholders were clas-
sified, the relationships between the stakeholders and the MCM systems were analyzed. 
The interest and influence that stakeholders have over funding, design and devel-
opment, system acceptance, operations, and disposal were used to prioritize the stake-
holders. Typically, the prioritization of stakeholders aids in determining the key system 
stakeholders and assists the SE team in identifying and focusing on the most important 
stakeholders and their needs in the event of a conflict. In this case, it assisted the MIW 
Team to understand and appreciate the spectrum of the needs for the MCM study. 
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For complex systems, determining the key stakeholders is critical to allow for 
proper identification of needs that shape the system design, development, acquisition, and 
operation (INCOSE 2010, Section 4.1). Each stakeholder’s importance, influence, inter-
actions with other stakeholders, and duration of involvement with the subject under study 
must be considered. After being identified as a key stakeholder, each key stakeholder was 
ranked as either primary or secondary. Primary stakeholder’s needs must be addressed. 
Secondary stakeholder’s needs are addressed if and when possible. In this project, the 
stakeholders’ needs were communicated via the MIW consultant. The primitive needs 
were discussed, evaluated, and analyzed until an effective need could be developed. This 
effective need formed the foundation for the problem statement. These were refined and 
modified until acceptable need and problem statements were developed.  
The requirements for the project were finally derived by analyzing the effective 
need of the key stakeholders. Research into the current state of MCM systems coupled 
with the key stakeholder’s requirements for future MCM capabilities helped define the 
project’s scope. Table 2 summarizes the results of the stakeholder analysis and includes 
the stakeholders, their interest in MIW, their classification and priority ranking, and their 
influence in systems that are related to MIW operations and capabilities. As shown in 
Table 2, there were two types of primary stakeholders identified as designated with the 
classifications of either project or internal. The groups and personnel who had a direct 
interested and involvement with the successful completion of this project were consid-
ered project, primary stakeholders. Those who were primarily involved with the conduct 
and outcome of this study were characterized as internal, primary stakeholders. 
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Involvement in MIW 
Interest in MIW & MCM 
(Primitive Need) 
NPS Project Primary Conducting research and development to 
support the warfighter. Provide quality 
educational environment to prospective 
SEs for DOD. 
Interested in developing new strategies and 
system for MIW Operations. Interested in 
developing skilled DOD SE personnel. 
Admiral Richard Williams III 
(Ret.) 
Project Primary Primary MIW expert consultant for NPS 
led study. 
Interested in providing expert advice for the
MIW Team to ensure the development of 
quality, useful research-based product. 
NSWC PC Internal Primary Conduct research, development, test and 
evaluation (T&E), in-service support of 
MIW systems, mines, naval special war-
fare systems, and other systems primarily 
occurring in coastal regions. (Naval Sea 
Systems Command n.d.—b) 
Interested in all aspects of MIW. As stated 
in 9 May 2014 meeting and in personal 
communication dated 15 May 2014, particu-
larly interested in increasing the ACRS for 
defensive MCM operations. 
NSWC, Future Ship Concept 
Branch 
Internal Primary Specializes in ship design & integration.
(Naval Sea Systems Command, n.d.—c) 
Interested in requirements for ship designs 
and equipment integration that enable best 
performance of MIW operations. 
PEO LCS 
(Formerly PEO LMW) 
Internal Primary Responsible for acquiring and maintaining 
the littoral mission capabilities of the LCS 
class including programs to support MIW
(Secretary of the Navy n.d.) 
Interested in capabilities assessments and 
recommendations for enhancements to 
shipboard, deployable vehicles 
PEO Ships Internal Primary Responsible for executing the development 
and procurement of all destroyers, amphib-
ious ships, special mission and support 
ships, and special warfare craft. (Naval Sea 
Systems Command n.d.—d) 
Interested in capabilities assessments and 
recommendations for enhancements to 
shipboard, deployable vehicles 
Personnel: Navy and Marines Internal Secondary Operational involvement Interested in the best equipment and meth-













Involvement in MIW 
Interest in MIW & MCM 
(Primitive Need) 
PMS 340: Naval Special Warfare 
Program Office 
Internal Secondary Involved in the development of systems 
and procedures for naval special warfare 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the War Fighters 
with the best equipment and training possi-
ble to accomplish the mission. 
PMS 403: Remote Mine Hunting 
Program Office 
Internal Secondary Involved in the development of systems 
and procedures for remote mine hunting. 
Interested in outfitting the War Fighters 
with the best equipment and training possi-
ble to accomplish the mission. 
PMS 406: Unmanned Maritime 
Systems Program Office 
Internal Secondary Involved in the development of systems 
and procedures for maritime surveillance 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the War Fighters 
with the best equipment and training possi-
ble to accomplish the mission. 
PMS 420: LCS Mission Modules 
Program Office 
Internal Secondary Involved in the development of systems 
and procedures for LCS Mission Module 
Systems. 
Interested in outfitting the War Fighters 
with the best equipment and training possi-
ble to accomplish the mission. 
PMS 495: MIW Systems Internal Secondary Involved in the development, fielding, and 
–n-service support for all mining and mine 
countermeasure systems in the areas of 
minehunting, minesweeping, mine neutral-
ization, and the development of mines for 
offensive MIW. (PMS 495 Mine Warfare 
Program Office 2008) 
Interested in developing the highest value 
MIW systems possible. 
Nation’s Allies Boundary Secondary Direct stakeholders as mines can affect any 
allied nation with littoral coastline. 
Interested in protecting their naval and 
commercial shipping, and keeping their 
SLOCs open. 
PMS 480: Anti-Terrorism Force 
Protection Afloat Program Of-
fice 
Boundary Secondary Involved in the development of systems 
and procedures for maritime anti-terrorism 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the War Fighters 
with the best equipment and training possi-
ble to accomplish the mission. 
PMS 485: Maritime Surveillance 
Systems Program Office 
Boundary Secondary Involved in the development of systems 
and procedures for maritime surveillance 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the War Fighters 
with the best equipment and training possi-













Involvement in MIW 
Interest in MIW & MCM 
(Primitive Need) 
N81 (Assessments) 1st Order Secondary Involved with the determination of system 
effectiveness through the conduct of capa-
bility assessment analyses for warfighting 
and warfighting support. Also responsible 
for the integration and prioritization of 
enhancements and upgrades to capabilities. 
Lastly, interested in the development and 
validation of analytic tools and techniques. 
(“N81 Alignment Warfare” 2006) 
Interested in methods to enhance and/or 
upgrade existing MIW scenario and warf-
ighting models 
N95 (Expeditionary Warfare) 1st Order Secondary Responsible for assessing requirements for 
naval expeditionary warfare missions and 
programs, including MIW. Also responsi-
ble for determining characteristics and 
structure for all MIW ships. (“[Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations] OPNAV 
95” 2013) 
Interested in capabilities assessments and 
recommendations for enhancements to 
shipboard, deployable vehicles 
N96 (Surface Warfare) 1st Order Secondary Responsible for determining requirements 
for surface combatants and support ships, 
as well as to coordinate, supervise, and 
execute Navy shipbuilding for above sur-
face combatant ships. (“OPNAV N96” 
2013) 
Interested in developing improvement mod-
ifications to the LCS current design 
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B. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
After the stakeholder analysis, it was necessary to analyze their needs in order to 
translate the primitive needs into an effective need. This section includes the progression 
from the identification of the primitive needs to the development of the effective need 
and then the problem definition as detailed in the SE Process (Chapter II). These tasks 
were necessary to develop the requirements and architecture to ensure that the project 
would satisfy the stakeholders’ needs.  
1. Primitive Need Summary  
Consistent among the many stakeholders is the need to develop the most capable 
and cost-effective MIW resources and to deploy those systems to the fleet for operational 
use. Initially, this was translated into the project requirement for a comprehensive com-
parative analysis that would result in sufficient data to provide an extensive assessment of 
the current MIW capabilities and that could be used as a foundation for decisions and 
plans that will result in the most effective MIW systems. Due to the project constraints 
(listed in Chapter I), however, it was deemed infeasible to conduct such a broad study. 
This reality combined with advice and guidance resulted in the need for a study that was 
focused on one aspect of MIW: the analysis of the MCM effectiveness and the ACRS in 
defensive MCM operations in deep water SLOC missions (see Chapter I for a detailed 
description of this metric). 
2. Effective Need Summary  
After extensive research to collect all available, unclassified performance data and 
through several iterations with the stakeholders at NSWC PC, the MIW Consultant, and 
MIW Team Advisors, the following effective need statement was developed: the stake-
holders need to quantitatively analyze the MCM effectiveness involving the capability to 
clear a minefield and the ACRS between the current and planned MCM capabilities to 
base procurement and planning decisions. The problem statement was then refined from 
this effective need. 
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Once the effective need was determined, the MIW Team transitioned to identify-
ing the stakeholders’ capability needs. This was essential to develop the MCM problem 
set into a manageable, focused effort as described in the problem definition. 
3. Capability Need Statement 
According to PEO LMW (2014) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011) the DON 
needs to have an effective and responsive defensive MCM capability in order to ensure 
“successful maritime and joint force access and power projection, and is essential to the 
protection of shipping, friendly forces, and noncombatants” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, 
1-1). Keeping the SLOC clear is necessary to support safe commerce, enable naval ma-
neuverability, and maintain the ability of the U.S. Navy to project power from the sea. 
Clearing littoral regions is necessary to support beach landings and amphibious assaults. 
There are many scenarios in which areas need to be cleared of sea mines and, as de-
scribed in Chapter I, each one presents significant challenges to the overall MCM opera-
tion. Furthermore, with the current fiscal environment and reductions in force, this capa-
bility must be effectively and efficiently operated without excess personal requirements 
and costs. Moreover, there is a requirement to conduct effective MCM missions with 
minimal risk to the lives of the service men and women controlling the MCM systems 
and platforms (DON 2010; PEO LMW 2009, 27; Secretary of Defense 2014). 
The MIW Team developed the problem statement based on the project goals and 
constraints as identified by the stakeholders. This more focused problem statement al-
lowed the project goals and objectives to take form in a manageable project that could be 
completed within the constraints contained within the next section. 
4. Problem Statement 
As described in the first paragraph of this section and in Section 3, the DON 
needs to have an effective defensive MCM capability that can be conducted in a manner 
that improves safety for sailors and the ships they operate (PEO LMW 2009). The DON 
stakeholders need quantitative data for evaluating the effectiveness of future MCM capa-
bilities, the core of which is the LCS, as compared with the legacy MCM capabilities, the 
core of which is the MCM 1 (DON 2010). Since each ship conducts the MCM mission 
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differently, the MIW Team based the comparative analysis on a common mission scenar-
io profile: mine clearing a rectangular area (10 NM by 10 NM) that would be within a 
SLOC. This evaluation was primarily based on the ACRS metric for each ship type over 
a 24-hour period. Additionally, the mine clearance effectiveness as represented by the 
percent clearance metric was analyzed to provide a comparison between the MCM plat-
forms in both time to conduct the mission and the mission effectiveness. 
Initially, the MIW Team pursued a study that would comprehensively evaluate all 
MCM functionality in the performance of multiple mission types. Due to the constraints 
to use unclassified data and the time required to complete the study, the MIW Team had 
to revise the original project scope. After extensive research and guidance provided by 
Admiral Richard Williams and Professor Eugene Paulo on 16 May 2014, the MIW pro-
ject team updated the problem statement and project focus, with favorable results. 
C. REQUIREMENTS 
According to Beude (2000), requirements for a system address the needs of the 
stakeholders. These initial requirements are the originating requirements, which focus on 
the boundary of the system in the context of the mission and use the stakeholder termi-
nology (Buede 2000). As first discussed in Chapter II, the goal of the requirements analy-
sis for this project was to produce a set of high level requirements for the models that, 
when met, adequately describe the MCM system functions relevant toward meeting the 
stakeholders’ effective need to quantitatively analyze legacy and future MCM effective-
ness. Taken in this context, the system requirements for this project outline the need for a 
MCM comparison method, or model. The extent to which the MCM functional and phys-
ical system architectures, as described in Chapter IV, relate to the system requirements 
for generating a model is characterized by those parameters which the model must utilize 
or describe. That is, while traditional system development provides a direct mapping 
from system to functional to physical requirements, this project dictates not that a system 
be developed but rather that a tool be created to simulate systems that perform defined 
functions with existing physical architectures in order to analyze their performance. 
Therefore, the purview of the system requirements is to define the scope of the model and 
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not to specify MCM system performance. Given the stakeholder analysis and needs anal-
ysis the originating requirements were:  
 R.1 An unclassified model shall be developed to determine the operational 
effectiveness of the LCS versus MCM capabilities 
 R.1.1 The model shall take unclassified inputs for various perfor-
mance parameters for the LCS and MCM to enable sensitivity 
Analysis 
 R.1.1.1 The model shall use best estimates of input factors 
in cases when real values are unavailable 
 R.1.2 The model shall identify parameters with high predictive 
power (relative to other parameters) 
 R.1.3 The model shall use an operationally relevant situation as the 
basis of comparison, focusing on system effectiveness in a SLOC 
scenario 
 R.2 The model shall provide quantitative estimates of overall mine clear-
ing effectiveness 
 R.2.1 The model shall produce a metric of ACRS 
 R.2.2 The model shall produce a metric of percent clearance to 
evaluate the minehunting effectiveness. 
These originating requirements were translated into top-level system requirements 
for the model, in the correct terminology. There are five top-level requirements for the 
study and for the development of the models and simulations necessary to complete the 
analysis. Table 3 lists the requirements and the type of requirement, the description of 
each follows the table.  
Table 3.   Requirements 
Number Requirement Type / MOE Mapping 
1.0 The simulation shall enable the determination of the ACRS for each 
MCM configuration in the performance of mine hunting.  
Top-Level 
1.1 The simulation shall represent the time required to perform each 
minehunting function within the minehunting operation: travel, de-
tect, classify, identify, reacquire, and neutralize for each MCM con-
figuration. 
ACRS 
1.2 The simulation shall calculate the ACRS (time required to conduct 
the entire minehunting sequence). 
ACRS 
2.0 The simulation shall model the effectiveness of each minehunting 
function. 
Top-Level 
2.1 The simulation shall calculate and store the effectiveness of each Percent Clearance  
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Number Requirement Type / MOE Mapping 
minehunting function. 
2.2 The simulation shall calculate and output the overall minehunting 
effectiveness in terms of the number of mines cleared, number of 
mines remaining, and the number of non-mines that were neutralized. 
Percent Clearance 
3.0 The simulation shall contain models of the minehunting sequence of 
events for the different configurations. 
Top-Level 
3.1 The simulation shall represent each of the three MCM configura-
tion’s minehunting functions: search, detect, classify, identify, reac-
quire, and neutralize. 
ACRS and  
Percent Clearance 
3.2 The simulation shall represent the minefield size and location for use 
in the effectiveness and ACRS calculations. 
ACRS and  
Percent Clearance 
3.3 The simulation shall transition the state and minehunting results of 
the previous function to the subsequent function IAW PEO LMW 
Instruction 3370.1A.  
ACRS and  
Percent Clearance 
4.0 The simulation shall support setting and modifying the listed perfor-
mance parameters without requiring modifying the simulation. 
Top-Level 
4.1 The simulation shall import specified input parameters without re-
quiring modifications to the code. 
Non-Functional 
4.2 The simulation shall support the export of the resulting effectiveness 
and time-to-complete parameters to a form that can be analyzed by 
statistical software products such as Excel and Minitab. 
Non-Functional 
4.3 The simulation shall be developed in a modular method that allows 
for each function to be replaced. 
Non-Functional 
5.0 The simulation shall include documentation that facilitates the use of 
the simulation tool by future study groups. 
Top-Level 
Non-Functional 
5.1 The simulation shall include documentation that describes the use of 
the code and descriptions of the input and output parameters. 
Non-Functional 
5.2 The simulation shall include documentation that describes the code, 




 Requirement 1.0: Determine the ACRS for each MCM configuration in 
the performance of mine hunting. 
The top-level requirement was to calculate the ACRS of each configuration based 
on specified performance parameters. The calculation of the ACRS supports one of the 
MOEs described in Chapter I. This requirement was decomposed into two lower-level 
requirements. 
 Req. 1.1: The simulation shall represent the time required to per-
form each minehunting function within the minehunting operation: 
travel, detect, classify, identify, reacquire, and neutralize for each 
MCM configuration. 
 Req. 1.2: The simulation shall calculate the ACRS (time required 
to conduct the entire minehunting sequence). 
 Requirement 2.0: The simulation shall model the effectiveness of each 
minehunting function. 
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As with the time to complete measure, the effectiveness of each function had to 
be represented; therefore, the following requirements were derived. The overall effec-
tiveness was measured as the percentage of mines cleared from the minefield, which is a 
function of the performance of each function involved in the minehunting operation. 
 Req. 2.1: The simulation shall calculate and store the effectiveness of each 
minehunting function. 
 Req. 2.2: The simulation shall calculate and output the overall minehunt-
ing effectiveness in terms of the number of mines cleared, number of 
mines remaining, and the number of non-mines that were neutralized. 
In order to satisfy the above requirements, the MIW Team had to build a simula-
tion to use as a basis for the comparison. The next set of requirements reflects the objec-
tive for the tool, that is, to represent the minehunting functions in a modular manner that 
provides the ability to replace functional modules. For future studies, it will be necessary 
to completely replace some functions with those having alternative attributes and opera-
tions. To be useful, the structure of the simulation had to be modular to support the ease 
of use and modification in the future. Two requirements were developed to decompose 
this objective. 
 Requirement 3.0: The simulation shall contain models of the minehunting 
sequence of events for the different configurations. 
As stated, this project evaluated three different MCM configurations; therefore, 
the performance and operation of the different systems for each had to be represented in 
the simulation. This single requirement was decomposed into three requirements. Re-
quirements 3.1 and 3.3 deal with the modeling of the MCM functions and transition of 
results from one function to the next and requirement 3.2 was required to allow for the 
specification of the mine field size and location. 
 Req. 3.1: The simulation shall represent each of the three MCM configura-
tion’s minehunting functions: search, detect, classify, identify, reacquire, 
and neutralize. 
 Req. 3.2: The simulation shall represent the minefield size and location for 
use in the effectiveness and ACRS calculations. 
 Req. 3.3: The simulation shall transition the state and minehunting results 
of the previous function to the subsequent function IAW PEO LMW In-
struction 3370.1A. 
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There was a requirement to represent the minehunting functions in a manner that 
supports varying the performance capabilities of the represented functions to support ex-
cursions and “what if” analyses. The MIW Team determined that a simulation that was 
capable of using tables and/or databases containing the many input parameters would best 
satisfy this objective. Three requirements were developed to decompose this top-level 
requirement. 
 Requirement 4.0: The simulation shall support setting and modifying the 
listed performance parameters without requiring modifying the simulation. 
As stated, this project evaluated three different MCM configurations; therefore, 
the actual performance parameters of the different MCM systems and subsystems were 
unavailable. In order for the model to be useful, the tool needed to have a way to allow 
for relatively easy manipulation and modification of the many parameters that affect the 
effectiveness and ACRS for the minehunting operation. The following lower-level re-
quirements decompose this top-level requirement. 
 Req. 4.1: The simulation shall import specified input parameters without 
requiring modifications to the code. 
 Req. 4.2: The simulation shall support the export of the resulting effec-
tiveness and time-to-complete parameters to a form that can be analyzed 
by statistical software products such as Excel and Minitab. 
This requirement was needed to specify that the calculated performance parame-
ters had to be exported for evaluation in standard tools. 
 Req. 4.3: The simulation shall be developed in a modular method that al-
lows for each function to be replaced. 
This requirement relates to best practices for developing code, the modular nature 
of the simulation not only enables future users the ability to modify it, but also allows for 
easier debugging. 
The last top-level requirement pertains to the documentation necessary to allow 
the simulation tool to be used in future studies. 
 Requirement 5.0: The simulation shall include documentation that facili-
tates the use of the simulation tool by future study groups. 
Appropriate documentation was required that specifies the way the simulation 
was developed and the way in which the parameters can be varied. Without this docu-
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mentation, the tool would be useless for further studies. Two requirements decompose 
this top-level requirement. 
 Req. 5.1: The simulation shall include documentation that describes the 
use of the code and descriptions of the input and output parameters. 
 Req. 5.2: The simulation shall include documentation that describes the 
code, the structure of the code, and the required inputs and outputs of each 
functional block. 
1. Verification of Requirements 
The team verified the results to ensure the project met the requirements. Most of 
the requirements (requirements 3.x, 4.x, and 5.x) were verified through inspection to vis-
ually check that the requirements were met. Requirements 1.x and 2.x were verified 
through comparison between an Excel model and the ExtendSim models. Test cases were 
modeled in Excel in which the effectiveness and time-related factors were used to com-
pute the ACRS and Percent Effectiveness values. These values were compared to the 
simulation results to indicate that the calculations and sequence of events were represent-
ed correctly. Chapter VI contains the detailed results from the verification and validation 
of the simulation in achieving the above requirements. 
D. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
This study was to conduct a comparative analysis of the ACRS metric as applied 
to defensive MCM operations employed to clear an area within a SLOC in deep water for 
the MCM 1 and the four variants of the LCS class ships. Once the problem was defined 
and the project focus identified, the context in which the MCM operations occur, includ-
ing the relationships between the entities, was defined. This step helped to further bind 
the problem space. The material within this section of the report describes the process 
with which the MIW Team defined the problem and scoped the project as part of the SE 
process used to conduct the study. Once concurrence was provided in the approach as 
outlined in this section, and IAW the SE approach, the MIW Team initiated the opera-
tional analysis. This analysis detailed the MCM operational concepts and the scenarios to 
be modeled and studied as part of the comparative analysis. 
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IV. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
A system architecture for each of the MCM systems is detailed in this chapter and 
provides fidelity to a model structure as it relates to various MIW systems. As stated by 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), “Given an identified need for a new improved system, 
the advanced stages of system planning and architecting can be initiated. Planning and 
architecting are essential and coequal activities for bringing a new or improved capability 
into being” (58). Though this research project did not involve the physical development 
of a new system, it did involve the development of simulations to represent the actual 
systems for the conduct of the analysis. Therefore, the conceptual needs that were ante-
cedent to the actual MIW systems (both legacy MCM 1 and future LCS) and their result-
ant system architectures were necessary in order to understand the system on which this 
project was based. Moreover, a thorough understanding of the system architecture was 
required in order to trace the component functional and physical architectures to their 
specific system functions, which were studied during this project. The goal was to gain an 
understanding of the MIW systems from a SE perspective, versus attempting to construct 
a new MIW system, in order to develop a model for MCM analysis. 
This chapter contains the contextual description for the MCM system, the func-
tional architecture, physical architecture, and the requirements. Additionally, the MOEs 
and MOPs are described and mapped to the system’s objectives and the requirements. 
These definitions were necessary to develop the approach to, and structure of, the simula-
tions that were used to conduct the analysis.  
A. SYSTEM CONTEXT  
As described, MCM requires the operation and interaction of many systems. 
These systems need to perform the various functions of detection, classification, identifi-
cation, neutralization, control, movement, and communications. As these systems are in-
tegrated to function as part of the larger MCM capabilities, performing MCM requires a 
system-of-systems (SOS). 
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Before developing the functional decomposition for the MCM SOS, it was neces-
sary to define the system boundaries and the context within which the MCM system op-
erates. This section begins with a top-level view of the MCM system context and then 
describes the portion of the system that is the focus of this study. The overall system 
boundaries or scope of the project is focused on understanding the functional capabilities 
of legacy MCM systems and comparing them to the future MCM capabilities as the en-
terprise transitions to new MCM systems. 
Figure 11 displays the MCM SOS context diagram. Shown in the diagram are the 
external factors that affect, or are affected by, the MCM SOS. The SOS terminology is 
used because the MCM systems and sub-systems of each MCM platform are independent 
systems that are functionally linked in performing MCM operations. 
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The MCM mission or operation (as seen in the upper right corner of Figure 11) is 
initiated by orders to commence operations. These orders involve the area of interest, the 
assets that can be made available to conduct the operation, the need (requirement) for the 
particular MCM operation (e.g., the clearance type, type of support required), the amount 
of time in which the MCM operation has to be completed, and the mission type (e.g., ex-
ploratory, reconnaissance, breakthrough, clearing, attrition). This information informs the 
MCM commander of the requirements for the mission so that he/she can determine the 
appropriate course(s) of action (e.g., whether to perform minesweeping, minehunting, or 
both, or whether to investigate and mark the area as dangerous or safe). This also deter-
mines the functions that are to be performed and allows for the selection and sequencing 
of the proper MCM systems to employ based on the operational conditions and circum-
stances. Based on SME feedback, this study assumed that the mission requirements were 
for mine clearing of a limited area in deep water using minehunting in a SLOC. 
Moving clockwise through the figure from MCM mission description, it shows 
that ISR also provides valuable data to the MCM operation such as the area of interest, 
the density and types of mines, and other non-mine threats that the assets must evade. 
This is a two-way link because the MCM SOS will provide updated intelligence regard-
ing the area(s) as it conducts its operations. None of the ISR capabilities were included in 
this study. 
The sea conditions also affect the MCM operations. The depth of the sea, the clut-
ter, and the type of bottom directly impact the performance of the MCM systems and 
therefore the overall effectiveness of the MCM SOS. None of these elements are being 
varied within this study. 
In addition to the sea conditions, the sea state conditions contribute to the overall 
effectiveness and operation of the MCM systems. Some systems likely cannot be operat-
ed in certain conditions or their effectiveness will be adversely impacted in high or low 
sea state conditions. This study assumed a steady-state sea condition during operation; 
therefore, the impacts of varying sea states were not evaluated. 
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Not only do the conditions of the sea affect the MCM operations, but the envi-
ronment will also play a role in the operation and effectiveness of the MCM SOS. The 
sea state is directly correlated to wind, but there are other factors that may impact the 
MCM SOS. These include the amount of ducting and environmental attenuation, which 
affects the communications between the MCM systems, the MCM platform, and other 
assets. The visibility, rain, and temperature may also affect the way in which the MCM 
operation is conducted. Environmental factors were not included in this study. 
The mine fields and their conditions both impact and are impacted by the MCM 
SOS. The location and size of the mine field will directly impact the operations due to 
range limitations of the various MCM systems and the amount of time required to clear 
the area. Additionally, the actual number and types of mines (as opposed to the suspected 
conditions provided by the ISR data) obviously impact operations. Different mine types 
and mine densities directly impact the operational effectiveness of the MCM SOS as well 
as the time to complete operations. This link is bidirectional due to the impact on the 
mine field as the MCM SOS begins clearing mines. Again, this study only accounted for 
a fixed mine field area containing bottom mines with the numbers and densities modeled 
as variable parameters. 
Finally, the MCM SOS and all assets supporting the MCM operation are affected 
by, and affect, the external, non-mine threats in the area. These include threats from guns, 
missiles, small boat attacks, and torpedoes. In the conduct of the mine clearance opera-
tion, the ships’ commanders must watch for and respond to these external threats. The 
threats are affected by the response provided by the MCM platforms including guns, mis-
siles (both cruise and surface-to-air), and torpedoes. No external threats were accounted 
for within this study. 
B. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
The next step in defining the architecture was to develop the functions that are 
performed in MCM operations. The definition and decomposition of the functions result-
ed in the functional architecture for the MIW project. This section describes the function-
al architecture. 
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1. MCM Operational Functions Overview 
MCM operations are determined by MCM missions, which in turn are described 
by MCM functions that are characterized by specific MOPs. MCM functions and MOPs 
are described in detail in this section. In PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A (PEO LMW 
2008), active defensive MCM MOPs are divided into four functional areas: sense, en-
gage, control, and logistics. These functional areas are described in detail in Chapter I. 
Operational C4ISR functions are not explicitly addressed due to the constraints within 
which the study was conducted. 
2. Top-Level Functional Description 
As introduced in Chapter I, the basic functions of MCM operation include: detec-
tion, classification, identification, and neutralization. The top-level view of the MCM 
functions in the form of a functional flow block diagram (FFBD) is shown in Figure 12. 
During detection (sometimes referred to as sensing), the system searches for and records, 
or transmits, mine-like echoes (MILECs), which are indications of possible mines. These 
MILEC items are then interrogated with higher resolution in order to classify them as ei-
ther MILCOs or non-MILCOs and this information is then passed to the next stage: iden-
tification. The systems that perform the identification function may first have to reacquire 
the MILCO signals and then resolve the objects to identify each as either a mine or a non-
mine. 
An important characteristic that mine hunters use to determine if a moored MIL-
CO is suitable for identification is the contact persistence of the MILCO. If the contact is 
persistent to sensors, with respect to time, or persistent through multiple interrogations of 
the same area, this factor weighs heavily on a MILCO being selected for identification. 
For bottom mines, it is more important that the search tracks be chosen to ensure MIL-
ECs are within the range of classification systems. Once an object has been detected and 
classified as a persistent MILCO, identification is used to identify a MILCO as a mine. 
Once an object has been identified as a mine, the MCM platform (ship or aircraft) at-
tempts to determine the type of mine. 
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The identification stage in the mine hunting chain of events usually happens just 
before a mine is neutralized, but if a mine is identified as a new type of mine, the mine 
can be designated for exploitation (where the mine is captured for analysis). This process 
continues as mines are either exploited or subsequently neutralized in order to clear the 
mine field of mines to make the waterway safe for follow-on forces or as dictated by the 
mission. The information regarding the identified mines, specifically their location and 
type (if resolved), is sent to the next function, neutralization, to clear the mines. The neu-
tralization function may reacquire the mine contacts and then either destroy the mines or 
render them safe for collection and exploitation. Not shown in Figure 12, but very rele-
vant to the effectiveness of mine clearance operations, are the reacquiring functions that 
must occur when the signals from one function have to be transferred to another system 
to perform the next function; it is assumed, at this top-level, that the reacquisition of the 
signals is accomplished within the function receiving the signals. 
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Figure 12.  Defensive MCM Functions—The Top-level FFBD View of the MCM 
Functions (from PEO LMW 2008) 
Two primary approaches are used to accomplish these functions: minehunting and 
minesweeping, although each performs the MCM functions differently. In minehunting, 
each function is accomplished sequentially and generally results in a higher probability of 
mine clearance. Minesweeping operations are primarily focused on the neutralization 
function and skip the detect-classify-identify functions so they can be accomplished 
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much faster. There are missions where minesweeping is performed first (especially for 
surface mines) and then followed by minehunting, and others in which minehunting and 
minesweeping occur simultaneously. 
As described in previous sections, this study will focus on minehunting operations 
in deep water (water depths greater than 200 feet). For completeness, the functional hier-
archy for MIW is shown in Figure 13. The MIW functions that are beyond the scope of 
this study are in grey. The primary functions associated with minehunting are shown in 
green. Other functions that are necessary to include in order to capture and analyze the 
ACRS for the operation are the control equipment functions (shown in orange) and the 
analyze function data (shown in blue). This last function is referred to as PMA and is de-
scribed in Section B. Additionally, the maintain equipment function will be considered, 
as the AO affects the ACRS and the conduct of the mission. It is important to note that 
those functions not directly associated with the primary minehunting functions are of in-
























































































































3. Minehunting Functional Description 
Figure 14 displays the functional hierarchy involved with minehunting operations. 
Again, those functions in grey are not included in this study. The descriptions of those 
functions that are included in the study are detailed in this section.  
 
Figure 14.  Minehunting Functional Hierarchy 
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a. 1.1.2.1 Detect Mines 
The first step in mine hunting is to detect mines and MILECs. This is usually per-
formed through sensing, in which sensing systems detect the returns from the mines, sea-
floor, and other objects. This can be extremely challenging and is dependent upon the sea 
state, the depth of the water, the conditions of the sea floor, and the materials used to 
build the mine. Humans, mammals, or sonar systems can perform this operation. Once 
the detection of the area is complete, the system will report that it either detected or did 
not detect possible mines in the area. If no possible mines are detected, these results are 
communicated to the personnel and platforms in the area and the system moves to the 
next mission area. Objects that are detected are designated as MILECs. These MILECs 
are passed to the next function for classification.  
b. 1.1.2.2 Classify Mines 
Once objects have been detected and designated as MILECs, they must be classi-
fied as either a MILCO or a non-MILCO based on the sonar image of the MILEC. This 
function is performed to determine which MILECs have a high probability of being a 
mine. This information is used to direct assets (systems) to further interrogate those ob-
jects to determine which are mines and which are not mines. 
c. 1.1.2.3 Reacquire MILCOs 
This reacquisition function is only performed when a different system is used in 
the next phase, identification. This function involves the tasks to search for and find the 
MILCO signal sources so that they can be investigated and identified as mines or non-
mines. 
d. 1.1.2.4 Identify Mines 
The identification process will further interrogate the MILCO objects to deter-
mine if they are mines or non-mines. At this point non-mines are designated as false tar-
gets. The type and location of the mines are then communicated to the supporting plat-
form and the other ships in the area. The Mine / Non-Mine information is then used to 
direct neutralization assets and to mark the area as a minefield to warn other vessels. 
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e. 1.1.3 Neutralize Mines 
This function involves rendering the mines impotent so that they cannot cause 
damage. This can be accomplished by destroying the mines or by disarming the mines. 
Disarming mines may be necessary if the U.S. Navy desires to collect the mines for study 
and analysis. In this study, the focus is on destroying the mines. 
f. 1.1.3.1 Reacquire Mines 
Similar to function 1.1.2.3 (Reacquire MILCOs), this reacquisition function is 
performed when a different system is used for neutralization. Again, this function in-
volves the tasks to search for and find the mine signal sources so that they can be neutral-
ized. 
g. 1.1.3.2 Destroy Mines 
The mine destruction function involves making mines safe so that their explosions 
do not cause damage or harm. There are a number of ways to destroy mines, dependent 
upon the type of mine, the location of the mine, the destruction capabilities present, and 
the speed with which the mines must be destroyed. In this study, the focus was on de-
stroying the mines through a neutralization system and not with a sweep system, as de-
scribed in Section C. 
4. Other Functions Related to Minehunting 
In addition to the minehunting functions, the simulation had to account for the 
time delays imposed on the completion of the mine clearance mission due to movement 
of the equipment and the analysis of the signals data from the minehunting systems that is 
necessary to determine the next course of action in a minehunting operation. These func-
tions are described within this section. 
a. 1.2 Control Equipment 
The functions decomposing this top-level function involve the actual movement 
of the MCM systems to the correct location, as well as the functions necessary to ensure 
each system is configured properly and is fueled. These functions were important to 
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model as each contributes to the amount of time that is captured in the ACRS metric. The 
hierarchy for these functions is shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Control Equipment Functional Hierarchy 
b. 1.2.1 Transit Systems 
This function involves the tasks necessary to move the appropriate system be-
tween the staging area and the minefield of interest.  
c. 1.2.2 Load Fuel 
This function involves the critical tasks of loading fuel onto the systems so that 
each system can perform its tasks. 
d. 1.2.3 Maneuver Systems 
This function involves the tasks necessary to put the systems in the right altitude, 
longitude, latitude, and depth such that the tasks performed by each system can be ac-
complished. This function also includes turning to the next track to continue operations. 
e. 1.2.4 Recover Equipment 
This function involves the tasks necessary to load the MCM systems onto the car-
rying and support platform. This is accomplished after each system has completed its 
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tasks and when the systems need to be refueled, rearmed, reconfigured, maintained, and 
repaired. 
f. 1.2.5 Stream Equipment 
This function involves the tasks necessary to configure and launch the appropriate 
MCM systems so that each can perform its tasks. 
g. 1.2.6 Reload / Rearm 
This function involves the tasks necessary to either reload or rearm equipment 
(e.g., armament, equipment) onto the MCM systems so that each can continue its tasks. 
h. 1.3 Gather or Receive Data and Information 
This top-level function involves the gathering or collecting of data and infor-
mation regarding the minefield, to include: the types and quantities of mines, type and 
condition of the sea-floor, etc. Additionally, this function involves receiving the various 
signals from the MCM systems as they go through the detect-classify-identify-neutralize 
sequence of operations. The signals of interest (e.g., MILEC, MILCO, Mine) are pro-
cessed and analyzed in this function to determine the appropriate course of action. This 
function was important to model as the time spent on receiving and analyzing the signal 
data contributes to the ACRS metric, which was analyzed for this study. Additionally, the 
probability that the analysis function will direct MCM neutralization assets to particular 
mines and/or MILCOs was required to develop the effectiveness MOE. The functional 
hierarchy for the gather/receive data and information functions is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16.  Gather/Receive Data and Information Functional Hierarchy 
i. 1.3.1 Analyze Data 
This function involves the PMA that is performed to determine the MILCOs that 
are most likely to be real mines. Although time-consuming, this crucial function in mine-
hunting allows the MCM commander to expend precious resources wisely. The fidelity 
of the data from this function (from the PMA process and system) is much better than 
that of the signal processing capability on the MCM systems involved with classifying 
and identifying mines and MILCOs. 
j. 1.3.2 Decide Course of Action 
This function involves the processing of the analysis data from the PMA tool in 
the conduct of the analyze data function. The processed data will result in a recommend-
ed course of action for the MCM SOS. The human-in-the-loop decision-making process 
was not explicitly modeled in this study. The PMA results that determine the mines and 
non-mines were modeled using a probability distribution function to replicate the accura-
cy of the post-processing analysis. 
k. 1.4 Maintain Equipment 
This function involves the tasks required to maintain the MCM equipment so that 
it attains the highest possible operational time. This function was not modeled in the sim-














would provide more information in evaluating the ACRS metric. The functional hierar-
chy for this function is not shown as it was not modeled or analyzed within this project. 
5. Functional Flow Block Diagrams and Descriptions 
Once the functions were identified, defined, and organized, the interactions be-
tween the functions that were required in the conduct of the minehunting operation were 
developed. This step resulted in a number of FFBDs and enhanced FFBDs (EFFBDs). 
Due to the inclusion of the data transferred between functions, the EFFBDs allowed the 
MIW Team to analyze the functions and steps involved in minehunting operations and to 
define the detailed requirements for the models. The EFFBDs made it possible to develop 
a model that properly accounted for the necessary functions and parameters (variables) 
for the scenario being modeled. The EFFBDs further allowed for the development of the 
physical architecture as well as the model requirements. 
a. Top-Level Minehunting Functions 
Figure 17 displays a top-level EFFBD for functions involved with minehunting 
operations. The individual functions were described previously within this section. The 
basic flow begins after the MCM systems have transited to the minefield area and 
streamed the equipment. The system then goes through the minefield looking for MIL-
ECs. As the system gets to the end of the current track through the minefield, it must ma-
neuver to the next track (shown in another EFFBD) to continue searching for MILECs. 
The next function is reacquire MILECs, during which the MILECs transferred 
from the detect function are located. This is then followed by the classify function, which 
interrogates the MILEC sources to classify the signal return as either a MILCO or a non-
MILCO. This is particularly important, as there could be thousands of MILECs trans-
ferred by the detect function, many of which are not mines. Through the elimination of as 
many non-MILCOs as possible, the MCM system can expend resources where they are 
most needed. The MILCO returns are sent to the next function, analyze data, which is 
also known as the PMA system. This system is able to more accurately resolve the signal 
returns from the classification function to further eliminate false targets. Additionally, the 
results of the analyze data function (or PMA) are processed to identify highly critical 
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mines that are the most dangerous due to their type and location and to assist with plan-
ning of the remainder of the MCM operations. Once the data has been analyzed and deci-
sions are made, the remaining MILCO signals are sent to the reacquire MILCOs function 
for localization so they can be processed by the identify mines function. The identify 
mines function examines the sources of the MILCOs to determine which are mines and 
which are non-mines. These mine objects are then sent to the reacquire mines function to 



















































Figure 17.  EFFBD for Minehunting Functions—Overview 
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These functions are repeated until the minefield has been cleared, with an ac-
ceptable probability that all mines have been neutralized, or until the MCM commander 
orders an end to the operation. Not shown in Figure 17 are the other functions involved 
that have to do with the movement, control, and maintenance of the MCM systems. Due 
to the project’s focus on ACRS, these functions were important to define. The following 
sections and figures will describe these functions in more detail. 
b. Transit Function 
Figure 18 displays the EFFBD for preparing the equipment for MCM operations. 
Shown are the transit from staging area to minefield area function and stream equipment 
function. Once the equipment has been configured and put into the correct position, the 
equipment is ready. This green bubble indicates that this condition is a trigger that causes 
another function to activate. 
 
Figure 18.  Prepare for Operations EFFBD 
c. Detect Function 
Figure 19 displays the first portion of the minehunting operations, the detect func-
tion. Once the MCM system maneuvers into position, the detect mines function is acti-
vated. Two items are output from the detect mines function: MILEC or Non-MILEC. The 
MILEC will trigger subsequent functions to resolve the signals to determine which are 
actually mines and which are not. At the end of the track, if the MCM detecting system 













repeat the detecting function. If the MCM detecting system is out of fuel or requires 
maintenance, it will transit from the minefield to the staging area for service. 
 
Figure 19.  Detect Mines EFFBD 
d. Classify and Analyze Functions 
Figure 20 displays the EFFBD associated with the classify and analyze functions. 
Once the MCM system maneuvers into position, the reacquire MILECs function will at-
tempt to locate the MILECs from the detect function. These reacquired MILECs are sent 
to the classify mines function to be interrogated in more detail. The classify mines func-
tion outputs non-MILCOs or MILCOs. The MILCO contacts are sent to the analyze data 
(PMA) function to be analyzed as previously described. The resultant information is 
passed to the decide course of action function for MCM planning information regarding 




























Figure 20.  Classify and Analyze EFFBD 
e. Identify Function 
Figure 21 displays the EFFBD associated with the identify function. Once the 
MCM system maneuvers into position, the remaining MILCOs from the analyze function 
are sent to the reacquire MILCOs for contact location and then to the identify mines func-
tion. The outputs from the identify mines function are mines or non-mines. As with the 
detect function, once the identify mines function has reached the end of the track, it will 
proceed to the next track or location and the sequence will repeat. If the MCM system 
requires maintenance, service, or fuel, it will return to the staging area. 
 
Figure 21.  Identify EFFBD 







































f. Neutralize Function 
Figure 22 displays the neutralize mines EFFBD. As in the previous stages, the 
system first maneuvers to position and then the reacquire mines function attempts to lo-
cate the mine objects that were identified by the identify mines function. Once located, 
the destroy mines function destroys the mines. Again, this sequence is repeated until the 
system performing the neutralization requires maintenance tasks, such as refueling or re-
arming, at which time it returns to the staging area. 
 
Figure 22.  Neutralize Mines EFFBD 
g. Control and Maintenance Functions 
Figure 23 displays the EFFBD for the control and maintenance functions. Once 
the MCM system has trasited from the minefield to the staging area, the recover gear 
function is initiated to reload the MCM system onto the support platform. At that time, 
dependent upon the system’s need, the platform will load fuel, reload and rearm equip-
ment, and perform maintenance activities on the system as needed. Once all necessary 
service has been provided, the MCM system is again streamed so that it can transit back 
to the minefield to continue operating. 
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Figure 23.  Control and Maintenance EFFBD 
6. Conclusion of the Functional Architecture 
The functional architecture was developed and refined to represent those func-
tions of interest to this study of minehunting operations and capabilities within the prede-
fined scenario. To verify the functional architecture was complete, the MIW Team used 
MBSE methods, specifically CORE’s simulation capability, to ensure that all functions 
and data transfers were accurately represented. Once the functional architecture had been 
developed, using the FFBDs, EFFBDS, hierarchy, and decomposition, it was necessary to 
define and develop the physical architecture. As described in the next section, this in-
volved mapping the physical systems to the functions ensuring that every physical entity 
had a function and vice versa. The physical architecture was then transformed into mod-
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els that represent the functions and the configurations that are described in the physical 
architecture section. 
C. PHYSICAL DECOMPOSITION 
The MCM functions described above are performed by several systems. For the 
purposes of this report, MCM systems can be thought of as being legacy, future, or both. 
Figure 24 shows the first three levels of MCM Systems. As with the functional hierar-
chies, those systems not part of this study are colored in grey. As described in Section B, 
both legacy and future MCM systems consist of AMCM, SMCM, and UMCM systems. 
 
Figure 24.  MCM Physical Systems Hierarchy 
1. Legacy MCM Systems Operational View and Physical Architecture 
Figure 25 shows a graphical depiction of the concept of operations (CONOPS) for 
the legacy MCM 1 MIW operations in terms of tasks, activities, operational elements, 
and data flow paths. It was necessary for the MIW Team to understand these details in 
order to develop the functional and physical architectures that led to the model design 
requirements and representation of the operational scenario under evaluation. Shown in 
Figure 25 is the MCM 1 ship platform towing the detection sonar systems through the 
minefield. Also depicted are the other support platforms that are required to support the 
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helicopter, MH-60S and MH-53E, with the AMCM equipment for detection and neutrali-
zation.  
 
Figure 25.  MCM 1 CONOPS (from MIW C4ISR 2001, Slide 14) 
Once the airborne surface sweep systems clear the area of surface mines, the 
MCM 1 ships move through the minefield, towing the sensor equipment to detect mines. 
Once mines are detected, classified, and identified, they are either neutralized immediate-
ly or their locations are sent to other systems (airborne, underwater, and/or surface) to 
reacquire the contacts and then to neutralize the mines. There are many neutralization op-
tions available in this operational view including the MCM 1 platforms. 
Figure 26 shows the legacy AMCM, SMCM, and UMCM family of systems bro-
ken down into their respective systems or systems of systems. The legacy AMCM, con-
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tems that carry out minehunting and minesweeping functions. Similarly, the legacy 
SMCM consisting of the MCM 1 ship contains both sensing and neutralizing systems. 
Legacy UMCM consists of the EOD divers and MMSs. 
 
Figure 26.  Legacy MCM Physical Systems Hierarchy 
Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the legacy AMCM minehunting and minesweeping 
neutralizers and SMCM minehunting and minesweeping neutralizers; respectively. The 
descriptions of the legacy MCM systems are in Table 4. 
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Figure 27.  Legacy AMCM Neutralizing Systems Hierarchy 
 







































Sensing AN/AQS-24A Side-looking sonar that can detect and classify bottom and moored mines as well as identify bottom mines 
Hunting SeaFox Unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) capable of detect-ing, classifying, identifying, and neutralizing mines 
Sweeping 
MK103 Mechanical sweep with a tow wire, cutters, and floats to 
target shallow-water moored mines 
MK104 Acoustic sweep with a self-rotating cavitating disk in-
side a venturi tube 
MK105 Magnetic sweep consisting of a gas turbine generator 
mounted on a sled 
MK106 Combination sweep consists of both the MK104 and 
MK105 
AN/SPU-1/W Magnetic and acoustic sweep consisting of parallel pipes 
or bars 
AN/37U-1 Mechanical sweep with cable cutters that actuate when 
in contact with mooring cables 
SMCM 
MCM 1 
Sensing AN/SQQ-32 Sonar that can detect and classify moored, close-tethered, and bottom mines 
Hunting 
SeaFox UUV capable of detecting, classifying, identifying, and 
neutralizing mines 
AN/SLQ-4 Remote and unmanned submersible MNS that can neu-
tralize bottom and moored mines 
Archerfish UUV capable of identifying and neutralizing mines 
Sweeping 
AN/SLC-37 Magnetic and acoustic sweep consisting of a straight-tail 
magnetic sweep and an acoustic sweep device  
AN/SLC-38 Mechanical sweep able to cut the mooring cable of 
buoyant mines that are near the surface 
UMCM 
EOD 
Support MCM operations in locating, identifying, neu-
tralizing, recovering, and disposing near surface sea 
mines, torpedoes, and other undersea weapons, includ-
ing underwater IEDs 
MMS 
Specially trained dolphins and sea lions used for detec-
tion and neutralization, swimmer defense, and recovery 
of mines, torpedoes, and other objects 
 
2. Future MCM Systems Operational View and Physical Architecture 
Figure 29 is a graphical depiction of the CONOPS of the LCS capabilities, indi-
cating the tasks, operational elements, data flows, and activities performed within the 
MIW mission. As seen within the CONOPS depiction, the conduct of MIW operations 
involves the integration of several systems working together. It was essential to represent 
these elements shown in Figure 29 in the architectures to be able to translate them into 
the models that were used to develop the comparative data. This approach instilled rele-
vance to the project, because the functional and physical architecture were mirrored from 
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fleet MIW legacy and future operations. This MCM operation is conducted by the use of 
a Sea Hawk helicopter, which departs the ship, flies a track search pattern over the mine-
field, and scans below the surface of the water with a laser scanner pod to hunt for 
MLOs. Once the helicopter has scanned the suspected minefield, the helicopter returns to 
the ship and the data from the laser scanner is downloaded and analyzed by countermine 
mission personnel aboard the ship (Broughton and Burdon 1998). 
 
Figure 29.  LCS CONOPS (from Broughton and Burdon 1998) 
Based on the analysis of the data, one of two courses of action then takes place, 
dependent upon the identification of shallow-water mines. If the laser scan results indi-
cate that there are no shallow water mines in the area that could endanger the ship, the 
ship enters the suspected mine field and initiates a search pattern with its semi-
submersible RMMV that is towed behind the ship. Attached to the RMMV is a tethered 
sonar that is winch-controlled to search different depths with its high-resolution, high 
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frequency sonar. The Sea Hawk helicopter also continues searching the minefield with a 
tethered sonar that it winches into the water and tows through the water to locate the deep 
water mines (mines located 200 to 600 feet below the surface). Once the deep-water 
mines are located, the helicopter is used to carry another pod to neutralize the mines. This 
pod is also winched into the water and maneuvered close to the mines where individual 
torpedo-like modules, called Archer Fish, then separate from the pod. A flight crew oper-
ator remotely controls the Archer Fish from the helicopter to direct them to the mine, at 
which point they are detonated to destroy the mines. If shallow water mines are found by 
the initial laser scan from the Sea Hawk, the pod containing the Archer-Fish can be load-
ed and the helicopter can then deploy to destroy the shallow water mines, making it safe 
for the ship-towed sonar and helicopter-towed sonar to continue the search for the deep 
water mines. This process is continued until all the mines are neutralized. See Figure 30 










































Figure 30.  LCS Countermine Warfare Flow Chart  
(after National Geographic Channel 2014) 
Figure 31 shows the future AMCM, SMCM, and UMCM family of systems bro-
ken down into their respective systems or systems of systems. The legacy AMCM, con-
sisting of the MH-60S helicopter, contains both sensing (detecting) and neutralizing sys-
tems that carry out minehunting functions. The future SMCM, consisting of the LCS 
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ship, contains both sensing and neutralizing systems. Future UMCM, like legacy UMCM, 
consists of the EOD divers and MMSs. 
 
Figure 31.  Future MCM Physical Systems Hierarchy 
Table 5 shows the future MCM system hierarchy and provides a description of the 
future MCM systems. 









Airborne laser mine 
detection system 
(ALMDS) 
Electro-optic laser system to detect, classify, and 





Remotely operated MNS that reacquires and neutral-
izes previously identified targets with Archerfish 
SMCM 
LCS Sensing 
RMS-AN/AQS-20A Unmanned, semi-autonomous vehicle that tows the 
AQS-20A, a sonar for detecting, classifying, locat-
ing, and identifying bottom, close-tethered, and 







Knifefish Autonomous unmanned undersea system that pro-
vides buried mine detection capability 
Sweeping UISS Unmanned surface craft that tows a magnetic cable and acoustical signal generator 
UMCM 
EOD 
Support MCM operations in locating, identifying, 
neutralizing, recovering, and disposing near surface 
sea mines, torpedoes, and other undersea weapons, 
including underwater IEDs 
MMS 
Specially trained dolphins and sea lions used for de-
tection and neutralization, swimmer defense, and 
recovery of mines, torpedoes, and other objects 
 
3. Physical Traceability to Functions 
Table 6 shows the traceability of the functions described in Section B to the phys-
ical systems described in this section. Only the minehunting functions and systems rele-
vant to the scope of this report are shown. This mapping, in addition to the value hierar-
chy described in Section D, acts as a tool to validate that the basis for the project model is 
grounded to actual functions and physical systems. 
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Table 6.   Functional/Physical Traceability Matrix 
 
 
D. VALUE HIERARCHY 
The value hierarchy is based on the objectives derived from the functional hierar-
chy described in Section B. The functional hierarchy portrays the sub-functions derived 
from the MCM research and from analyzing stakeholder needs; these sub-functions acted 
as objectives for the SE team in developing appropriate qualitative functional evaluation 
measures. 
After the system functional hierarchy was developed, the MIW Team performed a 
value system design analysis as a precursor to considering design implementation alterna-





















































































































































1.1.2 Perform Mine Hunting Operations
1.1.2.1 Detect Mines X X X X X X
1.1.2.2 Classify MILECs X X X X X X
1.1.2.3 Reacquire MILCOs X X X X X X
1.1.2.4 Identify Mines X X X X X X X
1.1.3 Neutralize Mines
1.1.3.1 Reaquire Mines X X X X X X X
1.1.3.2 Destroy Mines X X X X X
1.2 Control Equipment
1.2.1 Transit Systems X X X X X
1.2.2 Load Fuel X X X X
1.2.3 Maneuver Systems X X X X X
1.2.4 Recover Gear X X X X X
1.2.5 Stream Gear X X X X X
1.2.6 Reload and Rearm X X X X X X X X X
1.3 Gather/Receive Data and Information
1.3.1 PMA X X
1.3.2 Decide Course of Action X X






and objectives so that stakeholders have a metric by which they can later score design 
alternatives. In this project, the value system design allowed for the definition of the re-
quirements for the simulations that were used to develop the performance comparisons 
between the different MCM configurations. A fundamental tool used as part of value sys-
tem design is the value hierarchy. The value hierarchy depicts a value tree where the 
stakeholder effective need is traced to functions and objectives and their corresponding 
evaluation measures. The evaluation measures identify qualitative metrics for verifying 
that stakeholder needs are being met. Evaluation measures are further decomposed into 
MOEs and MOPs. MOEs formalize the qualitative evaluation measure for a particular 
function/objective while MOPs provide a foundation for formulating a performance re-
quirement to meet the MOEs. 
The performance and evaluation measures for MIW operations is defined in PEO 
LMW Instruction 3370.1A (Hagan 2008) and was used as the foundation for the MOEs 
and MOPs used within this project. The measures associated with defensive MCM are 
shown in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32.  Defensive MCM MOEs and MOPs Per PEO LMW 3370.1A  
(after PEO LMW 2008) 
Not all of the measures identified in Figure 32 applied to this project. Due to the 
study’s focus and the project’s constraints, only a subset of the measures were required 
for this analysis. Therefore, the MIW Team developed the value hierarchy depicted in 
Figure 33. This figure contains the objectives, MOEs, and MOPs associated with the 
overall purposes and goals for the simulation to be run in order to develop the compara-
tive analysis. 
The MIW Team also used the MOPs from the value hierarchy as a basis for gen-
erating requirements described in Section E. These requirements are associated with the 








































































Figure 33.  Value Hierarchy (after PEO LMW 2008) 
The effective need is to conduct a comparative analysis between the five different 
MCM configurations (four MCM 1 and one LCS configuration) in terms of ACRS and 
effectiveness. This overarching need was decomposed into a single objective and then to 
two MOEs and further decomposed into multiple MOPs. 
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1. Effective Need 
The effective need is shown in Figure 33 and is restated here: the stakeholders 
need to analyze and compare MCM effectiveness of the two capabilities offered by the 
two MCM 1 configurations and the future, Increment 1 installed on the LCS platforms. 
This need was decomposed into one primary objective. 
2. Primary Objective 
The primary objective was to perform a comparative analysis of the ACRS and 
percent clearance for the three MCM configurations in the conduct of minehunting in a 
predefined area in deep water. The MIW Team determined that a simulation containing 
models of the minehunting functions was the best way to represent the functions in repre-
sentative mission scenarios. 
The first MOE is to determine the ACRS for the conduct of the minehunting op-
eration. 
 MOE 1.1: Calculate the ACRS for the minehunting operation based on the 
specified performance parameters IAW PEO LM 3370.1A (2008).  
As stated, this project evaluated three different MCM configurations; therefore, 
the performance and operation of the different systems for each had to be represented in 
the simulation. This single MOE was decomposed into 18 MOPs to provide evidence of 
satisfying this MOE. 
 MOP 1.1.1 Sortie Time Required in the Area (Tsortie): This MOP sup-
ports the ACRS MOE and is the total sortie time in an area. It is a function 
of the number of sorties, the average time in the area per sortie, the plat-
form duty-cycle, and systems’ availabilities, and the time to sweep or 
hunt. 
 MOP 1.1.2 Transit Time to Target Area (Tta): This MOP supports the 
ACRS MOE and is the time to transit from the staging area to the area of 
the mine. In this study, this is calculated within the simulation using the 
supplied transit speed in knots and the distance from the current location 
to the mine location. 
 MOP 1.1.3 Transit Time to Staging Area (Tsa): This MOP supports the 
ACRS MOE and is the time to transit from the mine area to the staging ar-
ea. In this study, this is calculated within the simulation using the supplied 
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transit speed (in knots) and the distance from the current location to the 
staging location. 
 MOP 1.1.4 Time to Stream MCM Gear for Search Equipment (Tstream): 
This MOP supports the ACRS MOE and is the time required to deploy the 
MCM equipment from the platform. 
 MOP 1.1.5 Time to Recover MCM Gear (Trecover): This MOP supports 
the ACRS MOE and is the time required to recover or load the MCM 
equipment to the platform. 
 MOP 1.1.6 Time to Refuel/Rearm/Reconfigure (Trr): This MOP supports 
the ACRS MOE and is the time required to refuel, rearm, or reconfigure 
the MCM equipment. 
 MOP 1.1.7 Time to Turn (Tturn): This MOP supports the ACRS MOE and 
is the time required for the MCM platform to turn from one track to the 
next.  
 MOP 1.1.8 Time to Deploy for RI&N Equipment (Tdeploy): This MOP 
supports the ACRS MOE and is the time required to deploy the MCM 
equipment from the platform. 
 MOP 1.1.9 Average Time in Field per Sortie (Taps): This MOP supports 
the ACRS MOE and is the average time in the field per sortie for each 
MCM platform. 
 MOP 1.1.10 Number of Sorties (Nst): This MOP supports the ACRS 
MOE and is the number of sorties needed to complete a mission. 
 MOP 1.1.11 Operational Availability (Ao): This metric primarily supports 
the ACRS MOE and is the probability that the MCM equipment is capable 
of performing its function when it is needed. This metric is not explicitly 
modeled within the simulation, but is accounted for by a delay in the oper-
ation time. 
 MOP 1.1.12 On Duty Time (Ton): This metric supports the ACRS MOE 
and captures the operational constraints of the use of the MCM equipment. 
 MOP 1.1.13 Off Duty Time (Toff): This metric supports the ACRS MOE 
and captures the operational constraints of the use of the MCM equipment. 
 MOP 1.1.14 Time to Hunt (Thunt): This MOP supports the ACRS MOE 
and accounts for the total amount of time to perform minehunting. It is a 
function of the search time, time to classify, time to reacquire for identifi-
cation, time to identify, time to reacquire for neutralization, and time to 
neutralize. 
 MOP 1.1.15 Classification Time (Tcmm, Tcmn, Tcnm, Tcnn): This MOP 
supports the ACRS MOE and is the total time to classify. Classification 
time is a function of the number of classification attempts on mines, the 
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number of classification attempts on non-mines, the time to classify a 
mine as mine (Tcmm), the time to classify a non-mine as mine (Tcnm), 
the time to classify a non-mine as a non-mine (Tcnn) and the time to clas-
sify a mine as a non-mine (Tcnm). 
 MOP 1.1.16 Reacquisition Time for Identification and for Neutralization 
(Trmm, Trmn, Trnm, Trnn): This MOP supports the ACRS MOE and is 
the total time to reacquire a mine for identification or neutralization. Re-
acquisition time is a function of the number of reacquisition attempts on 
mines, the number of reacquisition attempts on non-mines, the time to re-
acquire a mine as mine (Trmm), the time to reacquire a non-mine as mine 
(Trnm), the time to reacquire a non-mine as a non-mine (Trnn) and the 
time to reacquire a mine as a non-mine (Trnm). 
 MOP 1.1.17 Identification Time (Timm, Timn, Tinm, Tinn): This MOP 
supports the ACRS MOE and is the total time to identify a mine. Identifi-
cation time is a function of the number of identification attempts on mines, 
the number of identification attempts on non-mines, the time to identify a 
mine as mine (Timm), the time to identify a non-mine as mine (Tinm), the 
time to identify a non-mine as a non-mine (Tinn) and the time to identify a 
mine as a non-mine (Tinm). 
 MOP 1.1.18 Neutralization Time (Tnm, Tnn): This MOP supports the 
ACRS MOE and is the total time to neutralize a mine. Neutralization time 
is a function of the number of neutralization attempts on mines, the num-
ber of neutralization attempts on non-mines, the time to neutralize a mine 
(Tnm) and the time to neutralize a non-mine (Tnn) (PEO LMW 2008). 
The second MOE is to determine the effectiveness of the minehunting operation 
in terms of the percent clearance. 
 MOE 1.2: Calculate the mine clearance effectiveness for each configura-
tion based on the specified performance parameters IAW PEO LMW 
3370.1A (2008). 
There are five MOPs for this MOE. 
 MOP 1.2.1 Probability of Detection vs. Lateral Range [PD(y)]: This met-
ric deals with the probability that a mine will be detected by the search so-
nar system as a function of the lateral range from the sonar system to the 
mine object. 
 MOP 1.2.2 Probability of Classification (Pcmm, Pcmn, Pcnm, Pcnn): This 
metric supports the effectiveness MOE and deals with the probability that 
a mine, once detected, is properly classified as a MILCO. The MOP deals 
with the probability of classifying a MILCO as a MILCO (Pcmm), the 
probability of classifying a MILCO as a non-MILCO (Pcmn), the proba-
bility of classifying a non-MILCO as a MILCO (Pcnm) and the probabil-
ity of classifying a non-MILCO as a non-MILCO (Pcnn). 
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 MOP 1.2.3 Probability of Reacquisition (Prmm, Prmn, Prnm, Prnn): This 
metric supports the effectiveness MOE and is the probability that the next 
MCM system used either for identification or for neutralization can accu-
rately locate the MILCO or identified mine so that the object can be either 
identified or neutralized. The MOP deals with the probability of reacquir-
ing a MILCO or mine as a MILCO or mine (Prmm), the probability of re-
acquiring a MILCO or mine as a non-MILCO or non-mine (Prmn), the 
probability of reacquiring a non-MILCO or non-mine as a MILCO or 
mine (Prnm) and the probability of reacquiring a non-MILCO or non-mine 
as a non-MILCO or non-mine (Pcnn). 
 MOP 1.2.4 Probability of Identification (Pimm, Pimn, Pinm, Pinn): This 
metric supports the effectiveness MOE and is the probability that a MIL-
CO is accurately identified as a mine. The MOP deals with the probability 
of identifying a MILCO as a mine (Pimm), the probability of identifying a 
MILCO as a non-mine (Pimn), the probability of identifying a non-
MILCO as a mine (Pinm) and the probability of identifying a non-MILCO 
as a non-mine (Pinn). 
 MOP 1.2.5 Probability of neutralization (Pn): This metric supports the ef-
fectiveness MOE and is the probability that a mine is successfully neutral-
ized. Although this MOP refers to detonation of the mine by any means 
(i.e., mechanical sweeping, influence sweeping, or charge placement), this 
study only evaluated this metric as it pertains to minehunting operations 
(charge placement, detonation, and accuracy) (PEO LMW 2008). 
Not captured in the listed MOPs are the set of elements that are required for the 
simulation to function such that the MOPs can be represented and calculated to provide 
the resultant MOEs, ACRS and percent clearance.  
E. REQUIREMENTS 
The following describes the detailed requirements for the study. IAW the defined 
SE process, the top-level requirements (Chapter III) were decomposed into detailed re-
quirements as listed in Table 7. The top-level requirements are shown in bold. 
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Table 7.   Detailed Requirements (after PEO LMW 2008) 
REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT 
1.0 The simulation shall enable the determination of the ACRS for each MCM 
configuration in the performance of mine hunting.  
1.1 The simulation shall represent the time required to perform each minehunt-
ing function within the minehunting operation: travel, detect, classify, identi-
fy, reacquire, and neutralize for each MCM configuration. 
1.1.1 The simulation shall represent the sortie time required in the area (Tsortie). 
1.1.1.1 The simulation shall represent the maximum endurance time per system (Sor-
tie_Time) for surface platforms between 336 and 504 hours. 
1.1.1.2 The simulation shall represent the maximum endurance time per system (Sor-
tie_Time) for airborne systems between one and four hours. 
1.1.2 The simulation shall represent the transit time to target area (Tta). 
1.1.2.1 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of MCM 1 between 10 and 15 
knots. 
1.1.2.2 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of LCS between 20 and 40 knots. 
1.1.2.3 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of helicopter between 80 and 150 
knots. 
1.1.2.4 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of airborne deployed neutralizer 
between zero and five knots. 
1.1.3 The simulation shall represent the transit time to staging area (Tsa). 
1.1.4 The simulation shall represent the time to stream MCM gear (Tstream) 
1.1.4.1 The simulation shall represent the time to stream MCM gear (Tstream) for search 
equipment for surface platforms between 0.25 and two hours. 
1.1.4.2 The simulation shall represent the time to stream MCM gear (Tstream) for search 
equipment for airborne systems between 0.2 and 0.5 hours. 
1.1.5 The simulation shall represent the time to recover MCM gear (Trecover). 
1.1.5.1 The simulation shall represent the time to recover RI&N equipment for surface 
platforms between 0.1 and two hours. 
1.1.5.2 The simulation shall represent the time to recover the search equipment for sur-
face platforms between 0.25 and two hours. 
1.1.5.3 The simulation shall represent the time to recover RI&N equipment for airborne 
systems between 0.2 and one hour. 
1.1.5.4 The simulation shall represent the time to recover the search equipment for air-
borne systems between 0.2 and 0.5 hours. 
1.1.6 The simulation shall represent the time to refuel/rearm/reconfigure (Trr) 
1.1.6.1 The simulation shall represent the time to refuel/rearm/reconfigure (Trr) for sur-
face platforms between four and eight hours. 
1.1.6.2 The simulation shall represent the time to refuel/rearm/reconfigure (Trr) for air-
borne systems between four and eight. 
1.1.7 The simulation shall represent the time to turn (Tturn). 
1.1.7.1 The simulation shall represent the time to turn (Tturn) for surface platforms be-
tween 300 and 600 seconds. 
1.1.7.2 The simulation shall represent the time to turn (Tturn) for airborne systems be-
tween 120 and 240 seconds. 
1.1.8 The simulation shall represent the time to deploy (Tdeploy) for RI&N equipment. 
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REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT 
1.1.8.1 The simulation shall represent the time to deploy (Tdeploy) for RI&N equipment 
for surface platforms between 0.1 and two hours. 
1.1.8.2 The simulation shall represent the time to deploy (Tdeploy) for RI&N equipment 
for airborne systems between 0.1 and one hour. 
1.1.9 The simulation shall represent the average time in field per sortie (Taps). 
1.1.10 The simulation shall represent the number of sorties (Nst). 
1.1.11 The simulation shall represent the operational availability (Ao). 
1.1.12 The simulation shall represent the on duty time (Ton). 
1.1.13 The simulation shall represent the off duty time (Toff). 
1.1.14 The simulation shall represent the time to hunt (Thunt). 
1.1.14.1 The simulation shall represent the speed in search area for surface platforms be-
tween one and five knots. 
1.1.14.2 The simulation shall represent the speed in search area for airborne systems be-
tween 10 and 30 knots. 
1.1.14.3 The simulation shall represent the number of search tracks per NM for surface 
platforms between 10 and 40. 
1.1.14.4 The simulation shall represent the number of search tracks per NM for airborne 
systems between 10 and 40. 
1.1.14.5 The simulation shall represent the number of passes per track for airborne systems 
between one and four. 
1.1.15 The simulation shall represent the classification time (Tcmm, Tcmn, Tcnm, Tcnn). 
1.1.16 The simulation shall represent the reacquisition for identification and for neutrali-
zation time (Trmm, Trmn, Trnm, Trnn). 
1.1.16.1 The simulation shall represent the mean reacquisition and identification for sur-
face platforms between 0.25 and one hour. 
1.1.16.2 The simulation shall represent the standard deviation time for reacquisition and 
identification for surface platforms between 0.1 and 0.5 hours. 
1.1.16.3 The simulation shall represent the mean reacquisition and identification for air-
borne systems between 0.5 and one hour. 
1.1.16.4 The simulation shall represent the standard deviation time for reacquisition and 
identification for airborne systems between 0.1 and 0.5 hours. 
1.1.16.5 The simulation shall represent the mean reacquisition and neutralization for sur-
face platforms between 0.2 and 0.5 hours. 
1.1.16.6 The simulation shall represent the standard deviation time for reacquisition and 
neutralization for surface platforms between 0.10 and 0.25 hours. 
1.1.16.7 The simulation shall represent the minimum safe stand-off distance during neu-
tralization (MCM 1) between 250 and 300 yards. 
1.1.16.8 The simulation shall represent the minimum safe stand-off distance during neu-
tralization (helicopter) between 300 and 350 yards. 
1.1.16.9 The simulation shall represent the minimum time for reacquisition for identifica-
tion, airborne deployed neutralizer between 0.25 and 0.50 hours. 
1.1.17 The simulation shall represent the identification time (Timm, Timn, Tinm, Tinn). 
1.1.18 The simulation shall represent the neutralization time (Tnm, Tnn). 
1.1.18.1 The simulation shall represent the number of neutralizers for MH-53E between 
zero and six. 
1.1.18.2 The simulation shall represent the number of neutralizers for MH-60S between 
zero and four. 
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REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT 
1.2 The simulation shall calculate the ACRS (time required to conduct the entire 
minehunting sequence). 
2.0 The simulation shall model the effectiveness of each minehunting function. 
2.1 The simulation shall calculate and store the effectiveness of each minehunting 
function. 
2.1.1 The simulation shall represent the probability of detection vs. lateral range 
[PD(y)] between 0.3 and 0.9. 
2.1.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of classification (Pcmm, Pcmn, 
Pcnm, Pcnn). 
2.1.2.1 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO 
for surface platforms between 0.5 and 0.9. 
2.1.2.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-
MILCO for surface platforms between 0.5 and 0.9. 
2.1.2.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO 
for airborne systems between 0.5 and 0.9. 
2.1.2.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-
MILCO for airborne systems between 0.5 and 0.9. 
2.1.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquisition (Prmm, Prmn, 
Prnm, Prnn). 
2.1.3.1 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquiring a mine as a MILCO 
for identification for surface platforms between 0.3 and 0.8. 
2.1.3.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquiring a mine for neutraliza-
tion given mine was already identified as a mine for surface platforms between 0.3 
and one. 
2.1.3.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of not reacquiring a non-mine as a 
MILCO for identification for surface systems between 0.01 and 0.30. 
2.1.3.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of not reacquiring a non-mine for 
neutralization given non-mine was already identified as a mine for surface sys-
tems between 0.01 and 0.30. 
2.1.3.5 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquiring a mine as a MILCO 
for identification for airborne platforms between 0.3 and 0.8. 
2.1.3.6 The simulation shall represent the probability of not reacquiring a non-mine as a 
MILCO for identification for airborne systems between 0.01 and 0.50. 
2.1.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of identification (Pimm, Pimn, 
Pinm, Pinn). 
2.1.4.1 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a mine as a mine for 
surface platforms between 0.5 and one. 
2.1.4.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a non-mine as a non-
mine for surface platforms between 0.5 and one. 
2.1.4.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a mine as a mine for 
airborne systems between 0.5 and one. 
2.1.4.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a non-mine as a non-
mine for airborne systems between 0.5 and one. 
2.1.5 The simulation shall represent the probability of neutralization (Pn) between 0.5 
and 0.9. 
2.2 The simulation shall calculate and output the overall minehunting effective-
ness in terms of the number of mines cleared, number of mines remaining, 
and the number of non-mines that were neutralized.  
3.0 The simulation shall contain models of the minehunting sequence of events 
for the different configurations. 
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REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT 
3.1 The simulation shall represent each of the three MCM configuration’s mine-
hunting functions: search, detect, classify, identify, reacquire, and neutralize. 
3.2 The simulation shall represent the minefield size and location for use in the 
effectiveness and ACRS calculations. 
3.2.1 The simulation shall represent the search area. 
3.2.1.1 The simulation shall represent the length of search area between one and 100. 
3.2.1.2 The simulation shall represent the width of search area between one and 100. 
3.2.1.3 The simulation shall represent the percentage of area covered by surface search 
(MCM 1) between zero and 100. 
3.2.1.4 The simulation shall represent the percentage of area covered by surface neutrali-
zation (MCM 1) between zero and 100. 
3.2.2 The simulation shall represent the staging position's coordinates for use in the 
ACRS and effectiveness calculations. 
3.2.2.1 The simulation shall represent the staging position—X-Coordinate between -50 
and zero. 
3.2.2.2 The simulation shall represent the staging position—Y-Coordinate between zero 
and SLOC width. 
3.2.3 The simulation shall represent the number of mines between one and 1000. 
3.2.4 The simulation shall represent the non-mine density for classification (λcnm) be-
tween one and 1000. 
3.3 The simulation shall transition the state and minehunting results of the pre-
vious function to the subsequent function IAW PEO LMW Instruction 
3370.1A (2008). 
4.0 The simulation shall support setting and modifying the listed performance 
parameters without requiring modifying the simulation. 
4.1 The simulation shall import specified input parameters without requiring 
modifications to the code. 
4.2 The simulation shall support the export of the resulting effectiveness and 
time-to-complete parameters to a form that can be analyzed by statistical 
software products such as Excel and Minitab. 
4.3 The simulation shall be developed in a modular method that allows for each 
function to be replaced. 
5.0 The simulation shall include documentation that facilitates the use of the 
simulation tool by future study groups. 
5.1 The simulation shall include documentation that describes the use of the code 
and descriptions of the input and output parameters. 
5.2 The simulation shall include documentation that describes the code, the 






Table 8 displays the mapping of the MOPs to the detailed requirements indicating 
that each MOP has a matching requirement. Note that some of the requirements do not 
map directly to specific MOPs, these requirements ensure that the simulation developed 
is sufficient to be used as the tool for performing the comparative analysis. These are 
marked on the table as “Non-functional—Ease of Use” to indicate that the satisfaction of 
these requirements had been addressed. 
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Table 8.   MOP to Requirement Mapping Matrix 
MOP(s) REQUIREMENT 
1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2
Sortie Time Required in the Area (Tsortie) X X   X X X X X    
Transit Time to Target Area (Tta) X X    X  X X    
Transit Time to Staging Area (Tsa) X X    X  X X    
Time to Stream MCM Gear (Tstream) for Search 
Equipment X X      X X    
Time to Recover MCM Gear (Trecover) X X      X X    
Time to Refuel/Rearm/Reconfigure (Trr) X X      X X    
Time to Turn (Tturn) X X      X X    
Time to Deploy (Tdeploy) for RI&N Equipment X X      X X    
Average Time in Field per Sortie (Taps) X X    X X X X    
Number of Sorties (Nst) X X    X X X X    
Operational Availability (Ao) X X       X    
On Duty Time (Ton) X X       X    
Off Duty Time (Toff) X X       X    
Time to Hunt (Thunt) X X   X X X X X    
Classification Time (Tcmm, Tcmn, Tcnm, Tcnn) X X   X X X X X    
Reacquisition for Identification and for Neutralization 
Time (Trmm, Trmn, Trnm, Trnn) X X   X X X X X    
Identification Time (Timm, Timn, Tinm, Tinn) X X   X X X X X    
Neutralization Time (Tnm, Tnn) X X   X X X X X    
Probability of Detection vs. Lateral Range (PD(y))   X X X X X X X    
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MOP(s) REQUIREMENT 
1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2
Probability of Classification (Pcmm, Pcmn, Pcnm, 
Pcnn)   X X X X X X X    
Probability of Reacquisition (Prmm, Prmn, Prnm, 
Prnn)   X X X X X X X    
Probability of Identification (Pimm, Pimn, Pinm, 
Pinn)   X X X X X X X    
Probability of Neutralization (Pn)   X X X X X X X    
Non-Functional—Ease of Use          X X X 
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F. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE SUMMARY 
A methodical, MBSE methodology was used to develop the system architecture 
that included the functional, physical architectures as well as the mapping of the perfor-
mance parameters required to fully represent the two MCM SOS. The development of the 
architectures was initiated with an evaluation of the various tasks and elements required 
for the conduct of MCM from a top-level perspective. This was then transformed into the 
functional and physical architectures through the development of a functional decomposi-
tion, FFBDs, and EFFBDs. The physical systems that perform the various functions were 
then evaluated and the physical decomposition and mapping to the functional architecture 
was performed. Subsequent to the development of these architecture designs were the 
identification of the MOEs and MOPs and the development of the value hierarchy to as-
sociate these with the performance of the MCM systems. Once the functional and physi-
cal architectures were developed and the requirements and MOPs defined, it was neces-
sary to evaluate the scenario within which the study was to be performed. The infor-
mation regarding the scenario is included in the next chapter. 
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V. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides an operational analysis of the U.S. Navy’s MCM missions 
as well as the operational concept for legacy and future MCM operations and capabilities. 
This chapter also lists and describes different operational vignettes for a particular MCM 
scenario based on relevant operational context that were modeled and studied as a basis 
for comparative analysis between the legacy and future MCM systems. 
A. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 
As described in Chapter I, naval MIW has not sustained a consistent level of in-
terest, historically, as compared to some other primary naval warfare disciplines, such as 
ASuW, ASW, and AAW. Consequently, organic fleet surface assets for MCM have con-
sisted of wood ships optimized for hunting or sweeping for sea mines by venturing into 
minefields to conduct MCM operations. These MIW ships were made small and maneu-
verable so that they could negotiate operations inside the minefields. Limitations of these 
ships are that they need to be carried to the minefield by heavy lift ships (one heavy lift 
ship carries two MCM 1 ships) and must rely on other large ships, such as Landing Heli-
copter Dock (LHD) ships, in the fleet to carry any MIW aviation assets, such as the CH-
53D Sea Dragon. As a result, MCM warfare has had to maintain a very large footprint, 
due to the large number of specialized equipment and personnel as well as the logistics 
requirements to move this equipment to the minefield in case an operational need arises. 
This operational concept is shown on the left side of Figure 34 where four smaller MCM 
platforms, a larger LHD ship with aerial MCM assets, and a separate LSD with EOD de-
tachment are needed to carry out a particular MCM mission. As a result of the past ineffi-
cient and dangerous methods of conducting MCM, the new line of MIW capable ships, 
the LCS, is planned to provide the fleet with an organic MCM capability through the 
four-phase LCS MIW package integration plan. This new operational concept is shown 
on the right side of Figure 34 where five LCS ships with their inherent aerial MCM capa-
bility are able to perform the same MCM mission with fewer personnel (390 instead of 
2,300 sailors) and equipment. 
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Figure 34.  MCM Roadmap (from Amador 2011) 
The LCS MIW deployment mission packages will be a four-phase process, begin-
ning in 2014, and scheduled to be completed in 2024. Each phase of LCS MIW develop-
ment and fielding process will add MIW capabilities to the LCS platform. As can be seen 
in Figure 35, as the LCS MIW capabilities are fielded (indicated by the label “LCS/MIW 
Ramp-Up”), new fleet MIW capabilities will be gained. Simultaneously, during the LCS 
MIW ramp-up period, the legacy MCM ship, MCM 1 ships, will be decommissioned, as 
indicated by the arrow labeled “MCM 1 Ramp-down.” 
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Figure 35.  MCM Transition  
It is this transition, from the MCM 1 being the cornerstone of naval MIW and op-
erating inside the minefield, to the LCS taking over this responsibility that poses a chal-
lange to maintaining an effective MCM capability. The LCS will primarily operate out-
side of the minefield (for initial phases of MCM) and then venture into the minefield 
once it is verified that mines have been neutralized and are not a threat to the ship. During 
this transition phase, occurring between 2017 and 2024, both MCM systems will be in 
operation, with the simultaneous ramp-down of the legacy MCM system and ramp-up of 
the LCS over the four phases of its MIW mission package deployment. This LCS MIW 
mission package deployment schedule can be seen in Figure 36. Note that in the legend 
for Figure 36, the reduction of the MH-53E Sea Dragon is tied to the reduction of the 
MCM 1, as each is part of the legacy MIW mission package despite the MCM 1 not be-
ing an aircraft capable ship. Figure 36 also depicts the simultaneous ramp down of the 
MCM 1 and MH-53E and ramp up of the LCS and MIW Increment 1 (Spiral Alpha) 
MCM Mission Package. 
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Figure 36.  Transition from Legacy to Future MCM Capability  
(from Amador 2011) 
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 
As described in Chapter I, MCM operations involve minehunting and minesweep-
ing. The comparative analysis focused on the minehunting capabilities of the legacy 
MCM 1 including the MH-53E and future incremental minehunting capabilities of the 
LCS including the MH-60S. In comparing legacy and future MCM effectiveness, it was 
important to consider differences in the way the legacy systems perform an MCM opera-
tion as compared to future systems. 
Legacy systems are able to perform a complete minehunting mission, from detec-
tion to neutralization, but must perform the functions of the mission in a more serial fash-
ion compared to future systems (LT Andrew Watts, personal communication, 10 July 
2014). Typically, the MH-53E is first deployed from a LHD ship outside the minefield to 
detect and classify mines with towed sonar. For surface mines, EOD divers or legacy 
sweep systems are needed for neutralization. The MH-53E also checks for moored 
MILCOs using “persistence by checking MLO track position with respect to time during 
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several runs, which is an indication a MLO is a mine” (Brett Cordes, personal communi-
cation, 12 August 2014). Following a PMA of MILCOs, a target list is generated for neu-
tralization. If the list contains a large number of targets then both the MH-53E and MCM 
1 are utilized for neutralization; otherwise, the MH-53E is the primary neutralizer. If the 
helicopter is not outfitted with a neutralization system, such as SeaFox, then the MCM 1 
is brought in to reacquire the MILCOs, identify them as mines, and neutralize them. The 
MH-53E can fly for approximately four hours. Each stage of hunting has an associated 
execution time, making the serial aspect of legacy MCM operations for particular mis-
sions especially time consuming (DON 2010). 
The future MCM capabilities afforded by the incremental LCS phases will also be 
able to complete a minehunting mission, from detection to neutralization, but several of 
the functions may be executed in parallel (LT Andrew Watts, personal communication 10 
July 2014). With the embarked MH-60S that is outfitted with both detection and neutrali-
zation systems, the LCS will not have to wait on another ship to provide aerial assets. 
Furthermore, the assets themselves will be able to carry out an entire minehunting mis-
sion for certain types of mines. For near surface mines in shallow water the MH-60S will 
use the ALMDS for detection and classification and the AMNS for neutralization. For 
subsurface mines in deeper water, the LCS will deploy the RMS with towed sonar for 
detection and classification and then utilize the MH-60S outfitted with an Archerfish for 
neutralization. Like the legacy systems, the future systems will be reliant on EOD and 
sweep systems for surface mines (Brett Cordes, personal communication, 8 May 2014). 
For minesweeping, the legacy and future capabilities differ in how they deploy 
surface sweep systems. Both are able to sweep from the air using the MH-53E and MH-
60S for legacy and future, respectively. The legacy surface sweep capability requires the 
MCM 1 to drag the sweep systems in the minefield while the future surface sweep capa-
bility will be provided by a remote unmanned vessel controlled by the LCS outside the 
minefield. 
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C. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
MCM operations are defined by the type of MCM mission objectives where the 
purpose of the attack conducted against the minefield defines the MCM mission (PEO 
LMW 2008). There are five basic objectives that are considered for MCM missions 
(DON 2010): 
 Exploratory: Determine whether mines are present within a certain confi-
dence level. 
 Reconnaissance: Determine the minefield characteristics including the 
number of mines. 
 Breakthrough: Reduce the threat to shipping in an area within a certain 
amount of time through mine clearance. 
 Clearing: Remove the greatest number of mines from an area to an ac-
ceptable level of risk. 
 Attrition: Remove mines from a field as they are added to maintain a cer-
tain risk level. 
Though different strategies are used, with some missions meeting several objec-
tives, a clearance mission in deep water was considered for analysis based on stakeholder 
feedback as to the relevant scenario to study. 
Deep water is defined as water deeper than 200 feet and was selected for this pro-
ject because this depth is the common depth for SLOCs, such as shipping channels, and 
has the potential to have less variability due to terrain effects of shallow water. The goal 
was to use the scenario context to answer the following questions: 
 What are the capabilities (parameters) that have the largest impact on the 
effectiveness of the MCM operations? 
 How does the method of mine clearing (i.e., serial or parallel) impact the 
effectiveness of the different MCM platforms? 
 What are the performance and execution time differences of the different 
configured platforms in the conduct of mine clearing operations? 
Figure 37 depicts a general scenario in which two variants of legacy MCM sys-
tems and one variant of future MCM will be compared, with respect to the clearing of a 
10 NM by 10 NM (100 NM2) portion of a SLOC. Given that each MCM 1 and LCS vari-
ant conducts MCM differently, the common metrics of ACRS, defined as the area (in 
NM2) cleared of mines in a 24-hour period, and the percent effectiveness, defined as the 
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percentage of mines successfully neutralized, were used to compare each variant for 
minehunting. 
 
Figure 37.  Common Deep-Water SLOC Scenario 
The aforementioned transitional environment is the situation considered by this 
project in addressing and analyzing some important stakeholder questions. The compara-
tive analysis accounted for the first LCS MCM increment capabilities as well as two dif-
ferent configurations of the MCM 1 platforms with a complement of MH-53E helicop-
ters. As described in Chapter I, the MCM 1 platforms assigned to the 7th Fleet area of re-
sponsibility are equipped with the newer SeaFox mine neutralizer system, and the MCM 
1 platforms assigned to the 5th Fleet have the older AN/SLQ-48 mine neutralizer systems 
(LT Andrew Watts, personal communication, 10 July 2014). Consequently, a robust sce-
nario was developed that helped to drive the M&S process to ensure that a thorough 
analysis was conducted to evaluate the performance in terms of percent clearance (effec-
tiveness) and ACRS between the different MCM configurations. A total of three specific 
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alternative system configurations were required to conduct a direct comparison between 
two MCM 1 platforms with their complement of MH-53E helicopters and Increment 1 of 
the LCS MCM systems. Table 10 lists the system complement and capabilities projected 
to be afforded by the four increments of the LCS MCM mission package (GAO 2013). 
Table 9.   LCS Incremental Capabilities (after GAO 2013) 







ALMDS X    Detect, classify, and local-ize near surface mines 
AMNS 
X  X*  
Identify and neutralize bot-
tom and moored mines in 
shallow water. 
*add near surface mines 
AN/AQS-20A X    Detect, localize, classify of bottom mines in deep water 
RMS X    Remote vehicle that tows AN/AQS-20A  
Coastal Battlefield Recon-
naissance and Analysis Sys-
tem  
 X   
Provide intelligence prepa-
ration for the minefield 
UISS 
  X  
Unmanned surface vehicle 
that tows an influence 
sweep 
Knifefish    X Unmanned undersea system that detects buried mines 
 
To normalize the basis for comparison, the same general operational deep water 
SLOC scenario was used to compare the system specific configurations shown in Figure 
37. In addition, it was assumed that the SLOC had already been cleared of surface and 
near surface mines. This assumption allowed the focus to be on hunting bottom mines in 
deep water, where each configuration had comparable capability based on system com-
plements. This assumption also allowed the analysis to be limited to the first LCS mis-
sion package, Increment 1, since it provides all necessary systems for hunting bottom 
mines. Additionally, the following MCM system context assumptions were made: 
 Only bottom mines were evaluated. 
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 The area was predefined. 
 The density and number of mines were fixed. 
 The locations of the mines and non-mines was randomly selected. 
 No effects of different sea conditions were considered. 
 No external threats were modeled or studied in this project. 
The stakeholders wanted the comparison to include the current MCM 1 configura-
tions for 5th Fleet and 7th Fleet. Furthermore, as the minehunting operations of the MCM 
1 ships are conducted in different ways (parallel and serial), two different scenarios for 
each configuration had to be evaluated for a total of four MCM 1 scenarios. The LCS 
configuration and operation made the fifth configuration to be studied. Table 10 summa-
rizes these five configurations. 





1A MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SLQ-48 
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24 
Hunt Method: Serial 
1B MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SeaFox 
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24 
Hunt Method: Serial 
2A MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SLQ-48,  
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24, SeaFox 
Hunt Method: Parallel 
2B MCM 1 MH-53E MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SeaFox 
MH-53E: AN/AQS-24, SeaFox 
Hunt Method: Parallel 
3 LCS MH-60S LCS: RMS with AN/AQS-20 
MH-60S: Archerfish 
Hunt Method: Serial  
 
The actual M&S for these comparative configurations was conducted using a 
combination of M&S tools including Excel and ExtendSim. Additional modeling pro-
cesses such as DOE, nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH), and linear regression 
were utilized, as introduced in Chapter II and described in Chapter VII, to determine the 
system parameters that have the highest impact on the performance of the minehunting 
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functions. The configurations considered in addressing the scenario based on stakeholder 
feedback are shown in Tables 11–13. 
Table 11.   Configurations 1A and 1B: MCM 1 with MH-53E (Serial Hunt) 
Situation: A red force navy has laid a minefield in a blue force SLOC. The di-
mensions of the minefield are 10NM x 10NM (100 NM2). Currently 
there is a MIW task group on station consisting of four MCM 1 ships 
outfitted with SQQ-32 sonar and SLQ-48 (Configuration 1A) or Sea-
Fox (Configuration 1B) neutralizers. For air support, one LHD is on 
station carrying four MH-53E Sea Dragons outfitted with the side scan 
AQS-24A sonar. Currently the task force is located outside of the 
minefield, only the MH-53Es have been operating inside of the mine-
field due to a large number of shallow water mines that have been neu-
tralized with the MH-53E’s minesweeping gear. Currently, 100 per-
cent of the surface and shallow water mines have been neutralized by 
the MH-53Es, MCM 1s, or EODs. The rest of the mines in the SLOC 
are deep water bottom mines which will require the cooperative mine 
hunting efforts of the MCM 1 and the MH-53Es. The MCM 1 will de-
tect, classify, identify and neutralize mines while the MH-53E will, in 
parallel, detect and classify mines to be neutralized later by a MCM 1. 
Mission: Complete the clearing of the deep water mines in the SLOC with the 
MCM 1 and MH-53E.  
Execution: On my command clear the mines out of the SLOC in the most efficient 
manner and with the highest level of confidence possible.  
Admin &  
Logistics: 
The MIW task force will be supplied with fuel, ordinance, spare parts, 
food, and water from a constant rotation of maritime prepositioning 
force ships (MPF) ships on rotation from Diego Garcia.  
Command &  
Signal: 
The LHD will be the flag ship, all commands and status reports will be 
communicated through encrypted blue force radio frequencies and da-
ta link. Report mission status updates to task force commander, as well 
as all mission MIW performance parameters and metrics. The task 
force commander is especially interested in the ACRS for each opera-
tional unit. MH-53E MILCOs will undergo PMA prior to being con-
sidered for neutralization 
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The complete physical architecture and functional flows are described in de-
tail in Chapter IV. Figure 38 provides a high-level representation of how configura-
tion 1 executes the scenario described in Table 11. 
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Figure 38.  Configuration 1: MCM 1 with MH-53E (Parallel Hunt and Serial Neutralization)
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Table 12.   Configurations 2A and 2B: MCM 1 with MH-53E (Parallel Hunt)  
Situation: A red force navy has laid a minefield in a blue force SLOC. The di-
mensions of the minefield are 10NM x 10NM (100 NM2). Currently 
there is a MIW task group on station consisting of four MCM 1 ships 
outfitted with SQQ-32 sonar and SLQ-48 (Configuration 2A) or Sea-
Fox (Configuration 2B) neutralizers. For air support, one LHD is on 
station carrying four MH-53E Sea Dragons outfitted with the side scan 
AQS-24A sonar and SeaFox neutralizers. Currently the task force is 
located outside of the minefield; only the MH-53Es have been operat-
ing inside of the minefield due to a large number of shallow water 
mines that have been neutralized with the MH-53E’s minesweeping 
gear. Currently, 100 percent of the surface and shallow water mines 
have been neutralized by the MH-53Es, MCM 1s, or EODs. The rest of 
the mines in the SLOC are deep water bottom mines which will require 
the cooperative mine hunting efforts of the MCM 1 and the MH-53Es. 
The MCM 1 will detect, classify, identify and neutralize mines. The 
MH-53E will, in parallel, first detect and classify mines to be neutral-
ized later by either a MCM 1 or MH-53E. 
Mission: Complete the clearing of the deep water mines in the SLOC with the 
MCM 1 and MH-53E.  
Execution: On my command clear the mines out of the SLOC in the most efficient 
manner and with the highest level of confidence possible.  
Admin &  
Logistics: 
The MIW task force will be supplied with fuel, ordinance, spare parts, 
food, and water from a constant rotation of MPF ships on rotation from 
Diego Garcia.  
Command &  
Signal: 
The LHD will be the flag ship, all commands and status reports will be 
communicated through encrypted blue force radio frequencies and data 
link. Report mission status updates to task force commander, as well as 
all mission MIW performance parameters and metrics. The task force 
commander is especially interested in the ACRS for each operational 
unit. MH-53E MILCOs will undergo PMA prior to being considered 
for neutralization.  
 
Figure 39 provides a high-level representation of how configuration 2 executes 




Figure 39.  Configuration 2: MCM 1 with MH-53E (Parallel Hunt and Parallel Neutralization)
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Table 13.   Configuration 3: LCS Increment 1 
Situation: A red force navy has laid a minefield in a blue force SLOC. The dimen-
sions of the minefield are 10NM x 10NM (100 NM2). Currently there is 
a MIW task group on station consisting of four LCS (MIW Mission 
Package Increment 1) ships, each carrying one MH-60S SeaHawk. The 
task force is located outside of the minefield; only the MH-60Ss have 
been operating inside of the minefield due to a large number of shallow 
water mines that have been detected and classified with the MH-60S’s 
ALMDS laser scanner system, and identified and neutralized by the 
MH-60S Archerfish system. Currently 100 percent of the surface and 
shallow water mines have been neutralized by the MH-60Ss or EODs. 
Now that the shallow water mines have been neutralized, the LCS will 
need to engage the minefield. It will launch the RMS towing the AQS-
20 sonar to detect and classify mines. The MH-60S and flight crew will 
be standing by ready to identify and neutralize mines once the 
RMS/AQS-20 sweeps and a PMA to identify targets is complete.  
Mission: Complete the clearing of the deep water mines in the SLOC with the 
LCS and MH-60S.  
Execution: On my command clear the mines out of the SLOC in the most efficient 
manner and with the highest level of confidence possible.  
Admin &  
Logistics: 
The MIW task force will be supplied with fuel, ordinance, spare parts, 
food and water from a constant rotation of MPF ships on rotation from 
Diego Garcia.  
Command &  
Signal: 
The USS Freedom (LCS-1) will be the flag ship, all commands and sta-
tus reports will be communicated through encrypted blue force radio 
frequencies and data link. Report mission status updates to task force 
commander, as well as all mission MIW performance parameters and 
metrics. The task force commander is especially interested in the ACRS 
for each operational unit. RMS MILCOs will undergo PMA prior to be-
ing considered for neutralization. 
 
The complete physical architecture and functional flows are described in detail in 
Chapter IV, but Figure 40 provides a high-level representation of the way in which con-




Figure 40.  Configuration 3: LCS Increment 1 
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D. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND SCENARIO SUMMARY 
Based on feedback from sponsors and input from SMEs, a relevant scenario was 
developed for comparative analysis between the performances of legacy MCM systems 
and future MCM systems. Specifically, clearance of an area within a deep water SLOC of 
bottom mines was considered with three different configurations. These configurations 
were represented IAW the functional and physical architectures. Once the operational 
scenario was defined, the modeling was initiated. The model provided the method 
through which the comparative analysis was conducted. 
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VI. MODEL AND SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter discusses the development of the models designed as a result of the SE pro-
cess followed. As discussed in Chapter V, a total of five different configurations needed 
to be modeled (four legacy configurations and one future configuration). This chapter 
describes the modeling and simulation tool, ExtendSim, as well as how the decision was 
made to use this particular tool for this study. This chapter then delves into a brief discus-
sion of the models, the methodology behind the models, and instructions on how to run 
the models. This chapter also includes an overview of how to configure the inputs of the 
models to run a simulation, and is heavily tied to Appendix C, which contains more de-
tailed information. Additional detail about the models is included in a separate Software 
Design Document (SDD) that is available with the models (see Appendix D). 
A. CHOICE OF MODELING AND SIMULATION TOOL 
Two M&S tools were considered for the comparison of legacy and future MCM 
capabilities. The MIW Team initially planned to use ExtendSim (Diamond 2007) based 
on previous experience with ExtendSim during the Capabilities Engineering course 
(SE3250) of the MSSE/MSES program, but was made aware of the MANA tool as a pos-
sible alternative. In ExtendSim, models are built by the user from configurable building 
blocks in a graphical programming environment coupled with the ability to integrate 
hand-written code. MANA, on the other hand, is a cellular automation model within the 
general class of agent based models (ABMs), in which entities in the model interact with 
their surroundings in an adaptive way, including behavioral modeling of the entities 
through the use of “personalities” (McIntosh et al. 2007). The model is already coded and 
must be configured through user-selection of inputs. The following sections describe the 
major features of ExtendSim and MANA, followed by an evaluation of the tools for use 
in this project. 
1. ExtendSim 
ExtendSim is a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) application developed by Imag-
ine That Inc. (Diamond 2007). ExtendSim is a simulation tool that allows the user to de-
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velop dynamic models through a graphical interface that provides access to libraries of 
building blocks to represent a wide range of real-world processes, such as queuing and 
transport delays, as well as mathematical and statistical functions. The individual blocks 
can be configured through graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to modify their behaviors. 
ExtendSim also has an equation editor for creating custom algorithms to add functionality 
not already present in the block libraries. ExtendSim is designed for rapid prototyping so 
that basic functionality can be achieved quickly and then additional complexity or fidelity 
can be added as needed, which is facilitated by allowing unlimited hierarchical decompo-
sition to allow the user to produce a modular design with reusable components. Accord-
ing to the ExtendSim User Guide (Diamond 2007), ExtendSim can be used to “dynami-
cally model continuous, discrete event, discrete rate, agent-based, linear, non-linear, and 
mixed-mode systems” (5). 
ExtendSim also includes probabilistic elements to enable Monte Carlo analysis, 
which is supported not only in terms of data input and output, but also by the algorithms 
used within the model itself. Due to the uncertainties in the source data (due to natural 
variations, as well as the need to use unclassified data rather than system specific data), 
the ability to perform Monte Carlo analysis was a critical feature in tool selection for the 
MIW Team. The ExtendSim User Guide (Diamond 2007) provides the following descrip-
tion of Monte Carlo modeling: 
Monte Carlo modeling uses random numbers to vary input parameters for 
a series of calculations. These calculations are performed many times and 
the results from each individual calculation are recorded as an observation. 
The individual observations are statistically summarized, giving an indica-
tion of the likely result and the range of possible results. This not only tells 
what could happen in a given situation, but how likely it is that it will hap-
pen. (47) 
These factors led to the need to model the MCM systems using a range of values for the 
individual system parameters within a DOE approach. The data-passing capabilities of 
ExtendSim, particularly the ability to import and export data between the built-in Ex-
tendSim data tables and Excel, make it ideally suited to performing DOE studies. 
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Members of the MIW Team had some limited experience with ExtendSim from 
previous course work in the Capabilities Engineering course (SE3250) of the 
MSSE/MSES program; however, the MIW Team was unfamiliar with some of the more 
advanced features of ExtendSim, such as 3-D animation, application programming inter-
faces (APIs) to access code created in high level languages (such as C++), and some of 
the other features such as ABM. Even limited the use of ExtendSim to some of its more 
basic capabilities, the MIW Team considered ExtendSim as a viable option because of 
the ability to develop a model specific to the analysis requirements rather than configur-
ing an existing model not build to the project’s requirements. 
2. MANA 
The MANA software (McIntosh et al. 2007) is an ABM that has been in devel-
opment by New Zealand’s Defence Technology Agency (DTA) since 2000. ABMs are a 
class of models that contain entities whose actions are controlled by decision-making al-
gorithms. Within the general class of ABMs, MANA is a cellular automation (CA) com-
bat model. A characteristic of CA models is the adaptive way in which the entities in the 
model interact with their surroundings. Unlike other CA combat models, “the MANA 
model uses a ‘memory map’ to provide shared situational awareness and guide entities 
about the battlefield” (McIntosh et al. 2007, iii). A key aspect of MANA is the behavioral 
modeling of the entities through the use of “personalities” that dictate their behaviors in 
response to one another and the environment. Entities may have weapons, sensors, and 
expendables such as ammunition and fuel. MANA models play out on maps and can in-
clude concealment, cover, terrain, and vegetation. Friendly, enemy, and neutral forces 
can be included and designated by various icons. Built-in trigger states, such as making 
contact with the enemy or running out of fuel, can lead to different behaviors. MANA’s 
strengths are the incorporation of combat factors such as: “change of plans due to the 
evolving battle; the influence of situational awareness when deciding an action; and the 
importance of sensors and how to use them to best advantage” (McIntosh et al. 2007, 5). 
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MANA takes its inputs from extensible markup language (XML) files, which can 
be edited directly or altered through the GUI. MANA can also be instructed to output into 
comma separated value (CSV) files several pre-determined parameters as the results of a 
run or set of runs. MANA can be configured in multi-run mode to run a scenario stochas-
tically a number of times, with up to two of the parameters being systematically varied 
for each run. MANA also includes a genetic algorithm capability to optimize user-
selected personality and agent characteristics based on predefined MOEs (McIntosh et al. 
2007). Genetic algorithms mimic the natural selection process where the “genes” are se-
lected input parameters of the model. With each successive run of the model the genes 
are varied slightly and those that do well in terms of the MOPs are propagated to the next 
generation. There is also a randomization element to the selection of genes that allows the 
complete solution space to be explored and makes it less likely that the solution will con-
verge to a locally optimal solution and more likely to find the global maximum. 
3. Evaluation for Utility in Capstone Study 
Table 14 presents the primary functionality required for the M&S tool for this 
study, as well as features that may be required for possible future developments. These 
future developments may include the human decision making element of MCM rather 
than the prescriptive approach taken with the current study. This would also need to in-
clude messaging (transfer of information between agents) and perhaps genetic algorithms 
for optimization of strategies. This would also make it more important to include 3-D an-
imation to view model outputs graphically and dynamically. 
Table 14.   Comparison of Functionality: ExtendSim vs. MANA 
Current Model 
Functionality Required ExtendSim MANA 
Design of experiments Well supported Limited 
User-defined functions Yes (ModL language) No 
MCM functionality Can be created by user Limited 




Positional resolution Continuously variable 1000x1000 grid
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Future Development 
Functionality Required ExtendSim MANA 
Messaging Yes Yes 
Agent based modeling Sample models available Yes 
Cellular automation Sample models available Yes 
Genetic algorithm Optimization (uses a similar evolution-
ary strategy) 
Yes 
3-D animation Yes Yes 
4. Recommendation for Use 
ExtendSim was chosen as the modeling program for use in this project. MANA 
had numerous technical drawbacks for application in this project and the MIW Team’s 
lack of familiarity with MANA impacted the ability to work around these issues. The key 
issues were the limited capability to perform DOE studies with MANA and the inability 
to modify or add functionality to the library of available model components through di-
rect insertion of source code with user-coded algorithms. Executing a DOE is difficult in 
MANA. Although it has a multi-run capability, which can be set to vary up to two varia-
bles, this capability is limited and does not allow for importing a DOE developed set of 
parameter values for execution (McIntosh et al. 2007). Additionally, MANA only has the 
functionality to represent the detection and classification, but not the identification, of the 
mine targets (McIntosh et al. 2007). Moreover, due to the limited information on actual 
system performance parameters available for the study, the model being created would 
rely on using ranges of factors and identifying critical points and factors of relatively 
large statistical significance to come to conclusions. Therefore, MANA’s limited ability 
to effectively ingest a DOE set of runs for automatic execution was considered a critical 
failing. 
If the models that have been developed during this study are to be developed fur-
ther, the required functionality is believed to exist in ExtendSim; however, this will re-
quire familiarity with some of the more advanced features of ExtendSim. Some of that 
functionality is already contained in MANA. Therefore, an alternative approach may be a 
hybrid of ExtendSim and MANA. It should be noted, however, that in order to integrate 
these two tools it would first be necessary to define and implement an interface between 
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ExtendSim and MANA. Additional information regarding the evaluation of the modeling 
tools is contained within Chapter VI and Appendix B. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF MODELS 
Two MCM models were developed by the MIW Team to support the comparative 
analysis of legacy and future MCM capabilities. One model was developed for the legacy 
MCM 1 system and a separate model for the future LCS system. The decision to develop 
two separate models was made because of the differences in physical architecture of the 
two systems as well as differences in their concepts of operations. Although it would 
have been possible to create a single model to accommodate both systems, it would have 
made it difficult to trace specific parts of the model to each physical system. This lack of 
traceability would unnecessarily complicate the maintainability of a single model. Each 
model is implemented using the discrete event modeling feature within ExtendSim (Dia-
mond 2007). Discrete event modeling involves the event-based modeling of distinct 
items. When events can be widely separated in time, discrete event modeling can lead to 
a more efficient code, rather than using a continuous modeling approach. In a continuous 
modeling approach, the simulation advances in a sequence of very small time increments 
requiring the computation of the simulation variables at every time step, rather than only 
when an event occurs. 
Figure 41 shows the modularity that can be included in an ExtendSim model. The 
top portion of the illustration shows a number of “hierarchical blocks,” each representing 
a separate function. These hierarchical blocks will themselves be part of a higher-level 
hierarchical block representing a higher-level function. By the same token, each of the 
hierarchical blocks shown may itself comprise a set of hierarchical blocks, each repre-
senting a lower-level function. The use of these hierarchical blocks to encapsulate differ-
ent functions results in modules that have high cohesion and low coupling. This facili-
tates both reuse and modification of the individual models. At the lowest level of the hi-
erarchy, shown in the lower left portion of Figure 41, the modules will contain individual 
blocks from the ExtendSim function libraries that can be reconfigured by the user to vary 
their behavior. One of the blocks shown is an “equation” block that can be used to im-
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plement the ModL programming language to add functionality not present in the standard 
libraries of ExtendSim blocks. A short segment of ModL code is shown in the lower right 
portion of Figure 41; however, apart from this example, the details of the model design 
and implementation are described in the SDD (see Appendix D) developed by the MIW 
Team as part of the development process. 
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Figure 41.  ExtendSim Model—Decomposition 
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The model of the legacy MCM 1 system was developed first. The modular archi-
tecture of the models allowed considerable reuse of components and the model of the fu-
ture LCS system was developed in less than 20 percent of the time taken to develop the 
model of the legacy MCM 1 system. 
Four different configurations of the legacy MCM system and one configuration of 
the future LCS system needed to be modeled. The various configurations are summarized 
in Table 15. Although only one model is used for all four configurations of the legacy 
MCM 1 system, the different functions and physical characteristics of each of the four 
configurations are controlled through the settings used for various input parameters (See 
Section D and Section G). 
Table 15.   Overview of the MCM Configurations Modeled 
Configuration Model Description 
1A Legacy MCM 1 with SLQ-48 and MH-53E—Serial Hunt 
1B Legacy MCM 1 with SeaFox and MH-53E—Serial Hunt 
2A Legacy MCM 1 with SLQ-48 and MH-53E with SeaFox—
Parallel Hunt 
2B Legacy MCM 1 with SeaFox and MH-53E with SeaFox—
Parallel Hunt 
3 Future LCS with RMS-AN/AQS-20A and MH-60S with 
Archerfish—Parallel Hunt 
For configurations 1A and 1B, which are termed “serial hunt,” the first phase of 
the clearance mission involves the MCM 1 performing detection-to-neutralization in one 
part of the target area, while the MH-53E is assigned the remainder of the target area to 
perform detection and classification only. After the MH-53E has downloaded the detec-
tion and classification data at the end of each sortie, a PMA is performed to decide which 
contacts to reacquire for neutralization. The reacquisition of targets for neutralization on-
ly commences after both the MCM 1 and MH-53E have completed this first phase of op-
erations in their respective portions of the target area. In the second phase of operations 
the MCM 1 alone performs the reacquisition-to-neutralization of targets identified by the 
MH-53E. For both phases of the operations, in configuration 1A the MCM 1 uses the 
SLQ-48, while in configuration 1B the MCM 1 uses the SeaFox. 
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For configurations 2A and 2B, which are termed “parallel hunt,” the first phase of 
the clearance mission involves the MCM 1 performing detection-to-neutralization in one 
part of the target area while the MH-53E is assigned the remainder of the target area to 
perform detection and classification only. This is identical to configurations 1A and 1B, 
respectively. After the MH-53E has downloaded the detection and classification data at 
the end of each sortie, a PMA is performed to decide which contacts to reacquire for neu-
tralization. Again, the reacquisition of targets for neutralization only commences after 
both the MCM 1 and MH-53E have completed this first phase of operations in their re-
spective portions of the target area. The reacquisition-to-neutralization is then performed 
by both the MCM 1 and the MH-53E working in parallel in different portions of the tar-
get area. In configuration 2A the MCM 1 uses the SLQ-48 while in configuration 2B the 
MCM 1 uses the SeaFox. The MH-53E uses the SeaFox in both configurations 2A and 
2B to perform the reacquisition-to-neutralization. 
For configuration 3 the clearance mission commences with the LCS releasing the 
RMS to detect and classify targets in the search area. At the end of each sortie, the RMS 
downloads data for a PMA to create a list of contacts to be reacquired for neutralization. 
This reacquisition-to-neutralization is performed by the MH-60S with Archerfish. After 
the RMS has completed its first sortie, and after the first PMA has been performed to cre-
ate the initial list of contacts, the remainder of the mission proceeds with the RMS and 
MH-60S working in parallel. The RMS continues to detect and classify targets while the 
MH-60S performs the follow-on reacquisition-to-neutralization of contacts identified in 
the PMA. The list of contacts for reacquisition and neutralization is updated by perform-
ing a PMA at the end of each sortie of the RMS or the MH-60S. 
1. Model of Legacy System MCM 
This section provides an overview of the legacy system MCM model. A brief 
overview of the concept of operations, by phases, is given. This overview is a look at the 
functions and stages modeled throughout a MCM mission using the legacy system. This 
section also provides a description of the legacy model, as well as describing the steps 
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necessary to properly implement this model to provide meaningful results from the simu-
lation. 
a. Concept of Operations 
This section provides the detailed description of the CONOPS for the legacy 
MCM system. It is divided into two phases; the first phase includes the operations in-
volved with the initial detection through classification and the second phase begins with 
the reacquisition and identification through the neutralization operations.  
(1) First Phase of Operations 
Figure 42 shows the CONOPS for the MCM 1 and its onboard systems during the 
first phase of operations, as represented in the legacy MCM model. The MCM 1 will pass 
backwards and forwards across its assigned portion of the target area (shown in blue) in a 
series of parallel tracks starting at the lower edge of the target area and progressing up-
wards until the whole of its assigned portion of the target area has been covered. Alt-
hough the MCM 1 is capable of sortie times up to a few weeks in duration, this may re-
quire multiple sorties. The MCM 1 first transits from the staging area to the edge of the 
target area closest to the staging area (shown by the green arrow labeled “1”) where it 
will stream its search equipment before entering the target area. It will then travel to the 
far end of the target area where it will turn onto a reciprocal heading on the next track. It 
will finish its sortie at the end of a track that is closest to the staging area, recover the 
search equipment and transit to the staging area where it will be replenished (shown by 
the red arrow labeled “1”). Additional sorties proceed in a similar fashion and Figure 42 
shows two more sorties (the arrows labeled “2” and “3”). As targets are detected they will 
be classified. Any targets that are classified as MILCOs will be reacquired for identifica-
tion and neutralization before resuming the search for additional targets. Figure 42 also 
shows the model parameters and variables that define the geometry of the area assigned 
to the MCM 1 and its position relative to the staging area. These model parameters are 
described in Section D. 
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Figure 42.  MCM 1—Detect to Neutralize 
Figure 43 shows the CONOPS for the MH-53E as it searches for targets during 
the first phase of operations, as represented in the legacy MCM model. The MH-53E will 
pass backwards and forwards across its assigned portion of the target area (shown in 
blue) in a series of parallel tracks starting at the upper edge of the target area and pro-
gressing downwards until the whole of its designated portion of the target area has been 
searched. This will require multiple sorties. The MH-53E first transits from the staging 
area to the edge of the target area closest to the staging area (shown by the green arrow 
labeled “1”) where it will stream its search equipment before entering the target area. It 
will then travel to the far end of the target area where it will turn onto a reciprocal head-
ing on the next track. Since the MH-53E will transit above the target area (and not 
through it like the MCM 1), it may finish its sortie at either end of a track where it will 
recover the search equipment before transiting to the staging area to be replenished 
(shown by the red arrow labeled “1”). Additional sorties proceed in a similar fashion and 
Figure 43 shows two more sorties (the arrows labeled “2” and “3”).  
During each sortie a number of targets will probably have been detected and clas-
sified as MILCOs. These MILCOs will include mines and non-mines. Other targets, both 
mines and non-mines, will have failed to be detected, or failed to be classified as 
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MILCOs. The detection and classification data from the MH-53E undergo PMA to create 
a target list for reacquisition and neutralization, either by the MCM 1 alone or by both the 
MCM 1 and MH-53E. In the model the list is sorted by using a “nearest neighbor” ap-
proach as a solution to the “traveling salesman problem” to create a list of targets in the 
order in which they are to be reacquired. The duration of the PMA, following the comple-
tion of each MH-53E sortie, is modeled to be equal to the time spent on the search pro-
cess by the MH-53E, per recommendation from the MIW SME (Brett Cordes, personal 
communication, 29 July 2014). Figure 43 also shows the model parameters and variables 
that define the geometry of the area assigned to the MCM 1 and its position relative to the 
staging area. These model parameters are described in Section D. 
 
Figure 43.  MH-53E—Detect and Classify 
(2) Second Phase of Operations 
Figure 44 shows the CONOPS for the MCM 1 and MH-53E to reacquire, identify, 
and neutralize targets during the second phase of operations, as represented in the legacy 
MCM model. When both the MCM 1 and MH-53E work in parallel it is termed “parallel 
hunt.” Alternatively, the MCM 1 may also perform this operation without the support of 
the MH-53E, which is termed “serial hunt.” 
When working in parallel, the MCM 1 and MH-53E will be allocated different 
portions of the target area (shown by the dashed line across the target area, highlighted in 
 142
blue). The MCM 1 and MH-53E will transit directly to the first target on their individual 
target list created during the PMA (these transits are shown by the green arrows labeled 
“1”) and will then transit to each successive target on their list until it is necessary to ter-
minate the sortie. For its first sortie, the MCM 1 will transit from the lower portion of the 
search area where it will have just completed the first phase of operations whereas the 
MH-53E will transit from the staging area. In the case of the MCM 1, sortie termination 
will be due to time constraints. However, in the case of the MH-53E, sortie termination 
could also result from using all of the onboard SeaFox neutralization rounds, if this 
comes first. At the end of its sortie each of the platforms will transit to the staging area 
(shown by the red arrows labeled “1”) for replenishment and another PMA will be per-
formed. Any targets that have undergone a reacquisition attempt will be removed from 
the PMA-generated list. The list will then be resorted into the order in which the remain-
ing targets should be reacquired. Additional sorties proceed in a similar fashion; Figure 
44 shows one additional sortie for both the MCM 1 and the MH-53E (the arrows labeled 
“2”). Figure 44 also shows the model parameters and variables that define the geometry 
of the areas assigned to the MCM 1 and MH-53E and their position relative to the staging 
area. These model parameters are described in Section D. 
 
Figure 44.  MCM 1 and MH-53E—RI&N 
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b. Model Design 
The model sequence diagram in Figure 45 shows the top-level design for the leg-
acy MCM model for the first phase of operations and Figure 46 illustrates the top-level 
design for the second phase of operations. The green colored blocks indicate the primary 
functions that will be executed by the model and the orange colored blocks are the prima-
ry decision points that affect the execution sequence of the functions. These diagrams are 
independent of the programming language used to implement the models. The design of 
the model required several iterations of the functional and physical architectures as well 
as the CONOPS. The need to design an executable model identified features that required 
further refinement to ensure consistency between different functions or physical compo-
nents. 
 
Figure 45.  Legacy MCM Model—Top Level Model Sequence Diagram (Phase 1) 
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Figure 46.  Legacy MCM Model—Top Level Model Sequence Diagram (Phase 2) 
For the first phase of operations (shown in Figure 45) the model design comprises 
three top-level functions: airborne detection and classification; surface detection to neu-
tralization; and PMA. The airborne detection and classification function models the MH-
53 searching for targets from the air and this occurs in the upper portion of the target ar-
ea. The surface detection to neutralization function models the MCM 1 hunting for tar-
gets from the surface and this occurs in the lower portion of the target area. These two 
portions of the model are independent of each other and proceed in parallel. Each one 
will terminate once the operations in the designated portion of the target area have been 
completed. The target detection and classification data from the airborne search will un-
dergo PMA at the end of each sortie in the PMA function to create the target lists for the 
reacquisition of targets classified as MILCOs. Once the PMA has been completed for the 
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last airborne sortie by the MH-53E, and the MCM 1 has completed the last surface sortie, 
the model will progress to the second phase of operations. 
In the second phase of operations (shown in Figure 46) the model also comprises 
three top level functions: surface RI&N; airborne RI&N; and PMA. The model allows 
both surface operations and airborne operations to proceed in parallel; however, it is pos-
sible to configure the model so that only surface operations are performed. In the second 
phase of operations the PMA is used to update the target lists at the end of each sortie to 
remove any targets that have been subject to reacquisition and to modify the order in 
which the remaining targets should be revisited. RI&N will continue until no more targets 
remain on the reacquisition lists. 
There are several hierarchical levels below this top level of the model in which 
the various individual functions of the legacy MCM system and its operation are mod-
eled. A complete hierarchy of the model is provided in the SDD (see Appendix D) devel-
oped by the MIW Team during the development process. 
c. Model Implementation 
The model of the legacy MCM system was implemented using the discrete event 
modeling feature of ExtendSim. The top-level view of the model is shown in Figure 47. 
The items within the model that are being transferred between the individual blocks are 
the targets (mines and non-mines). The individual blocks implement the various functions 
that can be performed by MCM systems together with the appropriate time delays. The 
“flow” of a particular target through the model will depend on the result of these individ-
ual functions, e.g., if a target is detected, it will be subject to further processing up to and 
including neutralization. The orange colored blocks are used to set up the global arrays. 
These global arrays are used to store information that can be accessed by any block with-
in the model. Some of the functions, such as post mission analysis, need to be aware of 
the state of all targets and this is accomplished through the use of the global arrays. 
The set initial conditions block reads in the input parameters and sets the initial 
values of the model variables. The first phase of operations is set up by dividing the tar-
get area into separate portions for the MCM 1 and MH-53E in the designate target areas 
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block. Operations of the MCM 1 and MH-53E then proceed in parallel in the surface 
search and hunt and airborne search blocks, respectively. The MCM 1 performs the sur-
face search for targets followed by RI&N of any MILCOs while the MH-53E performs 
the airborne search for targets in a separate portion of the target area. At the conclusion of 
each sortie of the MH-53E, the targets classified as MILCOs by the MH-53E will be sub-
ject to PMA in the PMA block to build a target list for RI&N. This will be performed in 
the second phase of operations either by the MCM 1 working alone in the surface RI&N 
block, or by the MCM 1 in the surface RI&N block working in parallel with the MH-53 
in the airborne RI&N block, each working in a separate portion of the target area. At the 
end of each sortie by the MCM 1 or MH-53E in the second phase of operations, a further 
PMA is performed to update the target list by removing any targets that have been the 
subject to a reacquisition attempt. After the completion of the clearance operations the 
output variables are written to data tables in the data output block.  
There are several hierarchical levels below this top level of the model in which 
the various individual functions of the legacy MCM system and its operation are mod-
eled. A complete hierarchy of the model is provided in the SDD (see Appendix D) devel-
oped by the MIW Team as part of the development process. 
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Figure 47.  ExtendSim Model for Legacy MCM—Top Level View 
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2. Model of Future MCM Systems 
This section provides an overview of the future system MCM model. A brief 
overview of the concept of operations is given. This overview is a look at the functions 
and stages modeled throughout a MCM mission using the future system. This section also 
provides a description of the future model, as well as describing the steps necessary to 
properly implement this model to provide meaningful results from the simulation. 
a. Concept of Operations 
Figure 48 shows the CONOPS for the LCS and its onboard systems, as represent-
ed in the future MCM model. The LCS remains in a staging area outside the target area. 
First the RMS is deployed to search the target area for mines. The RMS will pass back-
wards and forwards across the target area in a series of parallel tracks starting at the lower 
edge of the target area (the whole of the area marked by the two shades of blue) and pro-
gressing upwards until the entire target area has been searched. This will require multiple 
sorties. The second sortie for the RMS is illustrated in Figure 48. The RMS first transits 
from the staging area to the edge of the target area closest to the staging area (shown by 
the green arrow labeled “2”) where it will stream its search equipment before entering the 
target area. It will then travel to the far end of the target area where it will turn onto a re-
ciprocal heading on the next track. It will finish a sortie at the end of a track that is closest 
to the staging area, recover the search equipment, and transit to the staging area where it 
will be replenished (shown by the red arrow labeled “2”). A number of targets, both 
mines and non-mines, will probably be detected and classified as MILCOs while other 
targets will fail to be detected or fail to be classified as MILCOs.  
The detection and classification data from the RMS undergo PMA to create a tar-
get list for RI&N by the MH-60S using Archerfish. As in the legacy model, the list is 
sorted by using a “nearest neighbor” approach to create a list of targets in the order in 
which they are to be reacquired. The MH-60S will transit directly from the staging area to 
the first target on the list (shown by the green arrow labeled “1”) and will then transit to 
each successive target on the list until it has to terminate the sortie due to time constraints 
or due to the depletion of the onboard Archerfish neutralization rounds, whichever comes 
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first. At the end of each sortie the MH-60S will transit to the staging area where it will be 
replenished (shown by the red arrow labeled “1”). In Figure 48, the first sortie of the MH-
60S is illustrated and this takes place in the area already searched by the RMS (the area 
shaded in darker blue). The MH-60S will continue to execute the process of reacquiring, 
identifying, and neutralizing targets, working in the area previously searched by the 
RMS, until no more MILCOs remain. After each sortie by the MH-60S, an additional 
PMA is performed. New MILCOs classified by the RMS will be added to the list at the 
end of each RMS sortie and any targets that have undergone a reacquisition attempt by 
the MH-60S will be removed from the list. The list will then be resorted into the order in 
which the targets should be reacquired. Again, the duration of each PMA, following the 
completion of an RMS sortie, is equal to the time spent on the search process by the 
RMS. Figure 48 also shows the model parameters and variables that define the geometry 
of the target area its position relative to the staging area. These model parameters are de-
scribed in Section D. 
 
Figure 48.  LCS (RMS) and MH-60S—Parallel Operations 
b. Model Design 
Figure 49 displays the model sequence diagram for the top-level design for the fu-
ture MCM model. The green colored blocks indicate the primary functions that will be 
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executed by the model and the orange colored blocks are the primary decision points that 
affect the sequence of execution of the functions. This model sequence diagram is agnos-
tic to the programing language used to implement the models. The design of the model 
required several iterations of the functional and physical architectures as well as the con-
cept of operations. The need to design an executable model identified features that re-
quired further refinement to ensure consistency between different functions or physical 
components.  
The model design comprises three top-level functions: surface detection and clas-
sification; airborne RI&N; and PMA. Surface detection and classification models the 
RMS searching for targets over the entire target area. Airborne RI&N models the MH-
60S neutralization operations that also take place over the entire target area. The airborne 
RI&N can only commence after the RMS has completed its first sortie and after the post 
mission analysis function processes the RMS detection and classification data of the tar-
gets classified as MILCOs and builds a list of targets to be reacquired by the MH-60S. 
This means that the MH-60S may proceed no faster than the RMS can detect and classify 
targets. At the end of each sortie by the RMS, any targets classified as MILCOs will be 
subject to PMA to update the list of targets for reacquisition by the MH-60S. In addition, 
at the end of each sortie by the MH-60S, a PMA will be performed to remove any targets 
that were subject to reacquisition from the target list. The last sortie of the RMS will end 
once it has completed its search of the target area. After the last sortie of the RMS, no 
more targets will be added to the list of targets for reacquisition and then the last sortie of 
the MH-60S will end once there are no targets left on the reacquisition list. 
There are several hierarchical levels below this top level of the model in which 
the various individual functions of the future MCM system and its operation are modeled. 
A complete hierarchy of the model is provided in the SDD (see Appendix D) developed 
by the MIW Team as part of the development process. 
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Figure 49.  Future MCM Model—Top Level Model Sequence Diagram 
c. Model Implementation 
The model of the future MCM system was implemented using the discrete event 
modeling feature of ExtendSim. The top-level view of the model is shown in Figure 50. 
The items within the model that are being transferred between the individual blocks are 
the targets (mines and non-mines). The individual blocks implement the various functions 
that can be performed by MCM systems as well as accounting for the appropriate time 
delays. The “flow” of a particular target through the model will depend on the result of 
these individual functions, e.g., if a target is detected, it will be subject to further pro-
cessing up to and including neutralization. The orange colored blocks are used to set up 
the global arrays. These global arrays are used to store information that can be accessed 
by any block within the model. Some of the functions, such as post mission analysis, 
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need to be aware of the state of all targets and this is accomplished through the use of the 
global arrays. 
The set initial conditions block reads in the input parameters and sets the initial 
values of the model variables. The RMS performs the surface search for targets over the 
entire target area and this is implemented in the Surface Search block. As a result of each 
sortie by the RMS, a number of targets will have been detected and classified as MILCOs 
while other targets will have failed to be detected or failed to be classified as MILCOs. 
The MILCOs are sent to the PMA block to be processed into a target list for reacquisition 
and neutralization by the MH-60S. No further action will be taken against the non-
MILCO targets, and they are sent to the data output block. The MH-60S will continue to 
execute reacquisition and neutralization sorties until no more MILCOs remain. After each 
sortie by the MH-60S, another PMA is performed in the PMA block to process any new 
MILCOS discovered by the RMS and to remove any MILCOs that were subject to a re-
acquisition attempt. The MILCOs that were subject to a reacquisition attempt are sent to 
the data output block since no further action will be taken against them. After the comple-
tion of the clearance operations, the output variables are written to data tables in the data 
output block. 
There are several hierarchical levels below this top level of the model in which 
the various individual functions of the future MCM system and its operation are modeled. 
A complete hierarchy of the model is provided in the SDD (see Appendix D) developed 
by the MIW Team. 
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Figure 50.  ExtendSim Model for Future MCM—Top Level View 
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C. MODELING ASSUMPTIONS 
There are a number of assumptions made in the design and development of the 
models. Some were due to a lack of information and others were required to represent the 
MCM operations and performance within the constraints outlined in Chapter I. The as-
sumptions were discussed with the advisors and/or MIW SMEs during the model devel-
opment and are: 
 The hunt for mines would be conducted over a rectangular area represent-
ing a SLOC. 
 The only mines present would be bottom mines in water deeper than 200 
feet. Near surface mines would have already been neutralized to permit 
safe operation of the MCM 1 and RMS in the target area. 
 Only the mine clearance objective of the CONOPS was addressed in the 
model. Exploration, reconnaissance, breakthrough, and attrition were not 
modeled. 
 Environmental effects that could affect MCM operations were not mod-
eled. This includes sea state and weather that could affect MCM platform 
operations as well as water visibility and sea floor type that could affect 
detectability of mines. 
 The staging area, where each sortie originates and terminates, was at a 
fixed location to the left (west) of the target area. 
 The models accommodate multiple passes along the same track to improve 
the probability of detection of targets. A MILEC will be declared on a sin-
gle detection from the multiple passes. Although multiple passes are ac-
commodated by the model, SME input indicated (Brett Cordes, personal 
communication, 12 August 2014) that for the systems being considered 
within this project, the search speeds are slow enough to establish the per-
sistence of targets on a single pass. If multiple passes are required to estab-
lish target persistence for detection purposes (e.g., “m” detections from 
“n” passes), the model will need to be modified. 
 The areas assigned to the surface and airborne platforms were set by input 
parameters and were not varied dynamically during a run to reflect the 
progress made by each of the platforms. 
The probability of detection was a single value and not a function of range. In 
PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A (PEO LMW 2008) the probability of detection is charac-
terized as a function of range from the sensor. If probability of detection were to be im-
plemented in the model as a function of range then, as the number of tracks per nautical 
mile is increased (i.e., the lateral separation between tracks is decreased), this would in-
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crease the probability of detecting a target. First, the maximum distance of a target from 
the sensor would be reduced (this is half the lateral separation between tracks) and there 
will also be a possibility of detecting a target on multiple tracks. Due to the lack of data 
to describe the probability of detection as a function of range, this range dependency was 
not included in the models. Therefore, in the models, changing the number of tracks per 
nautical mile will not change the probability of detecting a target. It is up to the user to 
determine how the probability of detection will vary with the number of tracks per nauti-
cal mile and to ensure that these two separate input parameters have consistent values. A 
procedure is described in PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A (PEO LMW 2008, 50) in 
which the range-dependent probability of detection is used to compute a constant charac-
teristic probability of detection over a characteristic width. 
D. MODEL INPUTS 
All of the input parameters for the model are contained within four ExtendSim da-
ta tables within the Inputs database, as shown in Figure 51. The data tables in ExtendSim 
contain a separate column for each parameter and each row represents a different run. 
These data tables can be created in other applications, such as Excel, and then copied and 
pasted into ExtendSim. 
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Figure 51.  Model Input Parameters in Inputs Database 
Many of these input parameters are taken from PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A 
(PEO LMW 2008). In ExtendSim the names of the input parameters are limited to a max-
imum of 15 characters. Within this constraint, an attempt was made to make the parame-
ter names as descriptive as possible. Also, where appropriate, the parameter name in-
cludes a suffix to indicate the physical units for that parameter. The naming convention 
for physical units of measure is provided in Table 16. In addition, for parameters in the 
Blue Surface Force data table the prefix “S_” indicates that the input parameter applies 
for the surface minehunting systems whereas, in the Blue Airborne Surface Force data 
table, the prefix “A_” indicates that the parameter applies to the airborne minehunting 
systems.
 157
Table 16.   Input Parameters—Physical Units of Measure Naming Conventions 
Parameter Suffix Physical Unit Physical Quantity 
_hr hour time 
_kt knot speed 
_NM nautical mile distance 
_pNM per nautical mile 1/distance 
_s second time 
_yd yard distance 
 
The values of the input parameters can be varied within reasonable limits (e.g., 
probabilities should be between zero and one) but no checks are made in the model to 
ensure inputs will not cause the model to crash. The number of mines (“NumMines” in 
the Red Force data table) and the number of non-mine objects (“NumNonMines” in the 
Search Area data table) must both be greater than zero, but no more than 1,000, for the 
model to run. The input data tables can be set up for a single run, which may be repeated 
multiple times using the same parameter values, or set up to perform stacked runs, with 
different parameter values for each run, as part of a DOE.  
The MIW Team decided to use the same data table structure for all of the configu-
rations being modeled. If a parameter is not used by a particular configuration, the input 
value will be ignored. In the data table descriptions that follow, the cells for input param-
eters that are not required for a particular configuration are shaded gray. Table 17 de-
scribes the input parameters in the Blue Surface Force data table, Table 18 describes the 
input parameters in the Blue Airborne Force data table, Table19 describes the input pa-
rameters in the Search Area data table, and Table 20 describes the one parameter in the 
Red Force data table. Also shown in the tables are the particular MCM systems that use 
each parameter value. Within each data table, the input parameters are listed in alphabeti-
cal order. 
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Table 17.   Blue Surface Force Data Table 
Input Description 
MCM 1 LCS 
1A 1B 2A 2B 3 
S_NeutSpeed_kt The transit speed of the surface deployed neutralizer. SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_NumHntTrk_pNM 
The number of search tracks per nautical mile in the Y-direction 
during the search phase of minehunting. The Y-axis is normal to 
the direction of the search tracks, with the origin at the lower 
boundary of the target area (PEO LMW 2008). 
MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 RMS 
S_NumPassPerTrk 
The number of passes that will be made along each search track 
during the search phase of minehunting. These passes are per-
formed sequentially before moving to the next track (PEO LMW 
2008). 
MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 RMS 
S_Pcmm The probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO (PEO LMW 2008). SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 AQS-20A 
S_Pcnn The probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO (PEO LMW 2008). SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 AQS-20A 
S_Pd 
The probability of detecting a target. This should be consistent with 
the separation between search tracks (the reciprocal of 
S_NumHntTrk_pNM). Note: if data are available, the probability of 
detection should be implemented as a function of range from the 
sensor to the target in future studies (PEO LMW 2008). 
SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 AQS-20A 
S_Pimm The probability of identifying a mine as a mine (PEO LMW 2008). SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_Pinn The probability of identifying a non-mine as a non-mine (PEO LMW 2008). SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_Pn The probability of neutralizing a mine (PEO LMW 2008). SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_Prmm The probability of reacquiring a mine as a MILCO for identification (PEO LMW 2008). SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_PrmmI The probability of reacquiring a mine as a mine given that the mine has already been identified as a mine.  SeaFox  SeaFox  
S_Prnn The probability of not reacquiring a non-mine as a MILCO for identification (PEO LMW 2008). SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
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Input Description 
MCM 1 LCS 
1A 1B 2A 2B 3 
S_PrnnI The probability of not reacquiring a non-mine as a mine, given that the non-mine has already been identified as a mine.  SeaFox  SeaFox  
S_RDeployT_hr The time to deploy the RI&N equipment. SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_ReplenishT_hr The time to replenish the surface minehunting platform at the end of a sortie (PEO LMW 2008). SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_RIminT_hr The minimum time for reacquisition for identification, for the sur-face-deployed neutralizer. SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_RImuT_hr 
The mean time for reacquisition and identification, excluding the 
transit time of the equipment to the target (assuming a normal dis-
tribution). 
SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_RIsigmaT_hr 
The standard deviation of the time for reacquisition and identifica-
tion, excluding the transit time of the equipment to the target (as-
suming a normal distribution). 
SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_RNminT_hr Minimum time for reacquisition and neutralization for the surface-deployed neutralizer.  SeaFox  SeaFox  
S_RNmuT_hr 
The mean time for reacquisition and neutralization, excluding the 
transit time of the equipment to the target (assuming a normal dis-
tribution). 
 SeaFox  SeaFox  
S_RNsigmaT_hr 
The standard deviation of the time for reacquisition and neutraliza-
tion, excluding the transit time of the equipment to the target (as-
suming a normal distribution). 
 SeaFox  SeaFox  
S_RRecoverT_hr The time to recover the RI&N equipment. SLQ-48 SeaFox SLQ-48 SeaFox  
S_SafeDist_yd The minimum safe stand-off distance for the MCM 1 during neu-tralization. MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1  
S_SeaFox 
Flag to indicate the equipment, the SeaFox or SLQ-48, used for the 
RI&N of targets (S_SeaFox = 1 indicates SeaFox is used, 
S_SeaFox = 0 indicates SLQ-48 is used). This applies to legacy 
MCM 1 only. 
MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1  
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Input Description 
MCM 1 LCS 
1A 1B 2A 2B 3 
S_SeaFoxPID 
The probability the commander will send out a SeaFox identifica-
tion round first before sending out a SeaFox neutralization round. 
Note: the MH-53E does not have the option of sending out an iden-
tification round first, it always sends out a neutralization round. 
Therefore, this parameter does not apply to the MH-53E with Sea-
Fox, it applies only to the MCM 1 with SeaFox. 
 SeaFox  SeaFox  
S_SortieTime_hr 
The total endurance time of the surface minehunting platform be-
fore requiring replenishment (i.e. the maximum sortie time).  
Note: Replenishment takes 1-2 days. 
MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 RMS 
S_SrchSpeed_kt The speed of the surface minehunting platform while in the target area (PEO LMW 2008). MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 RMS 
S_SRecoverT_hr The time to recover the search equipment (PEO LMW 2008). SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 AQS-20A 
S_SStreamT_hr The time to stream the search equipment (PEO LMW 2008). SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 SQQ-32 AQS-20A 
S_TransitSpd_kt The speed of the surface minehunting platform while transiting between the staging area and the target area. MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 RMS 
S_TurnTime_s 
The time taken by the surface minehunting platform, at the end of a 
search pass, to turn onto a reciprocal heading to establish the next 
search pass (PEO LMW 2008). 
MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 MCM 1 RMS 
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Table 18.   Blue Airborne Force Data Table 
Input Description 
MCM 1 LCS 
1A 1B 2A 2B 3 
A_Neutralizer 
Flag to indicate if the SeaFox is used by the MH-53E for the 
RI&N of targets (A_Neutralizer = 1 indicates SeaFox is used, 
A_Neutralizer = 0 indicates no airborne neutralizer is being used 
and all of the RI&N of targets is performed by the MCM 1). This 
applies to legacy MCM 1 only. 
  
MH-53E MH-53E  
A_NeutSpeed_kt The transit speed of the airborne deployed neutralizer.   SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_NumHntTrk_pNM 
The number of search tracks per nautical mile in the Y-direction 
during the search phase of minehunting. The Y-axis is normal to 
the direction of the search tracks, with the origin at the lower 
boundary of the target area (PEO LMW 2008). 
MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E  
A_NumNeut The number of neutralizers carried onboard the helicopter.   MH-53E MH-53E MH-60S 
A_NumPassPerTrk 
The number of passes that will be made along each search track 
during the search phase of minehunting. These passes are per-
formed sequentially before moving to the next track (PEO LMW 
2008). 
MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E  
A_Pcmm The probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO (PEO LMW 2008). AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A  
A_Pcnn The probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO (PEO LMW 2008). AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A  
A_Pd 
The probability of detecting a target. This should be consistent 
with the separation between search tracks (the reciprocal of 
A_NumHntTrk_pNM). Note: if data are available, the probability 
of detection should be implemented as a function of range from 
the sensor to the target in future studies (PEO LMW 2008). 
AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A  
A_Pimm The probability of identifying a mine as a mine (PEO LMW 2008). 
  SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_Pinn The probability of identifying a non-mine as a non-mine (PEO LMW 2008). 
  SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_Pn The probability of neutralizing a mine (PEO LMW 2008).   SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_Prmm The probability of reacquiring a mine as a MILCO for identifica-tion (PEO LMW 2008). 
  SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
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Input Description 
MCM 1 LCS 
1A 1B 2A 2B 3 
A_Prnn The probability of not reacquiring a non-mine as a MILCO for identification (PEO LMW 2008). 
  SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_RDeployT_hr The time to deploy the RI&N equipment.   SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_ReplenishT_hr The time to replenish the helicopter at the end of a sortie (PEO LMW 2008). 
  SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_RIminT_hr The minimum time for reacquisition for identification, for the air-borne-deployed neutralizer. 
  SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_RImuT_hr 
The mean time for reacquisition and identification, excluding the 
transit time of the equipment to the target (assuming a normal dis-
tribution). 
  
SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_RIsigmaT_hr 
The standard deviation of the time for reacquisition and identifica-
tion, excluding the transit time of the equipment to the target (as-
suming a normal distribution). 
  
SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_RRecoverT_hr The time to recover the RI&N equipment.   SeaFox SeaFox Archerfish 
A_SafeDist_yd The minimum safe stand-off distance for the minehunting helicop-ter during neutralization for the helicopter. 
  MH-53E MH-53E MH-60S 
A_SortieTime_hr The total endurance time of the minehunting helicopter before requiring replenishment (i.e. the maximum sortie time). MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E Archerfish 
A_SrchSpeed_kt The speed of the minehunting helicopter while performing detec-tion and classification in the target area (PEO LMW 2008). MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E  
A_SRecoverT_hr The time to recover the search equipment (PEO LMW 2008). AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A  
A_SStreamT_hr The time to stream the search equipment (PEO LMW 2008). AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A AQS-24A  
A_TransitSpd_kt 
The speed of the minehunting helicopter while transiting between 
the staging area and the start or finish position of its work in the 
target area. 
MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-60S 
A_TurnTime_s 
The time taken by the minehunting helicopter to turn at the end of 
a search pass to turn on a reciprocal heading to establish the next 
search pass (PEO LMW 2008). 
MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-53E MH-60S 
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Table 19.   Search Area Data Table 
Input Description 
NumNonMines 
The number of non-mine objects in the target area that could be 
detected as MILECs. This value must be greater than zero, but no 
more than 1,000, for the model to run. 
SLOCLength_NM 
The extent of the target area in the X-direction. The X-axis is 
parallel to the direction of the search tracks, with the origin at the 
left boundary of the target area. 
SLOCWidth_NM 
The extent of the target area in the Y-direction. The Y-axis is 
normal to the direction of the search tracks, with the origin at the 
lower boundary of the target area. 
SearchSplitYpc 
The percentage of the total target area covered by surface search 
system (MCM 1) in the first phase of operations (detection to 
neutralization). This is entered as a value between zero and one 
(i.e., a value of one is equivalent to 100 percent). This only ap-
plies to the legacy MCM system.
NeutSplitYpc 
The percentage of the target area remaining after the first phase 
of operations (the area not cleared by the MCM 1) that will be 
covered by surface neutralization (MCM 1) in the second phase 
of operations (RI&N). This is entered as a value between zero 
and one (i.e., a value of one is equivalent to 100 percent). This 
only applies to the legacy MCM system.
StagingXPos_NM 
The X-coordinate of the staging area. The X-axis is parallel to the 
direction of the search tracks, with the origin at the left boundary 
of the target area. The model is constructed with the assumption 
that the staging area will always be to the left (west) of the target 
area. Therefore, the maximum value for this parameter is zero 
(i.e. the value of this parameter will be zero or negative). 
StagingYPos_NM 
The Y-coordinate of the staging area. The Y-axis is normal to the 
direction of the search tracks, with the origin at the lower bound-
ary of the target area. The staging area should be within the width 
of the SLOC (although the model does allow any value). 
Table 20.   Red Force Data Table 
Input Description 
NumMines The number of mines in the target area. This value must be great-er than zero, but no more than 1,000, for the model to run. 
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E. MODEL INTERNAL VARIABLES 
Internal variables within the ExtendSim model are used to communicate data be-
tween the items in the model and the functions that operate on those items. In the models 
of the legacy and future MCM systems, the items are the targets (the mines and non-
mines). There are five types of internal variables: 
1. Attributes are variables that are attached to the items within the simulation 
and are passed with each item as that item passes from block to block. 
2. Local variables only exist within the block in which they are declared, typ-
ically an equation block, but the local variables can be applied to any item 
passing through that block. 
3. Global variables are available to any block within the model and can be 
applied to any item passing through any block. 
4. Connector values are variables that are passed from one block to another 
that do not contain information about the item being passed. A different 
type of connector is used to pass values than the type of connector used to 
pass items. Connector values are primarily used by one block to control 
the action of another block. 
5. System variables are used to provide information about the state of the 
simulation and are accessible to any block within a model. 
A knowledge of the internal variables is not required to use the models, but is re-
quired if the models are to be developed further. The sections below provide an overview 
of the internal variables; the details, including a complete data dictionary, are provided in 
the SDD (see Appendix D) developed by the MIW Team. A full description of the differ-
ent types of model internal variables is provided in the ExtendSim User Guide (Diamond 
2007). 
1. Attributes 
Each target (mine or non-mine) is an item within ExtendSim and, as it passes 
through the simulation, it has a number of associated attributes. The attribute names and 
their descriptions are listed in the SDD (see Appendix D) developed by the MIW Team. 
It should be noted that the list of attributes includes a number of simulation variables that 
appear to have nothing to do with the targets themselves. This was necessary because the 
blocks in ExtendSim operate on each item as it passes through the block. Since the targets 
are individual items, it is necessary for them to carry an awareness of other simulation 
variables that may affect their behavior, especially in terms of the timing of events. As an 
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example, the sortie time is an attribute of every target so that the information is always 
available to determine when a sortie should end. It also has to be recognized that when 
the value of an attribute is changed for a specific target, the value of that same attribute 
for the other targets will not be changed. Therefore, during development, care has to be 
taken when setting and referencing the values of attributes. 
2. Local Variables 
There is a class of equation blocks within ExtendSim that operate on the items 
within the simulation, targets in this case. The equation blocks can be used to create spe-
cific functionality using the ModL programming language. The GUI of the equation 
blocks allows access to the target attributes and the ModL programming language allows 
access to the global variables of the models; however, in many instances there is a need 
to use variables to store the results of intermediate calculations that do not need to be 
shared with other parts of the model. These variables are declared as local variables with-
in the ModL programming language. This means these variables do not provide any cou-
pling with other ExtendSim blocks and this facilitates reuse and maintenance of the code. 
The names and descriptions of the local variables are provided in the source code listings 
contained in the SDD (see Appendix D) developed by the MIW Team. 
3. Global Variables 
The models use global variables to allow direct communication of values between 
model blocks throughout the simulation. This section describes the use of two types of 
global variables: general use and user defined. 
a. General Use Global Variables 
The ModL programming language, which can be used within the ExtendSim 
equation blocks, includes twenty general-use global variables (Global0 through Glob-
al19) that are available to all blocks. Effectively, this allows direct communication be-
tween any two blocks in the model. These general-use global variables can be used to 
store arrays of values but, currently, the model uses them to store single values. If the 
models are developed further to support future studies, it may be necessary to take ad-
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vantage of the array feature of these general-use global variables or replace them with 
user-defined global variables. Although there are benefits from the direct communication 
between blocks provided by general-use global variables, any blocks that use the same 
general-use global variable are directly coupled, which is not obvious from an examina-
tion of the connections between the blocks in the ExtendSim model diagrams. Therefore, 
in the SDD (see Appendix D) developed by the MIW Team, the data dictionary of the 
general-use global variables includes an indication of every block that uses each of the 
general-use global variables and whether the block references or sets the value of the 
general-use global variable. Another downside to the general-use global variables is that 
their names cannot be changed so, without the data dictionary, it is not obvious what data 
are being represented by the global variable. 
b. User-Defined Global Arrays 
ExtendSim allows the developer to create user-defined global arrays. These have 
the same benefit as the general-use global variables, but they can be tailored (including 
the ability to assign a meaningful name to a global array). In the models of the legacy and 
future MCM systems, the most significant use of user-defined global arrays is in the 
PMA block. Without the use of user-defined global arrays, it would not have been possi-
ble to include the PMA functionality within the ExtendSim models. 
The user-defined global arrays also have the same downside as the general-use 
global variables, by providing direct coupling between the blocks that use the same glob-
al array. Therefore, in the SDD (see Appendix D) developed by the MIW Team, the data 
dictionary of the user-defined global arrays includes an indication of every block that us-
es each of the user-defined global arrays and whether the block references or sets the val-
ue of the elements of the user-defined global arrays. 
4. Connector Values 
Connector values are used extensively in the ExtendSim models of the MCM sys-
tems. There are three ways in which they are used. The first is to use one block to control 
the action of another block. For example, a calculation in an equation block can be used 
to control another block that will change the path of an item through the model. The sec-
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ond way is to use the connector value as an input to an equation block to control the flow 
within an algorithm or to change the value of a variable used in an equation, including 
item attributes. The third way is to pass a value to an output block, either as a value that 
will be written to an output table, or to control how values are written to an output table.  
5. System Variables 
There are two ExtendSim system variables that are accessed in the ExtendSim 
models of the MCM systems. The first is the current time in the simulation and the sec-
ond is the current run number when executing repeated runs or multiple different runs. 
F. MODEL OUTPUTS 
The output variables (responses) from the model are contained within two Ex-
tendSim data tables within the Outputs database, as shown in Figure 52. The data tables 
are the Hunt Effectiveness data table and the Target Outputs data table. Both the legacy 
MCM model and the future MCM model have the same set of output variables. 
 168
 
Figure 52.  Model Output Data—Outputs Database 
1. Hunt Effectiveness Table 
The Hunt Effectiveness data table contains summary information for each run. 
The data table contains twenty columns of output variables and each row represents a dif-
ferent run of the simulation, i.e., the number of rows will be equal to the total number of 
runs. The data in the Hunt Effectiveness data table can be copied from ExtendSim and 
pasted into another program, such as Excel or Minitab, for analysis. Table 22 provides a 






Table 21.   Hunt Effectiveness Data Table 
Output Variable Description 
Undetected non-mine The number of non-mine targets that went unde-tected. 
Non-mine classified as non-MILCO The number of non-mine targets that were correct-ly classified as non-MILCOs. 
Non-mine not reacquired as MIL-
CO 
The number of non-mine targets that were incor-
rectly classified as MILCOs but were not reac-
quired for identification. 
Non-mine identified as non-mine The number of non-mine targets that were correct-ly identified as non-mines. 
Neutralization attempt against non-
mine 
The number of non-mine targets that were errone-
ously subject to a neutralization attempt. Although 
a non-mine does not pose a threat and cannot be 
neutralized, these represent false targets and a 
“waste” of both time and warheads due to the in-
correct identification of the non-mine as a mine. 
Undetected mine The number of mine targets that went undetected. 
Mine classified as non-MILCO The number of mine targets that were incorrectly classified as non-MILCOs. 
Mine not reacquired as MILCO 
The number of mine targets that were correctly 
classified as MILCOs but were not reacquired for 
identification. 
Mine identified as non-mine The number of mine targets that were incorrectly identified as non-mines. 
Mine successfully neutralized 
The number of mine targets that were successfully 
neutralized. When this number is divided by the 
total number of mines in the target area (the input 
parameter “NumMines” in the Red Force data ta-
ble) it yields the percent clearance for the mine-
hunting operation. The percent clearance is one of 
the MOEs. 
Mine unsuccessfully neutralized The number of mine targets against which the neu-tralization attempt was unsuccessful. 
Number of non-mines 
The total number of non-mine targets (this is the 
same as the input parameter “NumNonMines” in 
the Search Area data table). 
Number of mines 
The total number of mine targets (this is the same 
as the input parameter “NumMines” in the Red 
Force data table). 
Number of Neutralizers Used The total number of neutralizers used. 
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Output Variable Description 
Total Time (hours) 
The total length of the simulation run. This is the 
total time of the clearance mission. Dividing the 
size of the target area by the Total Time and multi-
plying by 24 gives the ACRS (the average area 
covered per day). The ACRS is one of the MOEs. 
Number of Surface Sorties 
The number of sorties made by the surface plat-
form. For the legacy MCM system this includes 
the sorties by the MCM 1 for the initial detection 
to neutralization during the first phase of opera-
tions and the number of sorties for the reacquisi-
tion, identification and neutralization in the second 
phase of operations. Since the sortie time of the 
MCM 1 is on the order of a few weeks, it is highly 
likely that the MCM 1 will transition from the first 
phase of operations to the second phase of opera-
tions during a sortie. For the future MCM system 
this is the number of detection and classification 
sorties made by the RMS. 
Number of Airborne Search Sorties 
The number of detection and classification sorties 
performed by the airborne platform. This only ap-
plies to the MH-53E component of the legacy 
MCM system during the first phase of operations. 
Number of Airborne Reacquisition 
Sorties 
The number of airborne sorties for RI&N. For the 
legacy MCM system this applies to the MH-53E 
during the second phase of operations and for the 
future MCM system this applies to the MH-60S. 
Number of Surface Neutralizers 
Used 
The number of surface neutralizers used by the 
surface platform. This only applies to the MCM 1 
during the second phase of operations. 
Number of Airborne Neutralizers 
Used 
The number of airborne neutralizers used. For the 
legacy MCM system this applies to the MH-53E 
during the second phase of operations and for the 
future MCM system this applies to the MH-60S. 
 
At the end of the simulation, the targets are sorted into eleven different categories 
that represent the state of each target at the end of the simulation. These categories com-
prise the first eleven columns of the Hunt Effectiveness data table (Table 21). The first 
five categories apply to non-mine targets and the next six categories apply to mine tar-
gets. Every target should be accounted for in these first eleven columns of the data table, 
provided ExtendSim was configured to allow sufficient time for the clearance mission to 
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be completed. Therefore, the sum of the first five columns of each row should equal the 
number of non-mine targets (column 12) and the sum of the next six columns of each row 
should equal the number of mine targets (column 13). This provides a means to perform a 
basic quality check on the correct functioning of the simulation. If the totals of either the 
non-mine or the mine target categories do not match the expected values (column 12 or 
column 13, respectively) then a check should be made to ensure that sufficient time was 
allowed for the simulation to complete the clearance mission. If an excessively long time 
is required to complete the clearance mission, the input parameters should be examined to 
see if any of the values was set to an unreasonable value.  
Some of the outputs in the Hunt Effectiveness data table (Table 21) are provided 
for the post-run calculation of MOEs or to support the cost analysis. The time to complete 
the clearance mission (Total Time (hours)) is used to calculate the ACRS, which was one 
of the two primary MOEs for this study. ACRS is the total area of the target area divided 
by the time taken to clear it (measured in days). The other primary MOE was the mine-
hunting effectiveness as represented by the percent clearance. This is the number of 
mines that were neutralized divided by the total number of mines in the target area. Other 
outputs, such as the number of neutralizers used, were used to develop elements of the 
cost estimates for the clearance mission. 
2. Target Outputs Data Table 
The Target Outputs data table (Table 22) contains summary information for each 
target (mine or non-mine). The data table contains ten columns of output variables (re-
sponses) and each row represents a different target and a different simulation run; there-
fore, the total number of rows will be equal to the product of the number of targets and 
the number of runs. The data in the Target Outputs data table can be copied from Ex-
tendSim and pasted into Excel or other tools for analysis. Table 22 provides a list of the 
output variables (listed in column one) and a brief description of each. These data outputs 
can be used as a first level diagnostic if the data in the Hunt Effectiveness data table does 
not appear to be reasonable, particularly if it is just a few runs out of many. Since the 
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Target Output data table contains data for every target run, it is possible to see what hap-
pened to every target in the run(s) in question. 
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Table 22.   Target Outputs Data Table 
Output Variable Description 
Target Type 
Flag to indicate the type of target (Target Type = 0 
indicates a non-mine target, and Target Type = 1 
indicates a mine target). 
Target Detection 
Flag to indicate if the target was detected (Target 
Detection = 0 indicates target was not detected, 
Target Detection = 1 indicates the target was de-
tected as a MILEC). 
Target Classification 
Flag to indicate if the target was classified as a 
MILCO (Target Classification = 0 indicates no at-
tempt was made to classify the target, Target Clas-
sification = 1 indicates the target was classified as 
a MILCO, and Target Classification = 2 indicates 
the target was classified as a non-MILCO). 
Target Reacquisition 
Flag to indicate if the target was reacquired for 
identification (Target Reacquisition = 0 indicates 
no attempt was made to reacquire the target for 
identification, Target Reacquisition = 1 indicates 
the target was reacquired as a MILCO, and Target 
Reacquisition = 2 indicates the target was not re-
acquired as a MILCO). 
Target Identification 
Flag to indicate if the target was identified as a 
mine (Target Identification = 0 indicates no at-
tempt was made to identify the target, Target Iden-
tification = 1 indicates the target was identified as 
a mine, and Target Identification = 2 indicates the 
target was identified as a non-mine). 
Target Neutralization 
Flag to indicate if the target was neutralized (Tar-
get Neutralization = 0 indicates no attempt was 
made to neutralize the target, Target Neutralization 
= 1 indicates the target was successfully neutral-
ized, and Target Neutralization = 2 indicates the 
neutralization attempt against the target was un-
successful). 
Target X-Position 
The X-coordinate of the target. The X-axis is par-
allel to the direction of the search tracks, with the 
origin at the left boundary of the target area. The 
unit of measure is nautical miles. 
Target Y-Position 
The Y-coordinate of the target. The Y-axis is nor-
mal to the direction of the search tracks, with the 
origin at the lower boundary of the target area. The 
unit of measure is nautical miles. 
 174
Output Variable Description 
Target ID 
The unique identifier of the target within the par-
ticular run. The Target ID is assigned in the order 
of increasing values of Target X-Position. 
Run number 
The number of the current simulation run. In Ex-
tendSim the numbering of runs starts at zero, so 
the nth run will show up as (n-1). 
 
3. History Blocks 
The model contains a number of history blocks, an example of which is shown 
highlighted in Figure 53. These history blocks are primarily used for debugging the mod-
el because they capture the value of specified model attributes as each item passes 
through the block, including the time in the simulation when the item passed through. 
The History table can be opened by double-clicking the history block icon in the Ex-
tendSim model and selecting the history tab. The information within the History table can 
then be copied and pasted into Excel for further analysis; however, if multiple runs are 
performed, the history block will only include the data from the most recent run. 
 
Figure 53.  Example of a History Block (shown in red circle) 
G. RUNNING THE SIMULATION 
The models were built using ExtendSim version 8 and this is the version of Ex-
tendSim that should be used to execute simulation runs. The following sections summa-
rize how to run a simulation in ExtendSim 8 using the models described in the previous 
sections. 
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1. Repeated Runs versus Multiple Different Runs 
Depending on whether an ExtendSim model is going to be used for a set of re-
peated runs or to execute a set of multiple different runs as part of a DOE, the model 
needs to be configured differently. In other words, these different run options cannot be 
controlled from the ExtendSim Run menu, but require modifications within the model 
itself to structure how the input data are read into the model. It was decided to maintain 
two versions of the legacy MCM model and two versions of the future MCM model. In 
each case, one model is configured for single or repeated runs, while the other is config-
ured for multiple DOE runs. Full details of how the models are configured for these dif-
ferent use cases are provided in Appendix C. 
2. Selecting Legacy MCM Model Configurations 
Two of the input parameters are used to configure the model of the legacy MCM 
1 system to represent the four possible configurations. The setting of these parameters for 
each of the configurations is show in Table 23. The input parameter “A_Neutralizer” is in 
the Blue Airborne Force input data table and the input parameter “S_SeaFox” is in the 
Blue Surface Force input data table. These settings need to be present in every record 
(row) in the input data tables. 
Table 23.   Parameter Settings to Select Legacy MCM Configurations 
Configuration Description A_Neutralizer S_SeaFox 
1A Serial Hunt - SLQ-48 0 0 
1B Serial Hunt - SeaFox 0 1 
2A Parallel Hunt - SLQ-48 1 0 
2B Parallel Hunt - SeaFox 1 1 
H. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
Before the simulations could be run to develop and collect performance data, they 
had to be evaluated to ensure they met the requirements and that they worked in the way 
they were intended. The first step after developing the models was to verify and validate 




The following definitions for verification and validation have been extracted from 
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.61, “DOD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A)” (Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) 2009). 
 “Verification: The process of determining that a model or simulation im-
plementation and its associated data accurately represent the developer’s 
conceptual description and specifications” (Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 2009). 
 “Validation: The process of determining the degree to which a model or 
simulation and its associated data are an accurate representation of the real 
world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model” (Under Sec-
retary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 2009). 
2. Verification 
The requirements presented in Chapter IV define the modeling and simulation ca-
pabilities required for this project. The solution to these requirements was the develop-
ment of a modeling and simulation capability using the ExtendSim general-purpose ap-
plication (Diamond 2007). The purpose of the verification activity was to determine 
whether or not the requirements were met in the solution that was developed. The vast 
majority of the requirements were of a functional nature and, while some numerical val-
ues were included in the requirements, these numerical values only referred to the numer-
ical ranges of input parameters. Therefore, most of the verification comprised inspection 
of the model code and input parameters.  
Two verification tests were performed to determine whether the sequence of 
MCM activities and the interactions between them were correctly captured in the model. 
This was done with respect to the calculation of the primary MOEs for this study, the 
“timing” test was relevant to the ACRS (top-level requirement 1.0) and the “effective-
ness” test was relevant to minehunting effectiveness (top-level requirement 2.0). For 
these calculations to be correct, however, the sequence of events (top-level requirement 
3.0) had to be captured correctly in the models. 
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The result of the verification test for each of the requirements is summarized in 
Table 24. The results from the verification tests were placed in one of three categories: 
pass, partial pass, or fail. The three categories are indicated in Table 24 through shading 
of the appropriate cell in the result column: green for pass, orange for partial pass, and 
red for fail. In all, there were 61 passes, six partial passes, and four failures. 
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Table 24.   Verification Test Summary 
REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
1.0 The simulation shall enable the determination of the ACRS for each MCM configuration in the performance of mine hunting.  
    
1.1 The simulation shall represent the time required to perform each minehunting func-
tion within the minehunting operation: travel, detect, classify, identify, reacquire, 
and neutralize for each MCM configuration. 
Test 1: Timing Pass 
    
1.1.1 The simulation shall represent the sortie time required in the area (Tsortie).   
1.1.1.1 The simulation shall represent the maximum endurance time per system (Sor-
tie_Time) for surface platforms between 336 and 504 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.1.2 The simulation shall represent the maximum endurance time per system (Sor-
tie_Time) for airborne systems between one and four hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.2 The simulation shall represent the transit time to target area (Tta). 
1.1.2.1 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of MCM 1 between 10 and 15 
knots. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.2.2 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of LCS between 20 and 40 knots. Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.2.3 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of helicopter between 80 and 150 
knots. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.2.4 The simulation shall represent the transit speed of airborne deployed neutralizer 
between zero and five knots. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.3 The simulation shall represent the transit time to staging area (Tsa). Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.4 The simulation shall represent the time to stream MCM gear (Tstream) 
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REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
1.1.4.1 The simulation shall represent the time to stream MCM tear (Tstream) for search 
equipment for surface platforms between 0.25 and two hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.4.2 The simulation shall represent the time to stream MCM gear (Tstream) for search 
equipment for airborne systems between 0.2 and 0.5 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.5 The simulation shall represent the time to recover MCM gear (Trecover). 
1.1.5.1 The simulation shall represent the time to recover RI&N equipment for surface 
platforms between 0.1 and two hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.5.2 The simulation shall represent the time to recover the search equipment for surface 
platforms between 0.25 and two hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.5.3 The simulation shall represent the time to recover RI&N equipment for airborne 
systems between 0.2 and one hour. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.5.4 The simulation shall represent the time to recover the search equipment for air-
borne systems between 0.2 and 0.5 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.6 The simulation shall represent the time to refuel/rearm/reconfigure (Trr) 
1.1.6.1 The simulation shall represent the time to refuel/rearm/reconfigure (Trr) for surface 
platforms between four and eight hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.6.2 The simulation shall represent the time to refuel/rearm/reconfigure (Trr) for air-
borne systems between four and eight hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.7 The simulation shall represent the time to turn (Tturn). 
1.1.7.1 The simulation shall represent the time to turn (Tturn) for surface platforms be-
tween 300 and 600 seconds. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.7.2 The simulation shall represent the time to turn (Tturn) for airborne systems be-
tween 120 and 240 seconds. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.8 The simulation shall represent the time to deploy (Tdeploy) for RI&N equipment. 
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REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
1.1.8.1 The simulation shall represent the time to deploy (Tdeploy) for RI&N equipment 
for surface platforms between 0.1 and two hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.8.2 The simulation shall represent the time to deploy (Tdeploy) for RI&N equipment 
for airborne systems between 0.1 and one hour. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    




met due to sched-
ule constraints) 
    
1.1.10 The simulation shall represent the number of sorties (Nst). Inspection: Model code Pass 
    




met due to sched-
ule constraints) 
    




met due to sched-
ule constraints) 
    




met due to sched-
ule constraints) 
    
1.1.14 The simulation shall represent the time to hunt (Thunt). 
1.1.14.1 The simulation shall represent the speed in search area for surface platforms be-
tween one and five knots. 




REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
1.1.14.2 The simulation shall represent the speed in search area for airborne systems be-
tween 10 and 30 knots. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.14.3 The simulation shall represent the number of search tracks per NM for surface plat-
forms between 10 and 40. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.14.4 The simulation shall represent the number of search tracks per NM for airborne 
systems between 10 and 40. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.14.5 The simulation shall represent the number of passes per track for airborne systems 
between one and four. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.1.15 The simulation shall represent the classification time (Tcmm, Tcmn, Tcnm, Tcnn). Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Partial pass 
(replaced by a 
single parameter 
due to lack of 
data) 
    
1.1.16 The simulation shall represent the reacquisition for identification and for neutralization time (Trmm, Trmn, Trnm, Trnn). 
1.1.16.1 The simulation shall represent the mean reacquisition and identification for surface 
platforms between 0.25 and one hour. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.16.2 The simulation shall represent the standard deviation time for reacquisition and 
identification for surface platforms between 0.1 and 0.5 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.16.3 The simulation shall represent the mean reacquisition and identification for air-
borne systems between 0.5 and one hour. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.16.4 The simulation shall represent the standard deviation time for reacquisition and 
identification for airborne systems between 0.1 and 0.5 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.16.5 The simulation shall represent the mean reacquisition and neutralization for surface 
platforms between 0.2 and 0.5 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.16.6 The simulation shall represent the standard deviation time for reacquisition and 
neutralization for surface platforms between 0.1 and 0.25 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.16.7 The simulation shall represent the minimum safe stand-off distance during neutrali-
zation (MCM 1) between 250 and 300 yards. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.16.8 The simulation shall represent the minimum safe stand-off distance during neutrali-
zation (helicopter) between 300 and 350 yards. 




REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
1.1.16.9 The simulation shall represent the minimum time for reacquisition for identifica-
tion, airborne deployed neutralizer between 0.25 and 0.5 hours. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    




quisition time due 
to lack of data) 
    




quisition time due 
to lack of data) 
1.1.18.1 The simulation shall represent the number of neutralizers for MH-53E between 
zero and six. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
1.1.18.2 The simulation shall represent the number of neutralizers for MH-60S between 
zero and four. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
1.2 The simulation shall calculate the ACRS (time required to conduct the entire mine-
hunting sequence). 




run from the mis-
sion time (run 
time) and area of 
SLOC) 
    
2.0 The simulation shall model the effectiveness of each minehunting function. Test 2: Effectiveness Pass 
    
2.1 The simulation shall calculate and store the effectiveness of each minehunting function. 
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REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
2.1.1 The simulation shall represent the Probability of detection vs. lateral range (PD(y)) 
between 0.3 and 0.9. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Partial pass 
(replaced by a 
constant value 
that is consistent 
with the spacing 
between search 
tracks) 
    
2.1.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of classification (Pcmm, Pcmn, Pcnm, Pcnn). 
2.1.2.1 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO for 
surface platforms between 0.5 and 0.9. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.2.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-
MILCO for surface platforms between 0.5 and 0.9. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.2.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO for 
airborne systems between 0.5 and 0.9. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.2.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-
MILCO for airborne systems between 0.5 and 0.9. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
2.1.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquisition (Prmm, Prmn, Prnm, Prnn). 
2.1.3.1 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquiring a mine as a MILCO 
for identification for surface platforms between 0.3 and 0.8. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.3.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquiring a mine for neutraliza-
tion given mine was already identified as a mine for surface platforms between 0.3 
and one. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.3.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of not reacquiring a non-mine as a 
MILCO for identification for surface systems between 0.01 and 0.30. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.3.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of not reacquiring a non-mine for 
neutralization given non-mine was already identified as a mine for surface systems 
between 0.01 and 0.30. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.3.5 The simulation shall represent the probability of reacquiring a mine as a MILCO 
for identification for airborne platforms between 0.3 and 0.8. 




REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
2.1.3.6 The simulation shall represent the probability of not reacquiring a non-mine as a 
MILCO for identification for airborne systems between 0.01 and 0.50. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
2.1.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of identification (Pimm, Pimn, Pinm, Pinn). 
2.1.4.1 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a mine as a mine for 
surface platforms between 0.5 and one. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.4.2 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a non-mine as a non-
mine for surface platforms between 0.5 and one. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.4.3 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a mine as a mine for 
airborne systems between 0.5 and one. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
2.1.4.4 The simulation shall represent the probability of identifying a non-mine as a non-
mine for airborne systems between 0.5 and one. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
2.1.5 The simulation shall represent the probability of neutralization (Pn) between 0.5 
and 0.9. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
2.2 The simulation shall calculate and output the overall minehunting effectiveness in 
terms of the number of mines cleared, number of mines remaining, and the number 
of non-mines that were neutralized.  
Inspection: Model code and 
date output 
Pass 
    
3.0 The simulation shall contain models of the minehunting sequence of events for the different configurations. 
    
3.1 The simulation shall represent each of the three MCM configuration’s minehunting 
functions: search, detect, classify, identify, reacquire, and neutralize. 
Inspection: Model code  Pass 
    
3.2 The simulation shall represent the minefield size and location for use in the effectiveness and ACRS calculations. 
    
3.2.1 The simulation shall represent the search area. 
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REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
3.2.1.1 The simulation shall represent the length of search area between one and 100. Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
3.2.1.2 The simulation shall represent the width of search area between one and 100. Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
3.2.1.3 The simulation shall represent the percentage of area covered by surface search 
(MCM 1) between zero and 100. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
3.2.1.4 The simulation shall represent the percentage of area covered by surface neutraliza-
tion (MCM 1) between zero and 100. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
3.2.2 The simulation shall represent the staging position's coordinates for use in the ACRS and effectiveness calculations. 
3.2.2.1 The simulation shall represent the staging position—X-Coordinate between -50 and 
zero. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
3.2.2.2 The simulation shall represent the staging position—Y-Coordinate between zero 
and SLOC width. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
    
3.2.3 The simulation shall represent the number of mines between one and 1000. Inspection: Model code and 
date input 
Pass 
3.2.4 The simulation shall represent the non-mine density for classification (λcnm be-
tween one and 1000. 




ed by specifying 
the total number 
of non-mines in 
the target area) 
    
3.3 The simulation shall transition the state and minehunting results of the previous 
function to the subsequent function IAW PEO LMW Instruction 3370.1A (2008). 
Inspection: Model code  Pass 
    
4.0 The simulation shall support setting and modifying the listed performance parameters without requiring modifying the simulation. 
    
4.1 The simulation shall import specified input parameters without requiring modifica-
tions to the code. 




REQ. NO. REQUIREMENT VERIFICATION TEST RESULT 
4.2 The simulation shall support the export of the resulting effectiveness and time-to-
complete parameters to a form that can be analyzed by statistical software products 
such as Excel and Minitab. 
Inspection: Model code and 
date output 
Pass 
4.3 The simulation shall be developed in a modular method that allows for each func-
tion to be replaced. 
Inspection: Model code  Pass 
    
5.0 The simulation shall include documentation that facilitates the use of the simulation tool by future study groups. 
    
5.1 The simulation shall include documentation that describes the use of the code and 
descriptions of the input and output parameters. 
Inspection: Documentation Pass 
5.2 The simulation shall include documentation that describes the code, the structure of 
the code, and the required inputs and outputs of each functional block. 
Inspection: Documentation Pass 
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All four failures were for requirements that were not met due to schedule con-
straints for developing the model. Consideration should be given to making these re-
quirements a high priority if the model is developed further. All of these requirements are 
related to MCM system availability. 
Of the six partial passes, four were requirements that could not be supported by 
data so a lower fidelity approach was adopted in the model. The fifth requirement that 
was a partial pass was the calculation of the ACRS. The model provides all of the infor-
mation required to calculate the ACRS; however, the ACRS must be calculated as part of 
the data processing after the simulation runs have been completed. The final requirement 
that was a partial pass was the representation of the non-mine density in the target area. 
Rather than specifying a non-mine density, the total number of mines in the target area is 
specified. 
3. Validation 
One of the challenges of this modeling and simulation effort was how to represent 
MCM capabilities without using system-specific data. The solution was to define the 
MCM characteristics and performance parametrically using external inputs to the model. 
For this study representative values were used for these parameters but, ultimately, this 
will allow system-specific values to be used in an appropriate computational environ-
ment. Since validation is the measurement of how well the model and simulation repre-
sents the real world, it was impossible to perform a quantitative validation based on the 
representative parameter values used in this study; however, the MIW Team obtained 
SME feedback on the reasonableness of the results based on the input parameters to pro-
vide a cursory validation check. In this regard, as much as it was possible to perform val-
idation, this process indicated that the models and simulations were producing credible 
results – both in terms of the ACRS and percent clearance. Also, in terms of the intended 
use of the models and simulations, these were being used in a comparative analysis of 
legacy and future MCM capabilities. Therefore, absolute accuracy was not required, pro-
vided the relative performance of legacy and future MCM systems was well represented. 
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Again, subjectively, the models and simulations appeared to meet this evaluation criteri-
on, based on SME feedback. 
I. MODELING AND SIMULATION CONCLUSION 
Once the models were built and tested, they were used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the legacy and future MCM systems. The DOE approach used the input param-
eters as factors and the Time to Complete and Number of Mines Neutralized as the output 
responses for the analysis. Although the M&S development is reported in this chapter and 
the DOE approach is reported in Chapter VII, there was significant iteration between 
these two activities to ensure that the factors and responses were included in the models 
in a way that supported detailed analysis. 
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VII. DOE AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The models described in Chapter VI provided the basis for a systematic investiga-
tion of how the numerous input model parameters impacted the model outputs associated 
with the ACRS and percent clearance MOEs. Given the large number of model input pa-
rameters, it was important to create an experimental design that efficiently and effectively 
explored the input parameter ranges. Regression analysis was utilized for each configura-
tion to analyze the sensitivity of the MOEs to the various input factors. This chapter de-
scribes which model parameters were found to be the most impactful to the MOEs based 
on the sensitivity analysis performed as an output of the DOE and provides a foundation 
for the performance analysis leading to future MCM recommendations. 
A. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
The variables of interest are defined by the input parameters of the models that are 
associated with MCM MOPs relevant to the legacy and future configurations for the sce-
nario of interest. Table 25 shows the relevant input model parameters and initial value 
ranges based on SME feedback for the legacy and future configurations. 
Table 25.   Input Model Parameters and DOE Factors—Initial Ranges 
Input Model 
Parameter Parameter Description 
Legacy Range Future Range 
Min Max Min Max 
S_SrchSpeed_kt Surface search speed 1 5 1 10 
S_TurnTime_s Surface time to turn at the end of a track 300 600 300 600 
S_TransitSpd_kt Surface transit speed from staging area to 
minefield 
10 15 20 50 
S_NumHntTrk_pNM Surface hunting tracks per nautical mile 1 80 1 80 
S_SStreamT_hr Surface time to stream search gear 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface time to recover search gear 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 
S_ReplenishT_hr Surface time to replenish 24 48 4 8 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface max sortie time 336 504 16 20 
S_NumPassPerTrk Surface passes per track 1 1 1 1 
S_Pd Surface probability of detecting a MILEC 0.30 0.90 0.30 0.90 
S_Pcmm Surface probability of classifying a mine 
as a MILCO 
0.50 0.90 0.50 0.90 
S_Pcnn Surface probability of classifying a non-
mine as a non-MILCO 
0.50 090 0.50 0.90 
S_Prmm Surface probability of reacquiring a mine 
as a MILCO 
0.30 0.80 0.00 0.00 
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Input Model 
Parameter Parameter Description 
Legacy Range Future Range 
Min Max Min Max 
S_Prnn Surface probability of reacquiring a non-
mine as a non-MILCO 
0.01 0.30 0.00 0.00 
S_Pimm Surface probability of identifying a mine 
as a mine 
0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Pinn Surface probability of identifying a non-
mine as a non-mine 
0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Pn Surface probability of neutralizing a mine 0.50 0.90 0.00 0.00 
S_SeaFox Surface flag indicating whether legacy 
model uses SeaFox 
0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_SeaFox_PID Surface flag indicating percentage of Sea-
Fox’s using ID rounds 
0.10 0.60 0.00 0.00 
S_Prmml Surface probability of reacquiring a mine, 
previously identified as a mine, as a mine 
0.30 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Prnnl Surface probability of reacquiring a non-
mine, previously identified as a mine, as a 
mine 
0.01 0.50 0.00 0.00 
S_RDeployT_hr Surface time to deploy reacquisition and 
identification gear 
0.10 2.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RRecoverT_hr Surface time to recover reacquisition and 
identification gear 
0.10 2.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RImuT_hr Surface mean time for reacquisition and 
identification 
0.25 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RIsigmaT_hr Surface standard deviation for reacquisi-
tion and identification 
0.10 0.50 0.00 0.00 
S_RNmuT_hr Surface mean time for reacquisition and 
neutralization 
0.25 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RNsigmaT_hr Surface standard deviation for reacquisi-
tion and neutralization 
0.10 0.50 0.00 0.00 
S_RIminT_hr Surface minimum time for reacquisition 
and identification 
0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S_RNminT_hr Surface minimum time for reacquisition 
and neutralization 
0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S_NeutSpeed_kt Surface neutralizer speed 0.10 5.00 0.00 0.00 
S_SafeDist_yd Surface safe distance from neutralizer 250 300 0 0 
A_SrchSpeed_kt Airborne search speed 10 30 0 0 
A_TurnTime_s Airborne time to turn at the end of a track 120 240 0 0 
A_TransitSpd_kt Airborne transit speed from staging area to 
minefield 
40 180 40 150 
A_NumHntTrk_pNM Airborne hunting tracks per nautical mile 10 40 0 0 
A_SStreamT_hr Airborne time to stream gear 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.00 
A_SRecoverT_hr Airborne time to recover gear 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.00 
A_ReplenishT_hr Airborne time to replenish neutralizers 1 2 1 2 
A_SortieTime_hr Airborne max sortie time 1 4 1 3 
A_NumPassPerTrk Airborne passes per track 1 1 0 0 
A_Pd Airborne probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
0.30 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Pcmm Airborne probability of classifying a mine 
as a MILCO 
0.50 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Pcnn Airborne probability of classifying a non-
mine as a non-MILCO 
0.50 0.90 0.00 0.00 
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Input Model 
Parameter Parameter Description 
Legacy Range Future Range 
Min Max Min Max 
A_Prmm Airborne probability of reacquiring a mine 
as a MILCO 
0.30 0.80 0.30 0.80 
A_Prnn Airborne probability of reacquiring a non-
mine as a non-MILCO 
0.01 0.30 0.01 0.30 
A_Pimm Airborne probability of identifying a mine 
as a mine 
0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 
A_Pinn Airborne probability of identifying a non-
mine as a non-mine 
0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 
A_Pn Airborne probability of neutralizing a 
mine 
0.50 0.90 0.50 0.90 
A_NumNeut Airborne number of neutralizers 6 6 4 4 
A_Neutralizer A flag indicating whether legacy helicop-
ter has neutralizers 
0 1 0 0 
A_RDeployT_hr Airborne time to deploy reacquisition and 
identification gear 
0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 
A_RRecoverT_hr Airborne time to recover reacquisition and 
identification gear 
0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 
A_RImuT_hr Airborne mean time for reacquisition and 
identification 
0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 
A_RIsigmaT_hr Airborne standard deviation for reacquisi-
tion and identification 
0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 
A_RIminT_hr Airborne minimum time for reacquisition 
and identification 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
A_NeutSpeed Airborne neutralizer speed 0.01 5.00 0.01 5.00 
A_SafeDist_yd Airborne safe distance from neutralizer 300 350 300 350 
SLOCLength_NM SLOC length 10 10 10 10 
SLOCWidth_NM SLOC width 10 10 10 10 
NumNonMines Number of non-mines 400 400 400 400 
SearchSplitYpc Minefield split between surface and air-
borne for legacy parallel search 
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 
StagingXPos_NM Staging distance from minefield (x-axis) -10 -40 -10 -40 
StagingYPos_NM Staging distance from minefield (y-axis) 0 10 0 10 
NeutSplitYpc Minefield split between surface and air-
borne for legacy parallel neutralization 
0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 
NumMines Number of mines 100 100 100 100 
 
As can be seen in Table 26, some key similarities and differences between the 
legacy and future systems can be inferred from the input parameters ranges, such as: 
 Similarities: 
 SLOC dimensions, number of non-mines, number of mines, and 
surface passes per track are constant and germane to legacy and fu-
ture systems. 
 Probabilistic value ranges are intentionally wide due to the classi-




 The future capability does not include using the RMS for neutrali-
zation so all associated surface neutralization probabilities are set 
to zero. 
 The future capability does not include using the MH-60S for detec-
tion or classification so all associated airborne search probabilities 
are set to zero. 
 The future surface capability provided by the RMS has better 
transit and search speeds compared to the legacy capability of the 
MCM 1. 
 The legacy surface sortie time provided by the MCM 1 is longer 
compared to the future capability of the RMS. 
 Originally, it was believed that the legacy airborne capability pro-
vided by the MH-53E could carry six neutralizers compared to four 
neutralizers carried by the future MH-60S. This was corrected dur-
ing the second DOE, and is discussed further in Section B. 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
Given the large number of factors and their associated ranges, simulation optimi-
zation and ranking/selection techniques did not appear to provide practical methods for 
determining which input parameters impacted the output MOE metrics of the models. A 
nearly orthogonal-and-balanced (NOAB) design was chosen primarily based on the num-
ber of allowable input factors. The Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs 
(SEED) Center for Data Farming at the NPS provided a 512-point design for exploring 
up to 200 discrete factors and 100 continuous factors. The DOE afforded by the SEED 
NOAB tool provided a design that was: 
 Nearly balanced in that every factor level occurs nearly equally often 
(Vieira Jr. et al. 2013) 
 Nearly orthogonal in that the pairwise correlation between two factors is 
very small (Vieira Jr. et al. 2013) 
These DOE characteristics enable investigation of the effect of one factor nearly 
independent of the other factors (Vieira Jr. et al. 2013). The 512-point design output from 
the NOAB tool provided input parameters for simulation runs of the models. This method 
determines the effect of each variable on ACRS and percent clearance by saturating the 
solution space with approximately evenly spaced orthogonal (independent) data points. 
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This process increases the efficiency of collecting data because the solution space is 
evenly saturated with data points, allowing the relationship between key system inputs 
and outputs to be determined without analyzing every possible combination of variables, 
which would be nearly impossible. Figure 54 depicts the principle of solution space satu-
ration as a method to find correlations between data points of interest. 
 
Figure 54.  Figurative Solution Space Saturation: A Method to Find Data Correla-
tions (after Vieira Jr. et al. 2013) 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The process of determining which input variables have the biggest effect on the 
MOE involved using the 300 factor by 512-point design NOAB matrix, followed by a 
regression analysis. The NOAB matrix spreadsheet generates a random uniform distribu-
tion, from the minimum input value to the maximum value. For example, if the input var-
iable surface probability of mine detection (S_Pd) varies over a range of 0.90 to 0.99, the 
NOAB tool generates design points evenly distributed from 0.90 to 0.99 from line one to 
line 512. The same process is repeated for each input variable in the NOAB matrix. The 
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uniformly distributed data for each input variable directly corresponds to the input varia-
bles in the ExtendSim model. The output data from the NOAB matrix was pasted into the 
input database of the model. The ExtendSim model utilized these input parameters to run 
the simulation, then generated a set of outputs that were associated with the performance 
of the model and resultant MOEs for the MCM scenario described in Chapter V. Once 
this was complete, a regression analysis was conducted to determine the linear relation-
ships within the solution space and the sensitivity of the system output to that of the sys-
tem inputs. Figure 55 shows the process used to conduct the sensitivity analysis. As seen 
in Figure 55, the input to the sensitivity analysis was the output from the model, which 
was analyzed with regression analysis to determine the input effects on the output. This 
process was repeated for each of the five model configurations. The regression analysis 
of the resultant data was evaluated using Minitab and JMP. 
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Figure 55.  Sensitivity Analysis Process 
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The regression analysis measures the statistical significance of each input model 
parameter to the primary model output MOEs, in this case ACRS and percent clearance. 
The input model parameters were sorted by p-value in order to determine the statistical 
significance of each with respect to each MOE. Statistical significance, for the scope of 
this project, was defined as 0.05; i.e., the analysis only looked at those parameters with p-
values less than or equal to 0.05. 
1. Outputs of the Initial DOE 
Based on the initial input ranges shown in Table 25, each model was run using the 
NOAB DOE and it was determined that there were some overlaps between the airborne 
sorties’ times and distance between the staging area and the minefield. That is, the input 
ranges allowed for circumstances where a helicopter could not even make it to the mine-
field based on its speed and distance from the minefield and thereby resulting in no mines 
being neutralized in the case of the future systems. As a result, the input ranges were fur-
ther refined. 
2. Refinement of the Initial DOE 
In order to eliminate the factor range inconsistencies cited above, the factor rang-
es were adjusted as shown in Table 26. Additionally, factor ranges were reduced based on 
SME feedback and educated assumptions. This resulted in the creation of a second DOE 
input matrix for each configuration. The changes from the initial DOE ranges, which are 
highlighted in green in Table 26, are: 
 Minimum surface search speeds was increased from 1–5 knots to 2.5–5 
knots for the legacy system and from 1–5 knots to 5–10 knots for the LCS 
 Minimum airborne search speeds was increased from 10–30 knots to 15–
30 knots for the legacy system 
 Number of surface hunt tracks per nautical mile was fixed at 20, corre-
sponding to 40 tracks over the 10 NM SLOC 
 The future surface replenish time was reduced from 4–8 hours to 2–4 
hours 
 The future minimum surface sortie time was reduced from 16–20 to 10–20 
hours 
 197
 Minimum surface and airborne search probabilities were increased from 
0.3–0.9 to 0.7–0.9 
 Minimum surface and airborne neutralize probabilities were increased 
from 0.5–0.9 to 0.7–0.9 
 Minimum legacy airborne transit speeds were increased from 40–180 
knots to 90–180 knots 
 Minimum future airborne transit speeds were increased from 40–150 knots 
to 80–150 knots 
 Airborne sortie times were fixed at four hours for the legacy systems and 
three for the future system 
 The surface and airborne search and neutralize split percentages were re-
fined to 0.33–0.66 
 The lateral distance from the staging area to the minefield was reduced 
from 10–40 NM to 10–20 NM 













Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
S_SrchSpeed_kt 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 5.00 10.00 
S_TurnTime_s 300 600 300 600 300 600 300 600 300 600 
S_TransitSpd_kt 10 15 10 15 10 15 10 15 20 50 
S_NumHntTrk_pNM 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
S_SStreamT_hr 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 
S_SRecoverT_hr 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 
S_ReplenishT_hr 24 48 24 48 24 48 24 48 2 4 
S_SortieTime_hr 336 504 336 504 336 504 336 504 10 20 
S_NumPassPerTrk 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S_Pd 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 
S_Pcmm 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 
S_Pcnn 0.70 090 0.70 090 0.70 090 0.70 090 0.70 0.90 
S_Prmm 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.00 0.00 
S_Prnn 0.70 0.30 0.70 0.30 0.70 0.30 0.70 0.30 0.00 0.00 
S_Pimm 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Pinn 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Pn 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
S_SeaFox 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_SeaFox_PID 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.00 0.00 
S_Prmml 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Prnnl 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.00 0.00 
S_RDeployT_hr 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RRecoverT_hr 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RImuT_hr 0.25 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RIsigmaT_hr 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.00 0.00 














Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
S_RNsigmaT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.50 0.00 0.00 
S_RIminT_hr 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S_RNminT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S_NeutSpeed_kt 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 0.00 0.00 
S_SafeDist_yd 250 300 250 300 250 300 250 300 0 0 
A_SrchSpeed_kt 15 30 15 30 15 30 15 30 0 0 
A_TurnTime_s 120 240 120 240 120 240 120 240 0 0 
A_TransitSpd_kt 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 80 150 
A_NumHntTrk_pNM 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0 
A_SStreamT_hr 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.00 
A_SRecoverT_hr 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.00 
A_ReplenishT_hr 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
A_SortieTime_hr 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
A_NumPassPerTrk 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
A_Pd 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Pcmm 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Pcnn 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Prmm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 
A_Prnn 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 
A_Pimm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 
A_Pinn 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 
A_Pn 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 
A_NumNeut 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 6 4 4 
A_Neutralizer 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
A_RDeployT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 
A_RRecoverT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 
A_RImuT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 
A_RIsigmaT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25 
A_RIminT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
A_NeutSpeed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 
A_SafeDist_yd 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 300 350 300 350 300 350 
SLOCLength_NM 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
SLOCWidth_NM 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NumNonMines 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
SearchSplitYpc 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 
StagingXPos_NM -10 -20 -10 -20 -10 -20 -10 -20 -10 -20 
StagingYPos_NM 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 
NeutSplitYpc 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 
NumMines 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Using the modified DOEs based on these updated input parameter ranges yielded 
the MOE results shown in Table 27. As shown in this table, the parallel hunting opera-
tions represented in configurations 2A and 2B yield a slightly better ACRS than the other 
configurations, such that the 95% confidence interval surrounding the mean ACRS does 
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not overlap with any other configurations’ confidence intervals. The percent clearance is 
similar across all five configurations. 
Table 27.   Simulation Outputs from the First DOE 
DOE 1 Configura-
tion 






Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Configuration 1A 4.31 4.25 4.38 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 1B 4.27 4.20 4.34 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 2A 5.31 5.21 5.41 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 2B 5.30 5.20 5.40 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 3 4.78 4.69 4.87 0.32 0.32 0.33
 
While the simulation results are discussed in detail in Chapter VIII, the regression 
analysis summarized in Table 28 indicates which factors had a statistically significant 
impact on the MOEs. All those factors highlighted in green indicate a p-value less than or 
equal to 0.05. As expected, the factors associated with time were generally found to be 
more impactful for the ACRS MOE, while the factors associated with the probabilities of 
minehunting were generally found to be more impactful for the percent clearance MOE. 
Highlighted in blue in Table 28 are those factors that are not impactful to either 
MOE for any configuration. Model parameters showing a gray cell did not vary in the 
DOE and were therefore found to have a regression constant value of zero for that partic-
ular configuration. Not shown in Table 28 are those factors that were made constant for 
all configurations. These factors did not impact the regression analysis of the model out-


















Table 28.   Sensitivity Analysis of Outputs from the First DOE 
Input Model 
Parameter 
Configuration 1A Configuration 1B Configuration 2A Configuration 2B Configuration 3 









A_NeutSpeed     0.965 0.632 0.352 0.554 0.042 0.623 
A_Pcmm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.004 0.000   
A_Pcnn 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.227   
A_Pd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
A_Pimm     0.693 0.000 0.555 0.000 0.104 0.000 
A_Pinn     0.612 0.412 0.077 0.274 0.386 0.42 
A_Pn     0.657 0.000 0.625 0.004 0.887 0.000 
A_Prmm     0.664 0.036 0.197 0.841 0.447 0.000 
A_Prnn     0.52 0.907 0.573 0.074 0.247 0.967 
A_RDeployT_hr     0.863 0.412 0.566 0.485 0.008 0.359 
A_ReplenishT_hr 0.609 0.484 0.291 0.726 0.826 0.368 0.799 0.736 0.027 0.478 
A_RImuT_hr     0.119 0.549 0.785 0.93 0.077 0.209 
A_RIsigmaT_hr     0.625 0.191 0.646 0.852 0.791 0.976 
A_RRecoverT_hr     0.569 0.843 0.091 0.973 0.224 0.574 
A_SafeDist_yd     0.854 0.991 0.227 0.649 0.688 0.313 
A_SrchSpeed_kt 0.151 0.556 0.364 0.114 0.353 0.680 0.706 0.597   
A_SRecoverT_hr 0.112 0.447 0.082 0.638 0.781 0.739 0.493 0.544   
A_SStreamT_hr 0.009 0.203 0.207 0.229 0.302 0.725 0.333 0.582   
A_TransitSpd_kt 0.342 0.160 0.205 0.827 0.842 0.101 0.097 0.676 0.001 0.812 
A_TurnTime_s 0.740 0.284 0.145 0.727 0.738 0.814 0.086 0.205   
NeutSplitYpc 0.728 0.580 0.739 0.765 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.642 0.941 0.112 
S_NeutSpeed_kt 0.057 0.490 0.861 0.765 0.029 0.527 0.911 0.528   
S_Pcmm 0.026 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.671 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.957 0.000 
S_Pcnn 0.038 0.794 0.007 0.847 0.000 0.712 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.818 
S_Pd 0.100 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.031 0.000 
S_Pimm 0.792 0.000 0.433 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.352 0.000   
S_Pinn 0.138 0.182 0.061 0.381 0.239 0.815 0.323 0.681   
S_Pn 0.878 0.000 0.895 0.000 0.819 0.000 0.439 0.000   




Configuration 1A Configuration 1B Configuration 2A Configuration 2B Configuration 3 









S_PrmmI 0.922 0.471 0.778 0.000 0.993 0.201 0.931 0.007   
S_Prnn 0.412 0.439 0.644 0.835 0.253 0.067 0.959 0.388   
S_PrnnI 0.009 0.659 0.050 0.884 0.003 0.709 0.022 0.747   
S_RDeployT_hr 0.000 0.715 0.000 0.566 0.000 0.919 0.000 0.821   
S_ReplenishT_hr 0.000 0.891 0.000 0.294 0.000 0.798 0.000 0.808 0.000 0.374 
S_RImuT_hr 0.000 0.943 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.623 0.000 0.883   
S_RIsigmaT_hr 0.110 0.502 0.036 0.054 0.605 0.347 0.107 0.177   
S_RNmuT_hr   0.380 0.621   0.351 0.624   
S_RNsigmaT_hr   0.303 0.201   0.069 0.182   
S_RRecoverT_hr 0.000 0.912 0.000 0.731 0.000 0.650 0.000 0.439   
S_SafeDist_yd 0.554 0.523 0.653 0.724 0.436 0.614 0.500 0.062   
S_SeaFox_PID   0.243 0.002   0.001 0.021   
S_SortieTime_hr 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.765 
S_SrchSpeed_kt 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.663 0.000 0.761 0.000 0.926 0.000 0.005 
S_SRecoverT_hr 0.634 0.189 0.454 0.196 0.313 0.895 0.555 0.212 0.000 0.946 
S_SStreamT_hr 0.157 0.552 0.278 0.022 0.895 0.869 0.037 0.107 0.000 0.204 
S_TransitSpd_kt 0.902 0.805 0.788 0.09 0.815 0.409 0.232 0.244 0.000 0.393 
S_TurnTime_s 0.042 0.116 0.009 0.532 0.025 0.417 0.035 0.011 0.001 0.160 
SearchSplitYpc 0.000 0.579 0.000 0.627 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.242 0.071 0.385 
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3. Refinement of the First DOE 
Based on the sensitivity results from the model outputs of the first DOE, some 
factors that were not found to be significant were made constant by selecting a fixed val-
ue roughly equal to the mid-point of the initial DOE range. In addition, some factors that 
were found to be not significant were still varied to see whether they would become sig-
nificant based on other changes. Finally, a correction was made in the allowable number 
of airborne SeaFox neutralizers available on the MH-53E, changing the number from six 
to four (Brett Cordes, personal communication, 2 October 2014). This change is high-
lighted in green in Table 29, as it was a correction to the original and first DOE parameter 
values. A summary of the changes from the first DOE ranges, highlighted in blue in Ta-
ble 29, are: 
 Surface and airborne probabilities of reacquiring non-mines as non-mines 
were found to be insignificant and were made constant at 0.2 
 Surface and airborne probabilities of identifying non-mines as non-mines 
were found to be insignificant and were made constant at 0.85 
 Surface and airborne mean and standard deviation of reacquisition and 
neutralization times were found to be insignificant and were made con-
stant with a mean of 0.375 hours and a standard deviation of 0.175 hours 
 Surface and airborne safe stand-off distances for neutralization were found 
to be insignificant and were made constant at 275 yards for the surface 
platform and at 325 yards for the airborne platforms 
 Airborne search speed and turn times were found to be insignificant and 
were made constant, airborne search speed was set to 22 knots and the turn 
times were set at 180 seconds 
 The distance from the staging area to the minefield was made constant at 
15 NM in the lateral direction and 5 NM in the vertical direction 













Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
S_SrchSpeed_kt 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 5.00 10.00 
S_TurnTime_s 300 600 300 600 300 600 300 600 300 600 
S_TransitSpd_kt 10 15 10 15 10 15 10 15 20 50 
S_NumHntTrk_pN
M 














Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
S_SStreamT_hr 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 
S_SRecoverT_hr 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 0.25 2.00 
S_ReplenishT_hr 24 48 24 48 24 48 24 48 2 4 
S_SortieTime_hr 336 504 336 504 336 504 336 504 10 20 
S_NumPassPerTrk 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S_Pd 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 
S_Pcmm 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 
S_Pcnn 0.70 090 0.70 090 0.70 090 0.70 090 0.70 0.90 
S_Prmm 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.00 0.00 
S_Prnn 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 
S_Pimm 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Pinn 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.00 0.00 
S_Pn 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
S_SeaFox 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_SeaFox_PID 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.00 0.00 
S_Prmml 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.00 0.00 
S_Prnnl 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.00 0.00 
S_RDeployT_hr 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RRecoverT_hr 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.10 2.00 0.00 0.00 
S_RImuT_hr 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.00 0.00 
S_RIsigmaT_hr 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.00 0.00 
S_RNmuT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.375 0.375 0.00 0.00 0.375 0.375 0.00 0.00 
S_RNsigmaT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.175 0.175 0.00 0.00 0.175 0.175 0.00 0.00 
S_RIminT_hr 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S_RNminT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
S_NeutSpeed_kt 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 0.00 0.00 
S_SafeDist_yd 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 0 0 
A_SrchSpeed_kt 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 0 0 
A_TurnTime_s 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 0 0 
A_TransitSpd_kt 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 80 150 
A_NumHntTrk_pN
M 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0 
A_SStreamT_hr 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.00 
A_SRecoverT_hr 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.00 0.00 
A_ReplenishT_hr 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
A_SortieTime_hr 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
A_NumPassPerTrk 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
A_Pd 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Pcmm 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Pcnn 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 
A_Prmm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 
A_Prnn 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.30 
A_Pimm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 
A_Pinn 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
A_Pn 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 
A_NumNeut 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 
A_Neutralizer 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
A_RDeployT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 














Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
A_RImuT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 
A_RIsigmaT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 
A_RIminT_hr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
A_NeutSpeed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 
A_SafeDist_yd 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 325 325 325 325 325 325 
SLOCLength_NM 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
SLOCWidth_NM 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NumNonMines 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
SearchSplitYpc 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 
StagingXPos_NM -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 
StagingYPos_NM 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
NeutSplitYpc 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.66 
NumMines 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Using the second DOE based on these updated input parameter ranges yielded the 
MOE results shown in Table 30. As expected, setting insignificant factors from the first 
DOE constant did not have much impact on the resultant MOE values. 
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ACRS Percent Clearance 










Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
1A 4.31 4.24 4.38 4.32 4.25 4.39 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.34
1B 4.27 4.20 4.34 4.28 4.21 4.35 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.32
2A 5.31 5.21 5.41 5.35 5.25 5.45 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.34
2B 5.30 5.20 5.40 5.30 5.20 5.40 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.32
3 4.78 4.69 4.87 4.80 4.71 4.89 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.34
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Results from the second DOE were similar to the results obtained in the first 
DOE. Table 31 summarizes these results and shows the impactful inputs (highlighted in 
green) as well as the inputs that were discovered to be not significant (highlighted in 
blue). Model parameters showing a gray cell did not vary in the DOE and were therefore 
found to have a regression constant value of zero for that particular configuration. Not 
shown in Table 31 are those factors that were made constant based on the results from the 
first DOE. The factors that did not impact the regression analysis of the model outputs 
based on the second DOE, in addition to those constant factors found as a result of the 


















Table 31.   Sensitivity Analysis for Outputs of the Second DOE 
Input Model 
Parameter 
Configuration 1A Configuration 1B Configuration 2A Configuration 2B Configuration 3 









A_NeutSpeed     0.178 0.145 0.758 0.42 0.069 0.797 
A_Pcmm 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.033 0.000   
A_Pcnn 0.000 0.299 0.000 0.884 0.000 0.544 0.000 0.153   
A_Pd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
A_Pimm     0.774 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.035 0.000 
A_Pn     0.270 0.006 0.700 0.017 0.413 0.000 
A_Prmm     0.740 0.263 0.531 0.245 0.233 0.000 
A_RDeployT_hr     0.996 0.816 0.674 0.018 0.001 0.748 
A_ReplenishT_hr 0.753 0.766 0.654 0.245 0.885 0.641 0.995 0.055 0.186 0.129 
A_RRecoverT_hr     0.502 0.488 0.515 0.196 0.650 0.354 
A_SRecoverT_hr 0.033 0.620 0.050 0.837 0.338 0.902 0.446 0.008   
A_SStreamT_hr 0.196 0.788 0.696 0.449 0.358 0.820 0.791 0.356   
A_TransitSpd_kt 0.170 0.876 0.466 0.503 0.327 0.515 0.358 0.615 0.012 0.014 
NeutSplitYpc 0.561 0.172 0.402 0.481 0.000 0.402 0.000 0.072 0.990 0.632 
S_NeutSpeed_kt 0.100 0.057 0.118 0.306 0.065 0.060 0.173 0.210   
S_Pcmm 0.047 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.312 0.000 
S_Pcnn 0.016 0.015 0.389 0.271 0.000 0.650 0.000 0.841 0.000 0.187 
S_Pd 0.045 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.053 0.000 
S_Pimm 0.181 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.095 0.000   
S_Pn 0.879 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.986 0.000 0.771 0.000   
S_Prmm 0.447 0.000 0.189 0.000 0.152 0.002 0.130 0.000   
S_PrmmI 0.364 0.657 0.678 0.000 0.227 0.559 0.700 0.098   
S_PrnnI 0.011 0.343 0.030 0.400 0.020 0.903 0.030 0.080   
S_RDeployT_hr 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.760 0.000 0.920 0.000 0.440   
S_ReplenishT_hr 0.000 0.613 0.000 0.650 0.000 0.549 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.258 
S_RRecoverT_hr 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.760   
S_SeaFox_PID   0.461 0.000   0.000 0.022   
S_SortieTime_hr 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.484 0.000 0.834 




Configuration 1A Configuration 1B Configuration 2A Configuration 2B Configuration 3 









S_SRecoverT_hr 0.826 0.722 0.427 0.560 0.579 0.051 0.252 0.849 0.000 0.041 
S_SStreamT_hr 0.011 0.451 0.003 0.752 0.050 0.696 0.043 0.318 0.000 0.023 
S_TransitSpd_kt 0.769 0.970 0.291 0.528 0.248 0.210 0.620 0.565 0.000 0.154 
S_TurnTime_s 0.001 0.068 0.015 0.300 0.035 0.926 0.039 0.202 0.000 0.395 
SearchSplitYpc 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.316 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.695 0.019 0.346 
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Additionally, the DOE data from the second DOE was examined for significant 
two-factor interactions. Due to the large number of factors and subsequent two-way in-
teractions, the data were fed into JMP for this analysis because of its greater facility with 
large data sets (Paul Beery, personal communication, 1 October 2014). 
All constant data were removed from consideration, and then each response vari-
able was considered independently in JMP’s least squares regression model fitting. An 
iterative approach was taken to the model fitting, with each model examined for goodness 
of fit, number of factors, residuals, and any other anomalies. 
ACRS was considered first; all factors were put in for the initial analysis, and then 
sorted by p-value. Only those factors significant at the α = 0.10 level were included in the 
second regression. The second regression also included all two-way interactions between 
these factors. All factors and interactions significant at the α = 0.05 level were selected 
into another least squares fitting. In cases in which an interaction was significant, but one 
or more of its factors was not, the factors were retained despite non-significance. This 
was iterated until no interactions or factors had a p-value greater than 0.05, with the ex-
ception of those factors retained due to significant interaction with another factor. 
An additional fit was run retaining only those factors significant at the α = 0.01 
level to examine the effect on R2 and R2-adjusted. R2 is a measure of how much of the 
data’s variation can be explained by the model; values near one are desirable. R2-adjusted 
is the R2 value adjusted by the number of variables such that additional variables are pe-
nalized. This enables comparison between models with different numbers of variables 
and rewards a simpler model with fewer variables even though it may describe less of the 
variation; once again, a value near one is desirable and a lower value is less desirable 
(Montgomery and Runger 2011, 428-9 & 472). 
Table 32 contains the summary statistics of the ACRS fit. The configurations with 
the greatest R2 values are highlighted in yellow, and the configurations with the greatest 
R2-adjusted values are highlighted in green. 
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Table 32.   ACRS Fit Summary Statistics 









First Fit  
(no interac-
tions) 
# Factors In 27 28 33 34 20 
# Factors (p <0.10) 16 14 14 18 14 
R2 0.867 0.869 0.921 0.912 0.925 
R2-adjusted 0.859 0.861 0.915 0.906 0.922 
Second Fit  
(Two-way  
interactions) 
# Factors In 136 105 105 171 105 
# Factors (p <0.05) 34 26 21 37 26 
R2 0.952 0.943 0.925 0.961 0.948 
R2-adjusted 0.935 0.928 0.906 0.941 0.935 
Intermediate 
Fit 
# Factors In 37 28 22 38 28 
# Factors (p <0.05) 32 26 20 32 23 
R2 0.941 0.933 0.906 0.945 0.941 
R2-adjusted 0.936 0.929 0.902 0.940 0.938 
Final Fit 
(p<0.05) 
# Factors In 35 27 21 29 22 
# Factors (p <0.05) 31 26 20 29 21 
R2 0.940 0.933 0.905 0.942 0.939 
R2-adjusted 0.935 0.929 0.901 0.939 0.936 




# Factors In 26 22 15 25 14 
# Factors (p <0.01) 25 22 15 25 14 
R2 0.935 0.930 0.900 0.939 0.933 
 R2-adjusted 0.931 0.927 0.897 0.936 0.931 
Maximum R2 0.952 0.943 0.925 0.961 0.948 
Maximum R2-adjusted 0.936 0.929 0.915 0.941 0.938 
 
From the table, it can be seen that the second fitting, which included two-way in-
teractions, uniformly resulted in the highest R2 value, indicating that inclusion of two-
way interactions was important to explain the variability in the model. R2 values fell in 
the range between 0.86 and 0.97, indicating the statistical model has good explanatory 
power. As expected, further reduction of the number of factors resulted in lower R2 val-
ues, as less of the variation was explained. 
The R2-adjusted values were similar, ranging between 0.85 and 0.95. Adding in 
the interactions resulted in a higher R2-adjusted value, indicating that the additional ex-
planatory power of the interactions was more valuable than the added complexity. Only 
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configuration 2A with four neutralizers was an exception. Further, for most configura-
tions, the reduction of factors down to only those factors and interactions with p-values 
less than .05 resulted in a better R2-adjusted value. This is expected, as much of the varia-
tion is still explained, but fewer variables are required to do so. In a few instances this 
was not true; however, in all cases reduction of factors down to only those with p-values 
less than 0.01 still had relatively little reduction on the R2-adjusted value, which may in-
dicate it is reasonable to reduce the statistical models down to these factors. 
It should be noted that although the fits for ACRS had high R2 values, they also 
had some faintly patterned residual plots resembling a “V” lying on its side (i.e., “<”), 
which indicated the need for further transformation of the data. This pattern was much 
more prevalent in the first stages of model fitting. Reduction in the factors included in the 
model appeared in most cases to minimize this behavior; however, transformations using 
both the log and square root were attempted to evaluate the effect of a contractile func-
tion on the residuals and fit statistics. Additionally, configuration 3 has an apparent outli-
er. None of the values input were out of the ordinary and there appears to be no obvious 
reason to remove this point beyond its anomalous deviation from expectation. It may in-
dicate a poorly understood higher-order interaction, or the result of an unlikely event. For 
the sake of completeness, a fit was performed with this outlier removed to check for 
changes in fit and significance. Residual plots for the models with only factors significant 
at the α = 0.01 level, are depicted in Figures 56–60. Figure 61 contains the residual plot 
of configuration 3 without the outlier. 
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Figure 56.  Residual by Predicted Plot—Configuration 1A 
 

























Figure 58.  Residual by Predicted Plot—Configuration 2A 
 





























Figure 60.  Residual by Predicted Plot—Configuration 3 
 
Figure 61.  Residual by Predicted Plot-Configuration 3 Without Outlier 
Residual plots for the log and square root transformations are included in Figures 
62–67. Note that the contracted data have slightly better residual plots. For this reason, 
























Figure 62.  Configuration 1A Transformed Residuals Plot 
 
Figure 63.  Configuration 1B Transformed Residuals Plot 
 
Figure 64.  Configuration 2A Transformed Residuals Plot 
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Figure 65.  Configuration 2B Transformed Residuals Plot 
 
Figure 66.  Configuration 3 Transformed Residuals Plot 
 
Figure 67.  Configuration 3 Without Outlier Transformed Residuals Plot 
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Table 33 contains a list in order of decreasing statistical significance of all factors 
and interactions included in the α = 0.01 model for ACRS. As shown, many of the factors 
are significant for all configurations. 
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Table 33.   Factors Included in the ACRS Model Fit 
Configuration 1A Configuration 1B Configuration 2A Configuration 2B Configuration 3 Configuration 3 
(No Outlier) 
S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt 
S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc S_SortieTime_hr S_SortieTime_hr 
S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr S_RDeployT_hr S_SRecoverT_hr S_SRecoverT_hr 
SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc S_RDeployT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr S_SStreamT_hr S_SStreamT_hr 
A_Pcnn A_Pcnn A_Pcnn NeutSplitYpc S_ReplenishT_hr S_ReplenishT_hr 
(S_RRecoverT_hr)*
(SearchSplitYpc) 
A_Pd A_Pd A_Pcnn S_TransitSpd_kt S_TransitSpd_kt 
A_Pd (S_RRecoverT_hr)*
(SearchSplitYpc) 













































































(S_SrchSpeed_kt)* (A_Pd)* S_Pcnn 
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Legend (For a full list of model parameters, see Tables 17 through 20 in Chapter VI) 
A_Pcmm: Airborne probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO 
A_Pcnn: Airborne probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO 
A_Pd: Airborne probability of detecting a MILEC 
A_RDeployT_hr: Airborne time to deploy reacquisition and identification gear 
NeutSplitYpc: Minefield split between surface and airborne for legacy parallel neutralization 
S_Pcnn: Surface probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO 
S_RDeployT_hr: Surface time to deploy reacquisition and identification gear 
S_ReplenishT_hr: Surface time to replenish 
S_RRecoverT_hr: Surface time to recover reacquisition and identification gear 
S_SeaFox_PID: Surface flag indicating percentage of SeaFox’s using ID rounds 
S_SortieTime_hr: Surface max sortie time 
S_SrchSpeed_kt: Surface search speed 
S_SStreamT_hr: Surface time to stream search gear 
S_TransitSpd_kt: Surface transit speed from staging area to minefield 
S_TurnTime_s: Surface time to turn at the end of a track 
SearchSplitYpc: Minefield split between surface and airborne for legacy parallel search 
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The top five factors for each configuration, including transformations, are summa-
rized in Table 34. Again, the interactions shown are significant at the α = 0.01 level for 
ACRS. 
Table 34.   Top Five Significant Model Factors 
Model Configura-
tion 
Influential Factors for 
ACRS Log(ACRS) √(ACRS) 
Configuration 1A 
S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt 
S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr
S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr 
SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc 
A_Pcnn A_Pcnn A_Pcnn 
Configuration 1B 
S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt 
S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr
S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr 
SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc 
A_Pcnn A_Pcnn A_Pcnn 
Configuration 2A 
S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt 
SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc 
S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr
S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr 
A_Pcnn A_Pcnn A_Pcnn 
Configuration 2B 
S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt 
SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc SearchSplitYpc 
S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr S_RDeployT_hr 
S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr S_RRecoverT_hr
NeutSplitYpc NeutSplitYpc NeutSplitYpc 
Configuration 3 
S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt 
S_SortieTime_hr S_SortieTime_hr S_SortieTime_hr 
S_SRecoverT_hr S_SStreamT_hr S_SRecoverT_hr 




S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt S_SrchSpeed_kt 
S_SortieTime_hr S_SortieTime_hr S_SortieTime_hr 
S_SRecoverT_hr S_SStreamT_hr S_SStreamT_hr 
S_SStreamT_hr S_SRecoverT_hr S_SRecoverT_hr 
S_ReplenishT_hr S_ReplenishT_hr S_ReplenishT_hr
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In all cases, the top factors did not change with the transformations. In configura-
tion 3, transformation did change the order of two factors, S_SRecoverT_hr and 
S_SStreamT_hr (i.e., surface time to recover reacquisition and identification gear and 
surface time to stream the reacquisition and identification gear, respectively), between 
third and fourth most significant. Given the minimal amount of impact to the significant 
factors and the relatively small improvements in residuals, while the transformations are 
understood to be slightly better statistically the conclusions provided are based off of the 
untransformed model. The reason for presenting conclusions based on untransformed da-
ta is due to the increased utility of reporting ACRS as opposed to the lognormal of ACRS 
or the square root of ACRS. Factors commonly in the top five included: surface system 
search speed (S_SrchSpeed_kt), surface time to recover reacquisition and identification 
gear (S_RRecoverT_hr), surface time to deploy reacquisition and identification gear 
(S_RDeployT_hr), airborne probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO 
(A_Pcnn), and minefield split between surface and airborne for legacy parallel search 
(SearchSplitYpc). 
The model fitting procedure continued the same way for examination of percent 
clearance. Summaries of the fitting are contained in Table 35. The configurations with 
the greatest R2 values are highlighted in yellow, and the configurations with the greatest 
R2-adjusted values are highlighted in green. 
Table 35.   Percent Clearance Fit Summary Statistics 









First Fit  
(no interac-
tions) 
# Factors In 27 28 33 34 20 
# Factors (p <0.10) 11 9 12 16 8 
R2 0.599 0.519 0.452 0.415 0.573 
R2-adusted 0.576 0.491 0.415 0.374 0.555 
Second Fit  
(Two-way 
interactions) 
# Factors In 55 45 78 136 36 
# Factors (p <0.05) 10 11 16 17 10 
R2 0.615 0.547 0.534 0.555 0.589 
R2-adjusted 0.568 0.503 0.450 0.394 0.557 
Intermediate 
Fit 
# Factors In 11 11 17 20 10 
# Factors (p <0.05) 9 11 16 14 10 
 223









R2 0.575 0.523 0.465 0.422 0.571 
R2-adjusted 0.565 0.512 0.447 0.399 0.563 
Final Fit 
(p <0.05) 
# Factors In 9 11 17 13 10 
# Factors (p <0.05) 8 11 16 13 10 
R2 0.569 0.523 0.465 0.396 0.571 
R2-adjusted 0.561 0.512 0.447 0.380 0.563 




# Factors In 9 11 12 11 5 
# Factors (p <0.01) 8 11 11 10 5 
R2 0.569 0.523 0.443 0.382 0.550 
R2-adjusted 0.561 0.512 0.430 0.369 0.545 
Maximum R2 0.615 0.547 0.534 0.555 0.589 
Maximum R2-adjusted 0.576 0.512 0.450 0.399 0.563 
 
For percent clearance, the R2 values are much lower than they were for ACRS, 
indicating a much poorer fit to the data. R2 was as low as 0.38 and only as high as 0.61. 
R2-adjusted values were no better, ranging from 0.36–0.57. Although various transfor-
mations on the data were attempted, none were found to appreciably improve the fit. Un-
like ACRS, the residuals for the percent clearance fits were not problematic, which pro-
vided no other reason to apply any transformations. It appears that percent clearance may 
be dependent on much higher-order interactions, for which the statistical DOE would 
have to be changed and additional data produced from the ExtendSim model. Table 36 
contains a list, in order of decreasing statistical significance, of all factors and interac-
tions included in the α = 0.01 model for percent clearance. 











S_Pimm S_Pimm S_Pimm S_Pimm A_Pimm 
S_Pn S_Pn S_Pn S_Pn S_Pd 
S_Prmm S_PrmmI A_Pd S_Pd A_Pn 
S_Pd S_Pd S_Pd A_Pcmm S_Pcmm 
A_Pcmm A_Pd S_Prmm S_Pcmm A_Prmm 
A_Pd S_Prmm S_Pcmm A_Pimm  
(A_Pcmm)*(A_
Pcnn) 






























Legend (For a full list of model parameters, see Tables 17 through 20 in Chapter VI) 
A_Pcmm: Airborne probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO 
A_Pcnn: Airborne probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO 
A_Pd: Airborne probability of detecting a MILEC 
A_Pimm: Airborne probability of identifying a mine as a mine 
S_Pcnn: Surface probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO 
S_Pd: Surface probability of detecting a MILEC 
S_Pimm: Surface probability of identifying a mine as a mine 
S_Pn: Surface probability of neutralizing a mine 
S_Prmm: Surface probability of reacquiring a mine as a MILCO 
S_Prmml: Surface probability of reacquiring a mine, previously identified as a mine, as a mine 
S_SeaFox_PID: Surface flag indicating percentage of SeaFox’s using ID rounds 
S_SStreamT_hr: Surface time to stream search gear 
 
The top five factors for percent clearance in each configuration are summarized in 
Table 37. As expected, the factors related to sensor and neutralization performance were 
found to be most significant to the percent clearance MOE. 
Table 37.   Five Most Influential Factors for Percent Clearance Fit 


































D. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SUM-
MARY 
Using the information contained within Table 30 and Table 31 as guides, Chapter 
VIII explores the recommendations for improving future MCM capabilities as compared 
to legacy MCM capabilities. Specifically, Table 30 shows that while the future capability 
(configuration 3) performs better than, or as good as, the serial hunt legacy capability for 
ACRS and percent clearance (configurations 1A and 1B), it does not perform as well as 
the parallel hunt legacy capability (configurations 2A and 2B) for ACRS. The green high-
lighted parameters for configuration 3 in Table 31 indicate those parameters that could 
potentially be modified to improve the future capability. 
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VIII. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Having developed the models described in Chapter VI, and the DOE described in 
Chapter VII, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the data output from the model as a 
result of executing the DOE. The purpose of this analysis is to gain an understanding of 
the legacy and future MCM system capabilities. As described in Chapter VII, the evolu-
tion of the DOE took into account those factors that were found to be statistically signifi-
cant for each system configuration to reduce the number of factors used as part of a re-
gression analysis. This process provided a systematic approach to investigate how the 
numerous input model parameters impacted the model outputs associated with the prima-
ry system MOEs: ACRS and percent clearance. Given the large number of input parame-
ters, or factors, it was important to create a DOE to efficiently and effectively explore the 
input factor ranges. Regression analysis was utilized for each configuration to analyze the 
sensitivity of the MOEs to the various input factors. This chapter describes which factors 
were found to be most impactful to the MOEs based on the sensitivity analysis performed 
as an output of the DOE and provides a foundation for the performance analysis leading 
to MCM recommendations. The results for each legacy and future MCM configurations 
are identified as well as potential improvements for the future MCM configuration that 
could produce performance equal to or better than the legacy MCM configurations. 
A. BASELINE CONFIGURATIONS 
Using the input parameter ranges identified in Chapter VII, the five configurations 
were explored based on the 512-point NOAB DOE. As described in Chapter V, four leg-
acy configurations and one future configuration were considered based on SME feedback 
on relevant system compositions for the scenario under investigation. The outputs (ACRS 
and percent clearance) for the baseline configurations are shown in Table 38. 
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Table 38.   Model Results for Baseline Configurations 
 






Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Configuration 1A 4.32 4.25 4.39 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 1B 4.28 4.21 4.35 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 2A 5.35 5.25 5.45 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 2B 5.30 5.20 5.40 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 3 4.80 4.71 4.89 0.33 0.32 0.34
 
1. Baseline Legacy Configuration 1A 
Legacy configuration 1A, representing when the MCM 1 uses a SLQ-48 for neu-
tralization and the MH-53E is only used for detection and classification, was analyzed 
with 512 model runs with 65 input variables. The statistically significant input variables 
to the ACRS MOE are indicated in Table 39. After 512 runs of the legacy model, the 
mean ACRS was 4.32 with a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 4.25–4.39, as 
shown in Table 38. Effectively, the 1A legacy configuration was able to cover an area of 
4.32 NM2 in a 24-hour period. Table 39 also shows the normalized magnitude of each 
factor’s effects on ACRS in order of increasing p-value. 
Table 39.   Input Parameters Effects on ACRS for Baseline Configuration 1A 




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
Constant Regression Constant 0.24 0.000 
S_SrchSpeed_kt Surface minehunter search speed 0.04 0.000 
S_ReplenishT_hr Surface minehunter time to replenish 0.00 0.000 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface minehunter maximum sortie time 0.00 0.000 
S_RDeployT_hr Surface minehunter time to deploy RI&N gear -0.03 0.000 
S_RRecoverT_hr Surface minehunter time to recover RI&N gear -0.03 0.000 
A_Pd Airborne minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
-0.11 0.000 
A_Pcnn Airborne minehunter probability of classifying 
a non-mine a non-MILCO 
0.22 0.000 
SearchSplitYpc Percentage of search area covered by the sur-
face minehunter 
-0.15 0.000 





Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
track 
A_Pcmm Airborne minehunter probability of classifying 
a mine as a MILCO 
-0.05 0.001 
S_SStreamT_hr Surface minehunter time to stream search gear 0.00 0.011 
S_PrnnI Surface minehunter probability of not reacquir-
ing a non-mine as a mine, given that the non-
mine has already been identified as a mine 
-0.02 0.011 
S_Pcnn Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine as a non-MILCO 
0.03 0.016 
A_SRecoverT_hr Airborne minehunter time to recover search 
gear 
0.02 0.033 
S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
-0.03 0.045 
S_Pcmm Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
mine as a MILCO 
-0.03 0.047 
 
The statistically significant input variables for configuration 1A to the percent 
clearance MOE are indicated in Table 40. After 512 runs of the legacy model, the mean 
percent clearance was 0.33 with a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 0.32–0.34, 
as shown in Table 38. Effectively, the 1A legacy configuration was able to clear 33 per-
cent of the mines from the SLOC. Table 40 also shows the normalized magnitude of each 
variable’s effects on percent clearance, in order of increasing p-value. 
Table 40.   Input Parameters Effects on Percent Clearance for Baseline Configu-




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized Input 
Parameter Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant -0.38 0.000 
S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
0.06 0.000 
S_Pcmm Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
mine as a MILCO 
0.05 0.000 
S_Prmm Surface minehunter probability of reacquiring a 
mine as a MILCO 
0.15 0.000 
S_Pimm Surface minehunter probability of identifying a 
mine as a mine 
0.10 0.000 
S_Pn Surface minehunter probability of neutralizing 
a mine 
0.11 0.000 
A_Pd Airborne minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
0.05 0.000 





Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized Input 
Parameter Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
a mine as a MILCO 
S_Pcnn Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine as a non-MILCO 
-0.02 0.015 




2. Baseline Legacy Configuration 1B 
Legacy configuration 1B, representing when the MCM 1 uses a SeaFox for neu-
tralization and the MH-53E is only used for detection and classification, was analyzed 
with 512 model runs with 65 input variables. The statistically significant input variables 
to the ACRS MOE as well as the normalized magnitude variable’s effects on ACRS are 
indicated in Table 41. After the 512 runs of the legacy model, the mean ACRS was a 4.28 
with a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 4.21–4.35, as shown in Table 38. 
Compared to configuration 1A, configuration 1B was slightly less effective at covering a 
SLOC. This is primarily due to the fact that the SeaFox can utilize both an exploratory 
and neutralizing round, which institutes a delay due to the additional reacquisition step. 
Table 41.   Input Parameters Effects on ACRS for Baseline Configuration 1B 




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant 0.29 0.000 
S_SrchSpeed_kt Surface minehunter search speed 0.04 0.000 
S_ReplenishT_hr Surface minehunter time to replenish 0.00 0.000 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface minehunter maximum sortie time 0.00 0.000 
S_RDeployT_hr Surface minehunter time to deploy RI&N gear -0.03 0.000 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface minehunter time to recover search gear -0.03 0.000 
A_Pd Airborne minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
-0.13 0.000 
A_Pcnn Airborne minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine a non-MILCO 
0.22 0.000 
SearchSplitYpc Percentage of search area covered by the surface 
minehunter 
-0.15 0.000 
S_SStreamT_hr Surface minehunter time to stream search gear 0.00 0.008 
A_Pcmm Airborne minehunter probability of classifying a 
mine as a MILCO 
-0.04 0.006 







Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
S_PrnnI Surface minehunter probability of not reacquiring 
a non-mine as a mine, given that the non-mine 
has already been identified as a mine 
-0.01 0.030 
S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of detecting 
MILEC 
-0.03 0.032 
A_SRecoverT_hr Airborne minehunter time to recover search gear 0.02 0.050 
 
The statistically significant input variables for configuration 1B to the percent 
clearance MOE as well as the normalized magnitude of each variable’s effects on percent 
clearance in order of increasing p-value are indicated in Table 42. After 512 runs of the 
legacy model, the mean percent clearance was 0.31 with a 95 percent confidence interval 
ranging from 0.30–0.32, as shown in Table 38. Configuration 1B was slightly less effec-
tive at clearing a SLOC given the reacquisition step needed as part of going from a Sea-
Fox exploratory round to a neutralization round. There is a chance the neutralization 
round would not be able to reacquire a mine and therefore there is a reduction in the 
overall percent clearance. 
Table 42.   Input Parameters Effects on Percent Clearance for Baseline Configu-




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized Input Pa-
rameter Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant -0.39 0.000 
S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
0.06 0.000 
S_Pcmm Surface minehunter probability of classifying 
a mine as a MILCO 
0.05 0.000 
S_Prmm Surface minehunter probability of reacquiring 
a mine as a MILCO 
0.12 0.000 
S_Pimm Surface minehunter probability of identifying 
a mine as a mine 
0.10 0.000 
S_Pn Surface minehunter probability of neutralizing 
a mine 
0.10 0.000 
S_SeaFox_PID Surface minehunter probability of using a 
SeaFox identification round 
-0.02 0.000 
S_PrmmI Surface minehunter probability of reacquiring 
a mine as a mine, given that the mine has al-
ready been identified as a mine 
0.04 0.000 







Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized Input Pa-
rameter Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
A_Pcmm Airborne minehunter probability of classifying 
a mine as a MILCO 
0.05 0.000 
3. Baseline Legacy Configuration 2A 
Legacy configuration 2A, representing when the MCM 1 uses a SLQ-48 for neu-
tralization and the MH-53E uses a SeaFox in parallel, was analyzed with 512 model runs 
with 65 input variables. The statistically significant input variables to the ACRS MOE as 
well as the normalized magnitude of each variable’s effects on ACRS are indicated in 
Table 43. After 512 runs of the legacy model, the mean ACRS was 5.35 with a 95 percent 
confidence interval ranging from 5.25–5.45, as shown in Table 38. Compared to configu-
rations 1A and 1B, configuration 2A was significantly more effective at covering a 
SLOC. This is primarily due to the fact that the MH-53E shares the neutralization load 
with the MCM 1. 
Table 43.   Input Parameters Effects on ACRS for Baseline Configuration 2A 




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant 0.28 0.000 
S_SrchSpeed_kt Surface minehunter search speed 0.05 0.000 
S_ReplenishT_hr Surface minehunter time to replenish 0.00 0.000 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface minehunter maximum sortie time 0.00 0.000 
S_Pcnn Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine as a non-MILCO 
0.05 0.000 
S_RDeployT_hr Surface minehunter time to deploy reacquisition, 
identification, and reacquisition gear 
-0.02 0.000 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface minehunter time to recover search gear -0.02 0.000 
A_Pd Airborne minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
-0.09 0.000 
A_Pcnn Airborne minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine a non-MILCO 
0.12 0.000 
SearchSplitYpc Percentage of search area covered by the surface 
minehuntert 
-0.29 0.000 
NeutSplitYpc Percentage of search area covered by the surface 
minehunter during reacquisition, identification 
and neutralization operations in the uncleared 
portion of search area 
-0.10 0.000 







Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
A_TransitSpd_kt Airborne minehunter transit speed between stag-
ing area and search area 
0.00 0.045 
 
The statistically significant input variables for configuration 2A to the percent 
clearance MOE, as well as the normalized magnitude of each variable’s effect on percent 
clearance in order of increasing p-value, are indicated in Table 44. After 512 runs of the 
legacy model, the mean percent clearance was 0.33 with a 95 percent confidence interval 
ranging from 0.32–0.34, as shown in Table 38. It appears the parallel hunting does not 
impact the percent clearance given the values between configurations 1A and 2A are 
nearly identical. 
Table 44.   Input Parameters Effects on Percent Clearance for Baseline Config-




Model Variable Definition 
Normalized Input 
Variable Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant -0.40 0.000 
S_Pd Surface probability of detecting a MILEC 0.06 0.000 
S_Pcmm 
Surface probability of classifying a mine as a 
MILCO 0.06 0.000 
S_Pimm 
Surface probability of identifying a mine as a 
mine 0.10 0.000 
S_Pn Surface probability of neutralizing a mine 0.11 0.000 
A_Pd Airborne probability of detecting a MILEC 0.07 0.000 
A_Pcmm 
Airborne probability of classifying a mine as a 
MILCO 0.05 0.000 
A_Pimm 
Airborne probability of identifying a mine as a 
mine 0.03 0.000 
S_Prmm 
Surface probability of reacquiring a mine as a 
MILCO 0.07 0.002 
A_Pn Airborne probability of neutralizing a mine 0.03 0.005 
 
4. Baseline Legacy Configuration 2B 
Legacy configuration 2B, representing when both the MCM 1 and MH-53E use 
SeaFox neutralizers, was analyzed with 512 model runs with 65 input variables. The sta-
tistically significant input variables to the ACRS MOE, as well as the normalized magni-
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tude of each variable’s effects on ACRS, are indicated in Table 45. After 512 runs of the 
legacy model, the mean ACRS was 5.30 with a 95 percent confidence interval ranging 
from 5.20–5.40, as shown in Table 38. Compared to configuration 2A, configuration 2B 
was slightly less effective at covering a SLOC for the same reason that configuration 1B 
was less effective than configuration 1A; that is, going from a SeaFox exploratory round 
to a neutralization round takes time and therefore decreases the rate of coverage. 
 235
Table 45.   Input Parameters Effects on ACRS for Baseline Configuration 2B 




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant 0.25 0.000 
S_SrchSpeed_kt Surface minehunter search speed 0.04 0.000 
S_ReplenishT_hr Surface minehunter time to replenish 0.00 0.000 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface minehunter maximum sortie time 0.00 0.000 
S_Pcnn Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine as a non-MILCO 
0.04 0.000 
S_SeaFox_PID Surface minehunter probability of using a SeaFox 
identification round 
-0.02  
S_RDeployT_hr Surface minehunter time to deploy reacquisition, 
identification, and reacquisition gear 
-0.02 0.000 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface minehunter time to recover search gear -0.02 0.000 
A_Pd Airborne minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
-0.06 0.000 
A_Pcnn Airborne minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine a non-MILCO 
0.13 0.000 
SearchSplitYpc Percentage of search area covered by the surface 
minehunter 
-0.26 0.000 
NeutSplitYpc Percentage of search area covered by the surface 
minehunter during reacquisition, identification 
and neutralization operations in the uncleared 
portion of search area 
-0.10 0.000 
S_PrnnI Surface minehunter probability of not reacquiring 
a non-mine as a mine, given that the non-mine 
has already been identified as a mine 
-0.01 0.028 
S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
-0.02 0.033 
A_Pcmm Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
mine as a MILCO 
-0.02 0.033 
S_TurnTime_s Surface minehunter time to turn at the end of a 
track 
0.00 0.039 
S_SStreamT_hr Surface minehunter time to stream search gear 0.00 0.043 
 
The statistically significant input variables for configuration 2B to the percent 
clearance MOE, as well as the normalized magnitude of each variable’s effect on percent 
clearance in order of increasing p-value, are indicated in Table 46. After 512 runs of the 
legacy model, the mean percent clearance was 0.31 with 95 percent confidence interval 
ranging from 0.30–0.32, as shown in Table 38. It appears the parallel hunting does not 
impact the percent clearance given the values between configurations 1B and 2B are 
nearly identical. 
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Table 46.   Input Parameters Effects on Percent Clearance for Baseline Con-




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized Input 
Parameter Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant -0.36 0.000 
S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
0.09 0.000 
S_Pcmm Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
mine as a MILCO 
0.06 0.000 
S_Prmm Surface minehunter probability of reacquiring a 
mine as a MILCO 
0.09 0.000 
S_Pimm Surface minehunter probability of identifying a 
mine as a mine 
0.09 0.000 
S_Pn Surface minehunter probability of neutralizing a 
mine 
0.08 0.000 
A_Pd Airborne minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
0.05 0.000 
A_Pcmm Airborne minehunter probability of classifying a 
mine as a MILCO 
0.07 0.000 
A_Pimm Airborne minehunter probability of identifying a 
mine as a mine 
0.03 0.000 
A_SRecoverT_hr Airborne minehunter time to recover search gear -0.02 0.008 
A_Pn Airborne minehunter probability of neutralizing 
a mine 
0.03 0.017 
A_RDeployT_hr Airborne minehunter time to deploy reacquisi-
tion, identification, and reacquisition gear 
-0.02 0.018 
S_SeaFox_PID Surface minehunter probability of using a Sea-
Fox identification round 
-0.01 0.022 
 
5. Baseline Future Configuration 3 
Future configuration 3, representing when the LCS/RMS performs the detection 
and classification while the MH-60S performs the neutralization, was analyzed with 512 
model runs with 65 input variables. The statistically significant input variables to the 
ACRS MOE, as well as the normalized magnitude of each variable’s effect on ACRS, are 
indicated in Table 47. After 512 runs of the future model, the mean ACRS was 4.80 with 
a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 4.71–4.89, as shown in Table 38. This 
ACRS is better than the legacy serial configurations, but not as good as the legacy paral-
lel configurations. 
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Table 47.   Input Parameters Effects on ACRS for Baseline Configuration 3 




Model Parameter Definition 
Normalized In-
put Parameter 
Effect on ACRS 
p-Value 
S_SrchSpeed_kt Surface minehunter search speed 0.13 0.000 
S_TurnTime_s Surface minehunter time to turn at the end of a 
track 
0.00 0.000 
S_TransitSpd_kt Surface minehunter transit speed between staging 
area and minefield 
0.00 0.000 
S_SStreamT_hr Surface minehunter time to stream search gear -0.10 0.000 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface minehunter time to recover search gear -0.10 0.000 
S_ReplenishT_hr Surface minehunter time to replenish -0.06 0.000 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface minehunter maximum sortie time 0.04 0.000 
S_Pcnn Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 
non-mine as a non-MILCO 
0.28 0.000 
A_RDeployT_hr Airborne minehunter time to deploy reacquisi-
tion, identification, and reacquisition gear 
-0.14 0.001 
A_TransitSpd_kt Airborne minehunter transit speed between stag-
ing area and search area 
0.00 0.012 
A_Pimm Airborne minehunter probability of identifying a 
mine as a mine 
-0.07 0.035 
 
The statistically significant input variables for configuration 3 to the percent 
clearance MOE, as well as the normalized magnitude of each variable’s effects on per-
cent clearance in order of increasing p-value, are indicated in Table 48. After 512 runs of 
the future model, the mean percent clearance was 0.33 with a 95 percent confidence in-
terval ranging from 0.32–0.34, as shown in Table 38. Given that the legacy and future 
systems have the same performance ranges for the sensors, it is not surprising that the 
future percent clearance performance is similar to the legacy systems’ performance. 
Table 48.   Inputs Parameters Effects on Percent Clearance for Baseline Con-




Model Variable Definition 
Normalized Input 
Variable Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
Constant Regression constant -0.37 0.000 
S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of detecting a 
MILEC 
0.12 0.000 
S_Pcmm Surface minehunter probability of classifying a 






Model Variable Definition 
Normalized Input 
Variable Effect on 
Percent Clearance 
p-Value 
A_Prmm Airborne minehunter probability of reacquiring a 
mine as a MILCO 
0.14 0.000 
A_Pn Airborne minehunter probability of neutralizing a 
mine 
0.11 0.000 
A_Pimm Airborne minehunter probability of identifying a 
mine as a mine 
0.11 0.000 
A_TransitSpd_kt Airborne minehunter transit speed between staging 
area and search area 
0.00 0.014 
S_SStreamT_hr Surface minehunter time to stream search gear 0.00 0.023 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface minehunter time to recover search gear 0.00 0.041 
 
B. COMPARISON OF LEGACY AND FUTURE SYSTEMS 
Table 38 provides a basis of comparing the five different configurations in terms 
of their MOE values. Figure 68 provides a graphical representation of how each configu-
ration performs as compared to the other configurations. 
 
Figure 68.  Baseline Configuration Performance 
As can be seen in Figure 68, the percent clearance for each system configuration 
is very close and the baseline future system percent clearance does exceed the percent 
clearance value for the best performing legacy configuration (1A). With respect to 













































configuration (2A). While this ACRS difference is not statistically significant (the differ-
ence is within two standard deviations), one goal was to recommend ways in which the 
future LCS MCM configuration can meet or exceed the best legacy MCM configuration. 
As part of investigating ways in which LCS ACRS performance could be improved, the 
significant parameters were considered, as well as their input ranges. 
C. FUTURE LCS CONFIGURATION 3 IMPROVEMENTS 
Based on the analysis performed as part of developing the DOE, the input varia-
bles that have a significant effect on the future LCS MCM system MOEs of ACRS and 
percent clearance were identified. For the LCS configuration, Table 49 indicates which 
factors have the greatest effect on ACRS and percent clearance. 
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Table 49.   Descriptions of Key LCS Input Parameters Affecting the MOEs of ACRS and Percent Clearance 
LCS Input Vari-
ables Sensitive to 
ACRS 
LCS Factors Effecting ACRS LCS Input Varia-bles Sensitive to PC LCS Factors Effecting PC 
S_SrchSpeed_kt Surface search speed S_Pd Surface minehunter probability of de-
tecting a MILEC 
S_TurnTime_s Surface time to turn at the end 
of track 
S_Pcmm Surface minehunter probability of classi-
fying a mine as a MILCO 
S_TransitSpd_kt Surface transit speed from stag-
ing area to minefield 
A_Prmm Airborne minehunter probability of re-
acquiring a mine as a MILCO 
S_SStreamT_hr Surface time to stream search 
gear 
A_Pn Airborne minehunter probability of neu-
tralizing a mine 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface time to recover reacqui-
sition and identification gear 
A_Pimm Airborne minehunter probability of iden-
tifying a mine as a mine 
S_ReplenishT_hr Surface time to replenish A_TransitSpd_kt Airborne minehunter transit speed be-
tween staging area and search area 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface max sortie time S_SStreamT_hr Surface minehunter time to stream 
search gear 
S_Pcnn Surface probability of classify-
ing a non-mine as a non-mine 
S_SRecoverT_hr Surface minehunter time to recover 
search gear 
A_RDeployT_hr Airborne time to deploy reac-
quisition and identification gear 
A_ReplenishT_hr Airborne minehunter time to replenish 
A_TransitSpd_kt Airborne transit speed from 
staging area to minefield 
S_TransitSpdT_hr Surface minehunter transit speed be-
tween staging area and search area 
A_Pimm Airborne probability of identi-
fying a mine as a mine 
S_Pcnn Surface minehunter probability of classi-
fying a non-mine as a non-MILCO 
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Once the key input variables were identified, the model was executed with adjust-
ed values to evaluate the effects of these improved variables on the MOEs for the LCS 
model. Table 50 shows the experiments investigated as part of improving significant fu-
ture parameters to achieve ACRS performance similar to that achieved by legacy config-
uration 2A. For the most part, only one or two parameters were changed while all other 
input parameters varied as they had in the baseline configuration results. 
Table 50.   Experiment Adjustments Made to the LCS Configuration 3 Model 
to Gauge Effects on the ACRS and Percent Clearance MOEs 
Experiment Adjustment 
1 Set “A_Pimm” (Airborne minehunter probability of identifying a mine as 
a mine) to 0.9%, and set all other input variables to their baseline values.  
2 Set “S_SStreamT_hr” (Surface minehunter time to stream search gear), 
and “S_SRecoverT_hr” (Surface minehunter time to recover search gear) 
to 0.25 hours and “A_Pimm” (Airborne minehunter probability of identi-
fying a mine as a mine) to 0.9%, and all other factors set to their baseline 
values. 
3 Set “S_SrchSpeed_kt” (Surface minehunter search speed) to 10 knots, and 
all other factors set to baseline values.  
4 Set “S_SrchSpeed_kt” (Surface minehunter search speed) to 8 knots, and 
all other factors set to baseline values. 
5 Set “A_TransitSpd_kt” (Airborne minehunter transit speed between stag-
ing area and search area) to 150-180 knots, all other factors set to baseline 
values. 
6 Set “S_TransitSpd_kt” (Surface minehunter transit speed between staging 
area and search area) to 50 knots, set all other factors to baseline values.  
7 Set “S_SortieTime_hr” (Surface minehunter maximum sortie time) to 24 
hours, set all other factors to baseline values.  
8 Set “S_SStreamT_hr” and “S_SrecoverT_hr” to 0.25 hours, and set all 
other factors to baseline values. 
9 Set all sensor probabilities to 0.95 and set all other factors to baseline val-
ues. 
The model outputs based on the experiment parameter changes show that the LCS 
system MOEs can be affected, in a positive way, by modifying the statistically significant 
input variables, as shown in Table 51. The experiments are listed in separate rows, identi-
fied by the number shown in Table 50. Each experiment row has a separate row for each 
MOE (ACRS and percent clearance) and listed across the tables are the summary statis-
tics of that experiment for each particular MOE. 
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Table 51.   Results of Experiments Conducted on LCS Model 
















ACRS 4.782 1.04 - - 1.08 0.05 4.86 4.71 0.00% 
Percent Clearance 0.323 0.07 - - 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.32 0.00% 
Experiment 1 ACRS 4.789 1.05 2.02 7.24 1.09 0.05 4.87 4.72 0.30% 
Percent Clearance 0.350 0.07 0.18 0.57 0.00 0.00 5.62 5.47 8.17% 
Experiment 2  ACRS 5.545 0.97 3.50 7.98 0.95 0.04 5.62 5.47 15.97% 
Percent Clearance 0.342 0.06 0.17 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.34 5.69% 
Experiment 3 ACRS 6.086 0.74 3.77 7.78 0.55 0.03 6.14 6.03 27.28% 
Percent Clearance 0.325 0.07 0.15 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.32 0.57% 
Experiment 4 ACRS 5.124 0.65 3.51 6.54 0.42 0.03 5.17 5.08 7.16% 
Percent Clearance 0.327 0.07 0.16 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.32 1.18% 
Experiment 5 ACRS 4.827 1.07 1.99 7.27 1.13 0.05 4.90 4.75 0.94% 
Percent Clearance 0.328 0.07 0.09 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.32 1.39% 
Experiment 6 ACRS 4.947 1.03 2.14 7.48 1.07 0.05 5.02 4.87 3.46% 
Percent Clearance 0.324 0.07 0.17 0.55 1.01 0.00 0.33 0.32 0.07% 
Experiment 7 ACRS 5.537 0.87 3.70 7.75 0.76 0.04 5.60 5.47 15.78% 
Percent Clearance 0.328 0.07 0.15 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.32 1.44% 
Experiment 8 ACRS 5.530 0.96 3.48 7.76 0.93 0.04 5.60 5.46 15.65% 
Percent Clearance 0.326 0.07 0.13 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.32 0.89% 
Experiment 9 ACRS 4.850 1.08 2.00 7.14 1.17 0.05 4.93 4.77 1.44% 
Percent Clearance 0.513 0.06 0.34 0.7 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.51 58.69% 
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The results shown in Table 51 indicate that different levels of effects can be pro-
duced, depending on the experiment that was run on the LCS model. These differences in 
effect on the MOEs range from a very small percent increase to significant changes in 
MOE outputs; because the goal was to focus on increasing the performance of the LCS 
system, the MIW Team focused on the experiments that positively affected ACRS and 
percent clearance the most. 
The ACRS MOE is very sensitive to LCS characteristics tied to ship mine search 
speed, as the experiment that increased surface search speed to 10 knots indicated a  
27.28 percent increase in ACRS. ACRS is also sensitive to time required to stream and 
recover the RMS as a decrease in the time to stream and recover gear increased ACRS by 
15.69 percent. ACRS is also sensitive to the amount of time the RMS is able to perform 
its mission, or S_SortieTime, before requiring replenishment. Only one RMS was mod-
eled during the project MBSE, based on SME feedback that “two RMS may be used in 
shifts for each LCS,” (Brett Cordes, personal communication, 25 September 2014). In 
simulating the use of RMS in shifts from the LCS, by increasing the RMS sortie time up 
to 24 hours improved ACRS by 15.78 percent. 
With respect to increasing percent clearance for the LCS, the experiment that had 
the greatest effect showed that improvements to the sensors associated with detection, 
classification, reacquisition, and identification that increased probabilities to 0.95 resulted 
in an increase in percent clearance by 58.69 percent. 
D. ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS 
According to the modeling, allowing the RMS to operate at its maximum surface 
search speed of 10 knots, reducing the RMS stream and recover time to 15 minutes, and 
improving the RMS sortie time to 24 hours all improved the future ACRS by over 15 
percent. A 58 percent increase in percent clearance was obtained by setting all of the sen-
sor probabilities to 0.95. These modifications were examined due to their statistical sig-
nificance to the MOEs as defined in Chapter VII. Since these modifications improved the 
performance of the LCS MCM systems (with respect to ACRS and percent clearance) to 
a level comparable to or better than the legacy performance, these are recommended for 
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further analysis. The risks and costs associated with the operation of the legacy and future 
MCM systems were evaluated and are described in Chapter IX. 
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IX. COST AND RISK ANALYSIS 
A comprehensive comparison of legacy and future MIW systems must consider 
cost and risk; a performance comparison alone does not identify the more cost effective 
option, nor does a performance comparison necessarily identify conditions that could po-
tentially degrade or prevent system performance. A combination of performance, cost, 
and risk analyses is required to fully inform decision makers of how legacy MIW systems 
compare to future MIW systems. The overall performance of each MIW system is not 
just based on raw performance, as represented by resulting MOE performance, but is also 
based on raw performance with respect to cost. From an acquisition perspective, the con-
cept of evaluating a system based on performance and cost can be referred to as a best 
value analysis. This chapter describes performance with respect to cost and risk analyses 
performed by the MIW Team. 
A. COST ANALYSIS 
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) describes four categories of life-
cycle costs (DAG Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3): 
 Research and Development (R&D) Costs. R&D costs include costs asso-
ciated with trade studies, technology development, design, fabrication, in-
tegration, and testing. 
 Investment Costs. Investment costs include costs associated with produc-
tion and deployment. 
 Operating and Support (O&S) Costs. O&S costs include costs associated 
with operating, maintaining, and supporting a fielded system. 
 Mission cost associated with unit mission hourly cost and expenditure 
cost, associated with per unit baseline and task force size units.  
The MIW cost analysis was scoped to include only O&S costs. Other life-cycle 
cost categories were excluded due to manpower and time constraints. O&S cost infor-
mation was obtained from the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Costs (VAMOSC) management information system as well as SME feedback. VAMOSC 
collects and reports historical O&S costs for US Navy and Marine Corps weapon sys-
tems. VAMOSC cost information is available by request to US government personnel 
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and DOD contractors in support of providing cost analysis relate services. Cost infor-
mation not available from VAMOSC, namely neutralizer costs, were estimated based up-
on feedback from SMEs who are technical leaders directly involved with the MIW com-
munity. 
1. Cost Analysis Methodology 
The MIW Team considered two approaches for comparing the cost of legacy and 
future MIW systems. The first approach was to compare annual O&S costs. The MCM 1 
ships used for the legacy MIW system are dedicated to conducting MIW missions. There-
fore, the annual O&S cost of the MCM 1 should accurately represent the annual cost of 
conducting MIW missions. This is not the case for the future MIW systems because the 
LCS ships may be used for non-MIW missions when there are no MIW missions re-
quired. For this reason, the annual O&S cost of the LCS may not accurately represent the 
annual cost of conducting MIW missions especially during periods requiring a low num-
ber of MIW missions. 
The second approach was to compare the hourly O&S costs incurred while con-
ducting the common mission scenario profile. This approach was selected for the cost 
analysis because it is a natural way to link the cost estimation with the M&S results de-
scribed in Chapters VII and VIII. That is, the ACRS MOE is deterministic based on the 
total mission time, in hours, from the model output. In addition, the model outputs also 
included the number of surface and aerial neutralizers used as well as the total number of 
flight hours. The MIW Team deemed hourly O&S cost to be a more accurate representa-
tion of the cost of MIW because it takes into account the fact that better performance 
leads to less operating hours. 
2. Hourly O&S Cost Estimates for MIW Systems 
The naval cost database, VAMOSC, provided O&S costs for the legacy MCM 1, 
MH-53E, and LHD as well as the future LCS and MH-60S. The two variants of LCS, the 
Freedom and Independence class, have different O&S costs but are both expected to sup-
port MIW mission modules. Note that the O&S costs associated with the LSDs that sup-
port the EOD divers were not considered given the modeled operational scenario only 
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considers clearing bottom mines in an environment already clear of surface and near-
surface mines. The MIW Team estimated hourly O&S costs by dividing the VAMOSC 
annual O&S costs by 8,760, the number of hours in a year. Moreover, some helicopter 
manpower and operational and intermediate maintenance costs were associated with 
flight hours. VAMOSC provided annual O&S costs for available years in constant fiscal 
year 2015 (FY15) dollars. 
VAMOSC O&S costs do not remain constant from year to year. The MIW Team 
considered creating probabilistic cost models to reflect this year-to-year variation; how-
ever, this approach was not used because VAMOSC provides too few data points for 
most platforms. Although it would have been preferable to use hourly cost distributions 
to derive the cost estimates described within this report, the MIW Team lacked sufficient 
information and time to develop reasonable distributional data. Therefore, the analysis 
used hourly O&S costs that were estimated by averaging the VAMOSC O&S costs over 
the range for which the corresponding data was available. Tables 52–59 show the esti-
mated average cost per hour or flight hour for the future and legacy capabilities. Each ta-
ble lists costs in four categories: manpower, maintenance, energy, and other. The man-
power category contains costs associated paying personnel to operate the system. The 
energy category contains costs associated with the fuel and energy needed to maintain 
and operate the system. The maintenance category contains costs associated with the 
maintenance of the system, including personnel, parts, and facilities. The other category 
contains costs associated with training and continued product improvements. 
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Table 52.   O&S Cost Information for the MCM 1 
Cost Category 
MCM 1 Annual O&S Cost1 
(2004-2013, CY15M$) Estimated Average 
Hourly Cost2 (CY15$) 
Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower 6.85 7.37 7.84 841
Energy 0.21 0.30 0.49 34
Maintenance 4.21 5.54 8.90 632
Other 0.91 1.62 2.24 185
Total3 12.17 14.82 19.48 1,692
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 10 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by 8,760 hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each 
cost category. Not an actual annual cost. 
Table 53.   O&S Cost Information for the LHD 1 
Cost Category 
LHD 1 Annual O&S Cost1 
(2004-2013, CY15M$) Estimated Average 
Hourly Cost2 (CY15$) 
Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower 80.05 88.65 92.91 10,120
Energy 16.83 23.13 27.51 2,641
Maintenance 17.19 31.69 46.26 3,618
Other 10.80 17.96 28.82 2,050
Total3 124.87 161.43 195.50 18,428
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 10 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by 8,760 hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each 
cost category. Not an actual annual cost. 
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Table 54.   O&S Cost Information for the LCS 1 (Freedom Class) 
Cost Category 
LCS 1 Annual O&S Cost1 
(2010-2013, CY15M$) Estimated Average 
Hourly Cost2 (CY15$) 
Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower 8.04 9.52 10.13 1,087
Energy 1.38 4.70 9.07 536
Maintenance 8.43 15.95 20.02 1,821
Other 1.57 1.87 2.26 214
Total3 19.42 32.04 41.49 3,657
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 4 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by 8,760 hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each 
cost category. Not an actual annual cost. 
Table 55.   O&S Cost information for the LCS 2 (Independence Class) 
Cost Category 
LCS 2 Annual O&S Cost1 
(2011-2013, CY15M$) Estimated Average 
Hourly Cost2 (CY15$) 
Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower 9.55 9.68 9.91 1,104
Energy 2.00 2.43 2.91 277
Maintenance 4.39 10.30 16.76 1,175
Other 1.07 1.35 1.64 155
Total3 17.00 23.75 31.21 2,711
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 3 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by 8,760 hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each 
cost category. Not an actual annual cost. 
Given some of the O&S costs for the helicopters are associated with flight hours, 
several cost categories were broken out to reflect an average cost based on flight hours as 
opposed to annual hours. Specifically, the maintenance manpower, organizational and 
intermediate maintenance, and fuel costs were found by dividing the associated costs by 
flight hours as opposed to annual hours. Depot maintenance costs were still attributed to 
annual hours. Organizational maintenance is categorized as maintenance able to be per-
formed in the field during operations. Intermediate maintenance is categorized as mainte-
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nance performed by trained technicians in the field, but not during operations. Depot 
maintenance is categorized as maintenance only performed out of the field. Manpower 
costs were also split between those associated with maintenance based on flight hours 
and those associated with operations based on annual hours. 
Table 56.   O&S Cost Information for the MH-53E (per flight hour) 
Cost Category 




(CY15$) Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower—
Maintenance 1.68 1.91 2.08 8,598
Energy 0.41 0.49 0.56 2,211
Maintenance—
Organizational 2.96 3.10 3.26 13,921
Maintenance—
Intermediate 0.01 0.07 0.18 299
Total3 5.06 5.57 6.08 25,029
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 4 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by flight hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each 
cost category. Not an actual annual cost. 
Table 57.   O&S Cost Information for the MH-53E (based on annual hours) 
Cost Category 




(CY15$) Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower—
Operations 0.96 1.05 1.13 120
Manpower—
Other 0.56 0.60 0.67 69
Maintenance—
Depot 0.68 0.88 1.26 100
Other 0.96 1.33 1.69 152
Total3 3.15 3.86 4.75 440
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 4 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by 8,760 hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each 
cost category. Not an actual annual cost. 
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Table 58.   O&S Cost Information for MH-60S (per flight hour) 
Cost Category 




(CY15$) Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower- 
Maintenance 1.03 1.08 1.14 3,134
Energy 0.17 0.18 0.19 526
Maintenance-
Organizational 0.80 0.89 0.98 2,577
Maintenance-
Intermediate 0.10 0.13 0.15 370
Total3 2.10 2.28 2.46 6,606
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 4 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by flight hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each 
cost category. Not an actual annual cost. 
Table 59.   O&S Cost Information for MH-60S (based on annual hours) 
Cost Category 




(CY15$) Minimum Average Maximum
Manpower- Op-
erational 0.82 0.85 0.88 97
Manpower-
Other 0.27 0.29 0.30 33
Maintenance-
Depot 0.13 0.13 0.14 15
Other 0.50 0.52 0.55 59
Total3 1.72 1.80 1.88 205
1 Based on VAMOSC sample size of 4 years. 
2 Average annual cost divided by 8,760 hours per year. 
3 Total of minimum, average, and maximum years for each cost 
category. Not an actual annual cost. 
3. Neutralizer Cost Estimates 
VAMOSC did not have data on all the neutralizers so estimated costs were pro-
vided based on SME feedback. Specifically, minimum, most likely, and maximum costs 
were provided for the Archerfish, SLQ-48, and SeaFox. Using a triangle distribution, 
1,000 Monte Carlo simulations were run to generate an estimated average cost for each 
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neutralizer. Given the most likely value was exactly in the middle of each triangle distri-
bution, the estimated average neutralizer cost was found to be very close to the most like-
ly cost. Three outputs from the 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations were averaged to deter-
mine the estimated average neutralizer cost. These results are shown in Table 60. As the 
data from the SME indicated a symmetrical, triangular distribution, the results of the 
Monte-Carlo simulations produced estimates very near the most likely estimates, as 
would be expected. Had actual probabilistic neutralizer cost data been available, it would 
have been used to develop a higher confidence cost estimate. 
Table 60.   Neutralizer Costs 
Neutralizer 
Type 
CY15k$ Monte Carlo Output (1000 runs) Mean 
Cost 
(CY15$) Minimum Most Likely Maximum 1st 2nd 3rd 
Archerfish 50.00 60.00 70.00 58.04 60.24 63.83 60,704.6
SeaFox 50.00 60.00 70.00 59.93 56.31 61.57 59,268.9
SLQ-48 9.00 10.00 11.00 9.80 10.79 10.34 10,310.5
4. Scenario Cost Estimates 
To estimate the cost for each configuration to execute the scenario described in 
Chapter V, the model outputs for neutralizers used, total mission time, and flight time 
were multiplied by their associated costs and added together for each platform. The equa-
tion below describes how each configuration cost was calculated and Table 61 shows the 
estimated configuration costs. The table is a structure for a possible Monte-Carlo analy-
sis. Using cost element distribution functions would produce the desired cumulative dis-
tribution functions of all the configurations, thereby indicating the confidence levels for 
the cost estimates. 
TotalEstimatedCost  TotalMissionHours * ShipO & S
AnnualHours













NumberOfAirborneNeutralizers * AirborneNeutralizerCost  (4) 
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1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 2.06 0.50 14.12 
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 2.06 5.95 19.66 
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 3.33 2.32 15.10 
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 3.32 6.35 19.20 
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 314.46 0.00 128.38 1.93 1.67 7.79 11.39 
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 314.46 0.00 128.38 1.43 1.67 7.79 10.89 
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Table 61 shows that the estimated future configurations’ costs are less than those 
of the legacy configurations. Although the future configurations’ total ship O&S costs are 
much less than the legacy systems, the corresponding neutralizer cost is much greater. 
This difference between legacy and future neutralizer costs is significant and a conse-
quence of being reliant on only airborne neutralizers where there is no opportunity to 
share the neutralization load with a surface ship and neutralizers can be wasted on non-
mines. As discussed in Chapter X, gaining confidence in mine locations for achieving a 
threshold percent clearance could reduce the cost associated with wasted neutralizers. 
These cost results are based on point estimates and not cost probability distributions. Us-
ing point estimates does not cover the range of uncertainty, and therefore results in less 
meaningful cost estimates than using distribution functions for the cost elements would. 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that for what appears to be a cheaper point estimate by av-
eraging VAMOSC data, the overall probability could show otherwise. Had distribution 
data been available, the configurations cost performance could have shown overlap. That 
is, the future configuration cost could have been found to be lower than legacy configura-
tions 90 percent of the time. Investigation into the cost driver for the overlap could pro-
vide further areas of study for improving future cost performance. For continued study, it 
is recommended that the cost analysis be expanded to incorporate component cost distri-
butions to develop probabilistic cost estimates. By dividing each configuration’s ACRS 
value by its corresponding estimated cost, a baseline ACRS performance versus cost met-
ric is calculated as shown in Figure 69. 
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Figure 69.  Baseline Configurations: Normalized ACRS vs. Total Estimated Cost 
As shown in Figure 69, the future MCM capability provides the best ACRS per-
formance per cost despite not having the best ACRS performance. Given the percent 
clearance values are similar for each configuration, the percent clearance per total esti-
mated cost for each configuration shown Figure 70 mirror the cost estimates. 
 
Figure 70.  Baseline Configurations: Normalized Percent Clearance vs. Total Es-
timated Costs 
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5. Cost Comparison for LCS Improvements 
Because ACRS showed variations between configurations while percent clearance 
did not, ACRS was chosen as the MOE to use as a metric for improvement. Improving 
the future capability as discussed in Chapter VIII provides performance per cost de-
scribed in Table 62 and shown in Figure 71. As shown, maintaining a constant RMS 
search speed of 10 knots provides the best future ACRS performance/cost improvement. 
Also of note, increasing the RMS sortie time to 24 hours has the same ACRS perfor-
mance/cost impact as decreasing the RMS stream and recovery time to 15 minutes. 
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3 (LCS 2) Base-
line 528.10 314.46 0.00 128.38 1.43 1.67 7.79 10.89 
3 (LCS 2) 
SSrchSpeed 
= 10 knots 400.81 300.60 0.00 127.76 1.09 1.57 7.76 10.41 
3 (LCS 2) 
SSortieTime 
= 24 hours 444.59 296.63 0.00 127.50 1.21 1.58 7.74 10.53 
3 (LCS 2) 
Sstream = 0.25 
hours 
Srecover = 0.25 
hours 447.92 306.03 0.00 127.76 1.21 1.58 7.76 10.55 
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Figure 71.  LCS Improvements: Normalized ACRS vs. Total Estimated Costs 
Of particular relevance is the cost associated with each of the future configuration 
improvements. All improvements, by virtue of reducing the average mission time, reduce 
the total estimated future configuration cost as compared to the baseline future configura-
tion cost. The improvement to maintain a RMS search speed of 10 knots, however, re-
sults in the best ACRS and least associated cost. The cost for this improvement is thought 
to be minimal given the recommended search speed is within the current operating range.  
As indicated in Table 61 and Figure 69, the LCS baseline model has the highest 
ACRS/cost of any of the configurations, so there is trade space for the LCS model to op-
erate at the same ACRS/cost level as the best MCM legacy model, if that is considered 
good enough, at less mission cost than the MCM legacy model. For example, the legacy 
MCM configuration 2A model had an ACRS/cost of 0.85 with an estimated mission cost 
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of 15.1M calendar year 2015 (CY15) dollars, while if the future LCS model operated 
with an ACRS/cost level of 0.85 the mission cost would be an estimated 9.68M CY15 
dollars. This situation opens up some options for the LCS model to work within this trade 
space operating at peak performance to gain a better ACRS/cost or operating at a perfor-
mance level that is as good as the legacy MCM system but at a substantial cost savings. 
Given available data, the analysis within this section used point estimates, as opposed to 
cost element distributions. It is recommended that this cost analysis be expanded to in-
clude distributional data associated with each cost element. 
B. RISK ANALYSIS 
While performing the analysis of MIW architectures, it was important to consider 
the risks associated with the operational use of one system versus the other. According to 
the official guidance from the DOD risk, as it relates to management of Defense systems, 
is  “… a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and ob-
jectives within defined cost, schedule, and performance constraints” (Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L) Senior Systems Engineer/Engineering Department 2006, 1). Risk is 
“something one bears and is the outcome of uncertainty” (Mun 2010, 18). Therefore, giv-
en some set of potential events whose occurrences have a stochastic nature, it is possible 
to attribute some estimate of likelihood (which is synonymous with probability for the 
purposes of risk management) and consequence to those events. This section describes 
the risk assessment conducted to compare the legacy MCM 1 ship and legacy MCM MH-
53E helicopter to the new LCS ship, with its MH-60S helicopter and incremental MIW 
packages. 
1. Risk Assessment Methodology 
Typically, the overarching risk management process includes risk identification, 
analysis, mitigation planning, mitigation plan implementation, and continual tracking 
(Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) SSE/ED 2006). Given the scope of this research 
activity, the risk management activities spanned risk identification, analysis, and mitiga-
tion planning only. The risk identification phase has been a continual activity from the 
start of the research activity. The identification of risks has been facilitated by a combina-
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tion of several activities, including literature review, discussion with academic advisors, 
discussion with subject matter experts, and modeling and simulation. During risk identi-
fication activities, careful consideration was made to not confuse risks with issues. A key 
distinction between risks and issues, or problems, is that 
If a root cause is described in the past tense, the root cause has already oc-
curred, and hence, it is an issue that needs to be resolved, but it is not a 
risk. While issue management is one of the main functions of PMs, an im-
portant difference between issue management and risk management is that 
issue management applies resources to address and resolve current issues 
or problems, while risk management applies resources to mitigate future 
potential root causes and their consequences (Under Secretary of Defense 
(AT&L) SSE/ED, 2006, 1) 
Therefore, the identification of risks involved examining potential events that may 
result in impacts to cost, schedule, and performance of MIW systems, and which have a 
stochastic element. 
The next step in risk management is the risk analysis phase. The objective of risk 
analysis is to develop an analytical basis for estimates on the likelihood and consequence 
of each risk. For each risk, the severity of likelihood and consequence is rated on a scale 
with five bins, and the corresponding likelihood-consequence pair is plotted onto a two-
dimensional representation of the risk, as shown in Figure 73. 
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Figure 72.  Sample Risk Cube (from Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) 
SSE/ED, 2006, 11) 
Estimates of each risk’s likelihood and consequence have been facilitated by a 
combination of several activities, including literature review, discussion with academic 
advisors, discussion with SMEs, and M&S. The assignments of likelihood and conse-
quence have followed the guidelines provided in Table 63 and Table 64. 
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Table 63.   Levels of Likelihood Criteria (from Under Secretary of Defense 
(AT&L) SSE/ED, 2006, 12) 
Level Likelihood Probability of 
Occurrence 
1 Not Likely ~10% 
2 Low Likelihood ~30% 
3 Likely ~50% 
4 Highly Likely ~70% 
5 Near Certainty ~90% 
Table 64.   Levels and Types of Consequences (from Under Secretary of De-
fense (AT&L) SSE/ED, 2006, 13) 
Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 Minimal or no consequence to technical performance 
Minimal or no im-
pact 
Minimal or no im-
pact 
2 
Minor reduction in technical per-
formance or supportability, can be 
tolerated with little or no impact 
on program objectives 
Able to meet key 
dates 
 
Slip < * month(s) 
Budget increase or 
unit production cost 
increases 
 
< ** (1% of budget) 
3 
Moderate reduction in technical 
performance or supportability with 
limited impact on program objec-
tives 
Minor schedule slip. 
Able to meet key 
milestones with no 
schedule float. 
 
Slip < * month(s) 
 
Sub-system slip > * 
month(s) plus avail-
able float 
Budget increase or 
unit production cost 
increases 
 
< ** (5% of budget) 
4 
Significant degradation in tech-
nical performance or major short-
fall in supportability, may jeopard-




Slip < * months 
Budget increase or 
unit production cost 
increase 
 
< ** (10% of budg-
et) 
5 
Severe degradation in technical 
performance: cannot meet KPP or 
key technical/supportability 
threshold; will jeopardize program 
success 
Cannot meet key 
program milestones 
 




> ** (10% of budg-
et) 
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The final step in the risk management process (for this research project) was the 
mitigation planning phase. According to DOD guidance, 
The intent of risk mitigation planning is to answer the question “What is 
the program approach for addressing this potential unfavorable conse-
quence?” One or more of these mitigation options may apply: 
 Avoiding risk by eliminating the root cause and/or the conse-
quence, 
 Controlling the cause or consequence, 
 Transferring the risk, and/or 
 Assuming the level of risk and continuing on the current program 
plan. (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) SSE/ED, 2006, 18) 
Risk mitigation planning is the activity that identifies, evaluates, and se-
lects options to set risk at acceptable levels given program constraints and 
objectives. Risk mitigation planning is intended to enable program suc-
cess. It includes the specifics of what should be done, when it should be 
accomplished, who is responsible, and the funding required to implement 
the risk mitigation plan. The most appropriate program approach is select-
ed from the mitigation options listed above and documented in a risk miti-
gation plan. (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) SSE/ED, 2006, 18) 
The development of plausible methods of mitigating each of the identified risks 
have been facilitated by the same information gathering activities used to develop the 
likelihood and consequence of each risk. In addition, risk mitigation strategies have also 
been developed based upon the MIW Team's judgment, which is informed by this study 
effort. 
2. Legacy Option Risk Assessment 
A summary of the risks identified, along with their mitigation strategies and re-
sultant risk state post-mitigation are summarized for the legacy MIW system in Figure 
74. The six identified risks are described in more detail within the figure. 
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Figure 73.  Risk Summary for Legacy MIW System 
Risks associated with the legacy MIW system are: 
 Risk A: Rough Seas. 
 Risk Statement: If there are adverse sea states, then the MCM 1 
will be unable to conduct operations. 
 Likelihood: 2 
 Rationale: The MCM 1 is considerably smaller than the 
LCS and would therefore be more severely impacted by 
rough seas. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: The MIW mission would be delayed until the 
sea state permits operations to resume. 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Consider weather during pre-mission 
planning. (2) Use additional assets in MIW task force that can op-
erate through adverse sea states. (3) Deploy a large deck ship, such 
as a LHD with airborne MIW assets that can still conduct MIW 
operations in adverse sea states. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 2/2 
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 Risk B: Lack of Sustainment. 
 Risk Statement: If there is inadequate sustainment applied to the 
system, then the MCM 1 will be unable to conduct operations. 
 Likelihood: 2 
 Rationale: The MCM 1 requires considerably more man-
power and equipment than the LCS and would therefore be 
more severely impacted by inadequate sustainment. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: The MIW mission would be slowed or stopped 
due to a lack of adequate sustainment. 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Include logistics and sustainment during 
pre-mission planning. (2) Have an operational sustainment plan of 
at least 150 percent of what is determined as necessary to complete 
the mission. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 1/2 
 Risk C: Long Transit Limitations of the MCM 1. 
 Risk Statement: If the MCM 1 mission is located a long distance 
away from the current MCM 1 location, then it will take a long 
time to transport the MCM 1 to the mission location, which would 
result in a significantly lower ACRS. 
 Likelihood: 3 
 Rationale: Most of the areas in which there is a heightened 
MIW threat are a long distance from the United States. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: If the ships are a long distance away from the 
MIW mission, the consequence could be that the enemy 
force could block vital waterways until the task force can 
transit to the minefield and conduct MIW operations. 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Have MCM 1 ships, supporting heavy lift 
ships, and other MIW assets forward deployed near areas in which 
the MIW threat is high. (2) Purchase transport vessels for dedicat-
ed U.S. Navy use. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 1/4 
 Risk D: MCM 1 Runs Out of Neutralizers (SeaFox or SLQ-48), and/or the 
MH-53E Runs Out of Neutralizers. 
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 Risk Statement: If there are more mines than neutralizers, then 
there will not be enough neutralizers to clear the minefield, which 
will degrade the percent clearance for the mission. 
 Likelihood: 3 
 Rationale: Many mines can be laid in a very short period 
of time, and the MIW task force would not necessarily 
know how many mines are in the mine field until the MIW 
mission is started.  
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: Without a sufficient number of neutralizers the 
MIW mission could stagnate or fail. 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Plan for equipment needs at a level of at 
least 150 percent of what is needed for the operation. (2) Set up lo-
gistics support during pre-mission planning. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 1/4 
 Risk E: Ship Damaged by Mine While Conducting MIW Operations in the 
Minefield. 
 Risk Statement: If the MCM 1 is damaged during MIW operations, 
then it may become incapacitated. 
 Likelihood: 4 
 Rationale: Due to the nature of the MIW mission, there is a 
high probability that an MCM 1 ship could be damaged or 
destroyed by a mine while it is conducting MIW opera-
tions. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: A ship being damaged or destroyed inside a 
mine field could change the nature of the MIW mission or 
even cause the mission to fail. 
 Mitigation Strategy: Have helicopter assets available that can be 
used to rescue the crew of the damaged or destroyed ship. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 2/4 
 Risk F: Engine Damage Due to Long Duration Self-Transport. 
 Risk Statement: If the MCM 1 is required to self-transport to the 
mission area, then the overuse may damage its engines. 
 Likelihood: 2 
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 Rationale: Under some circumstances the MCM 1 will be 
required to be engaged in long-distance self-transport to the 
mission area due to either transport cost or availability is-
sues. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: In some instances the long distance self-
transport will result in catastrophic engine failure. 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Coordinate with transport systems and en-
gage in long-term transport contracts. (2) Purchase transport ves-
sels for dedicated U.S. Navy use. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 1/1 
3. Future Option Risk Assessment 
A summary of the risks identified, along with their mitigation strategies and re-
sultant risk state post-mitigation are summarized for the legacy MIW system in Figure 
75. The detailed descriptions of the four identified risks are contained with the figure. 
 
Figure 74.  Risk Summary for Future MIW System 
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The risks associated with the future MIW system are: 
 Risk A: Helicopters Unavailable. 
 Risk Statement: If there are adverse weather conditions, then the 
helicopters will be unable to operate. 
 Likelihood: 4 
 Rationale: Helicopter availability is limited due to envi-
ronmental conditions. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: LCS would lose near surface detection and all 
neutralization functions until helicopters are operational 
again. Other neutralization assets, such as EOD divers, 
could be used but operations would be much slower. (Brett 
Cordes, personal communication, 28 July 2014) 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Have at least two MH-60S Sea Hawk heli-
copters deploy on each LCS ship. (2) Equip each LCS ship with 
spare parts at 150 percent of expected need. (3) Equip each LCS 
ship with maintenance crews at 150 percent of expected need. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 2/1 
 Risk B: Helicopters Unavailable. 
 Risk Statement: If there are unexpected mechanical issues, then the 
helicopters will be unable to operate. 
 Likelihood: 4 
 Rationale: Helicopter availability is limited due to me-
chanical breakdown. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: LCS would lose near surface detection and all 
neutralization functions until helicopters are operational 
again. Other neutralization assets, such as EOD divers, 
could be used but operations would be much slower. (Brett 
Cordes, personal communication, 28 July 2014) 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Have at least two MH-60S Sea Hawk heli-
copters deploy on each LCS ship. (2) Equip each LCS ship with 
spare parts at 150 percent of expected need. (3) Equip each LCS 
ship with maintenance crews at 150 percent of expected need. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 2/1 
 Risk C: Archerfish Neutralizer System is Not Operable. 
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 Risk Statement: If there is an electromechanical failure, then the 
Archerfish system on the MH-60S will not function properly. 
 Likelihood: 3 
 Rationale: Because of the sea environment, electrome-
chanical systems such as the Archerfish can fail. The Arch-
erfish system is especially important because the Archer-
fish is the only mine hunting neutralization asset that is 
planned to be carried by the LCS MIW platform.  
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: If the MIW task force is unable to neutralize the 
mines in the minefield the mission could stagnate while 
waiting for replacement systems or the mission could fail. 
 Mitigation Strategy: (1) Equip LCS with Archerfish at 150 percent 
of expected need during pre-mission planning. (2) Provide alter-
nate method to identify and neutralize mines aside from the MH-
60S/Archerfish. For example, modify the RMMV to be capable of 
carrying the Archerfish in addition to the AQS-20. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 2/2 
 Risk D: RMMV Cannot Be Deployed. 
 Risk Statement: If there is an electromechanical or rigging failure, 
then the RMMV cannot be deployed by the LCS. 
 Likelihood: 3 
 Rationale: The RMMV is a complex electromechanical 
system that has to be hoisted into position behind the ship, 
and then lowered into the water each time it is deployed, 
and hoisted up each time for recovery. There is a high 
probability that electromechanical failure could cause the 
system to fail or to not be able to be deployed. 
 Consequence: 4 
 Rationale: If the RMMV cannot be deployed the 
LCS/MIW system will lose 100 percent of its deep water 
detect and classify capability. 
 Mitigation Strategy: Modify the AQS-20A on the MH-60S heli-
copter in case the RMMV is not operational. 
 Post-Mitigation Likelihood/Consequence: 2/2 
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4. Risk Comparison 
The risks indicated in this section pertain primarily to the operation of the legacy 
and future MCM systems. The risk mitigation approaches and their effects to reduce the 
probability of occurrence and impact on the successful completion of the MCM mission 
could be analyzed using the model built for this study. Possible risk studies such as study-
ing the effect if either the surface or air-based systems are inoperable or unavailable are 
recommended. These additional studies could be conducted with the model built for this 
study with some minor modifications. Understanding the impacts of these risks may as-
sist with planning alternative approaches or to determine when redundancy would be 
warranted. 
C. COST AND RISK CONCLUSIONS 
As studied, the MCM capability provided by the future, LCS, system provides the 
best cost/performance ratio over the legacy systems. Based on the point estimates used in 
the cost analysis, the baseline configuration that involves parallel hunting and neutraliz-
ing, as modeled in configurations 2A and 2B, has a higher ACRS value over all other 
configurations. Recommendations to improve the average mission hours and average 
flight time hours will have the largest impact on the total O&S costs and should be addi-
tionally evaluated. The recommendations to improve the performance of the LCS system 
(e.g. increasing the surface search speed, reducing the RMS stream and recover times, 
and increasing the RMS sortie time) should be evaluated further. Additionally, the costs 
of the configurations should be evaluated using probabilistic functions for the cost ele-
ments to produce the actual cost estimates. Developing the cost and risks associated with 
those improvements would be a logical extension of those improvement studies. 
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X. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The MIW Team followed a disciplined SE process from development of the pro-
ject scope and requirements through ultimate development of the conclusions and rec-
ommendations included in this section. The problem statement to evaluate the effective-
ness of future MCM capabilities compared to legacy MCM capabilities was derived from 
the stakeholders’ primitive needs and objective and then refined to develop a focused, 
realizable set of project goals. The functional and physical architectures were developed 
to represent the portions of the MCM system pertinent to the study’s objectives. The re-
quirements were defined and mapped to the critical MOPs and MOEs that guided the 
conduct of the study. Ultimately, IAW the requirements, a simulation was built that was 
used to develop the analytical results used to compare the performance of the legacy and 
future MCM systems. Moreover, the costs and risks associated with the legacy and future 
systems were evaluated that added depth to the performance analysis. Finally, analysis 
was conducted to develop a set of recommendations for potential improvements to the 
future system’s performance in defensive MCM operations.  
Through the execution of this project, the MIW Team was able to practice the SE 
skills and practices learned in the NPS MSES/MSSE curriculum. Several lessons were 
learned and reinforced, most notably, the iterative nature of SE tasks and the importance 
of continued communication with the stakeholders. MBSE was used to frame the study 
through the modeling of the functional and physical architectures and the mapping of 
these elements to the requirements.  
The primary research questions that guided the reviews of the literature and pre-
vious studies centered around the current and planned MCM capabilities, gaps in desired 
capabilities, systems and functions required or planned to provide capabilities, the CO-
NOPS that is followed by each of the MCM platforms, and the evaluation metrics that the 
U.S. Navy uses to assess the effectiveness of the MCM capabilities. The research also 
provided the information required of the necessary functions that are performed. Addi-
tional research and discussions with the MIW SMEs provided the essential details on the 
physical systems that are used to conduct the MCM functions and the way in which they 
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are used (e.g., the CONOPS of the MCM systems) (Admiral Richard Williams III, per-
sonal communication, 11 and 25 April 2014 and 2 May 2014; LT Andrew Watts, person-
al communication, 10 July 2014; Brett Cordes, personal communication, 9 May 2014). 
Regarding the MCM techniques and systems, this study allowed the MIW Team 
to develop a respectful appreciation for the complexity of MIW. This was extended to the 
design and development of appropriate models and simulations to represent the function-
al performance of the different MCM configurations. Through the M&S effort and the 
DOE approach described within this report, the MIW Team conducted the comparative 
analysis between the legacy and future MCM systems. Furthermore, these efforts allowed 
the team to extend the analysis to develop a set of recommendations that could potentially 
enhance the performance capabilities of the future MCM systems. Additionally, cost and 
risk analyses were performed on the planned and current platforms. 
A. CAPSTONE CONCLUSIONS 
Using the approved input model parameter value ranges based on MCM systems 
MOPs described in Chapter VII, the study found that the legacy MCM 1 configurations 
utilizing a parallel search approach outperformed all other configurations in the ACRS 
MOE while each configuration had similar mine clearance effectiveness. Table 65 con-
tains the results, originally documented in Chapter VII. 
Table 65.   Summary MOE Comparison 
 






Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Configuration 1A 4.32 4.25 4.39 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 1B 4.28 4.21 4.35 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 2A 5.35 5.25 5.45 0.33 0.32 0.34
Configuration 2B 5.30 5.20 5.40 0.31 0.30 0.32
Configuration 3 4.80 4.71 4.89 0.33 0.32 0.34
As shown, although the future LCS MCM capability (configuration 3) has an 
ACRS of approximately 10 percent over that of the best performing legacy MCM capa-
bility performing serial minehunting (configurations 1A and 1B), its ACRS is only about 
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90 percent of the performance of the legacy MCM capability performing parallel mine-
hunting (configurations 2A and 2B).  
These results make intuitive sense given the configuration and operational scenar-
io descriptions described in Chapters IV and V, respectively. Configurations 1A, 1B, and 
3 perform minehunting in a serial fashion where the AMCM and SMCM systems per-
form only portions of the functions required for successful MCM. In configurations 1A 
and 1B, the MH-53E is only used for mine detection and classification and the MCM 1 
must perform all of the identification and neutralization functions. In configuration 3, it is 
the MH-60S that performs all of the neutralization while the RMS launched from the 
LCS does the detection and classification tasks. The slight advantage of configuration 3 
over configurations 1A and 1B is thought to be attributed to the speed with which the de-
tection and classification is achieved. The speed advantage of the RMS over the MCM 1 
allows the mission to be completed faster, which has a direct impact on ACRS. The slight 
advantage of 1A over 1B is thought to be attributed to the fact that the SLQ-48 does not 
used an exploratory neutralization round. Configuration 1B’s probabilistic chance of us-
ing an exploratory neutralization round where a MILCO identified as a mine would then 
require another neutralizer to be launched would take additional time and therefore re-
duce the ACRS. Configurations 2A and 2B perform minehunting in a parallel fashion 
where the AMCM and SMCM systems perform all functions required for successful 
MCM. The MH-53E and MCM 1 detect, classify, identify, and neutralize. This allows an 
area to be covered more quickly. The slight advantage of 2A over 2B is due to the same 
reason that 1A performs better than 1B. That is, configuration 2A uses the SLQ-48 while 
configuration 2B may use an exploratory neutralization round. The percent clearance re-
sults for all configurations are also not surprising. Given the sensitive nature for the prob-
abilistic sensor performance, the same ranges were used for all configurations. The slight 
advantage of configurations 1A, 2A, and 3 over 1B and 2B is attributed to the extra reac-
quisition step required in configurations 1B and 2B when an exploratory neutralizer 
round is used. The extra step of trying to reacquire a mine with a live round could result 
in non-reacquisition and reduce the overall percent clearance. 
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The O&S cost per mission for the future and legacy systems are compared in Ta-
ble 66. The configuration performance versus cost, shown in Figure 69 and Figure 70 
from Chapter IX indicates that the future MCM configuration, despite not having the best 
ACRS performance, has the best overall performance versus cost based on point esti-
mates of costs. 

































1A 574.31 72.26 11.56 2.06 0.50 14.12
1B 578.81 72.26 11.65 2.06 5.95 19.66
2A 469.71 124.66 9.45 3.33 2.32 15.10
2B 473.58 124.47 9.53 3.32 6.35 19.20
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 314.46 1.93 1.67 7.79 11.39
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 314.46 1.43 1.67 7.79 10.89
 
The risks associated with the configurations include multiple elements as de-
scribed in Chapter IX. Primary among them is the risk to life and equipment. The legacy 
configurations utilize more equipment given the LHD is required to support AMCM and 
the manned MCM 1 must enter the minefield to conduct minehunting. The future config-
uration, however, requires only one minimally manned SMCM system, the LCS, in sup-
port of AMCM and utilizes the unmanned RMS for detection and classification. For these 
reasons, the future MCM configuration presents less risk to life and equipment for the 
MCM scenario considered as part of this study. 
Overall, in comparing legacy to future MCM capabilities in clearing a SLOC of 
bottom mines, the future MCM capability has clear performance versus cost and risk ad-
vantages. The following provides recommendations for improving the ACRS and effec-
tiveness of the LCS. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED LCS OPERATION 
Though the future MCM configuration was found to have better ACRS and per-
cent clearance performance versus cost, the MIW Team explored several potential chang-
es to the future MCM configuration that would improve its ACRS performance to that of 
the best legacy MCM configuration. Based on the impactful factors found as part of the 
sensitivity analysis conducted (described in Chapter VII), several experiments were per-
formed as described in Chapter VII. It was found that the ACRS could be increased by 
over 15 percent through each one of the following improvements: keeping the RMS sur-
face search speed constant at 10 knots, reducing the RMS stream and recover time to 15 
minutes, and improving the RMS sortie time to 24 hours all improved the future ACRS 
by over 15 percent. Moreover, as shown in Chapter IX, each of these improvements for 
the future configuration resulted in a total estimated cost that was less than the original 
baseline future configuration. Figure 76 displays the normalized ACRS per total O&S 
cost for the baseline configurations, as well as the three recommended LCS improve-
ments (highlighted in blue). As indicated, if only one improvement were to be chosen, the 
MIW Team would recommend maintaining the RMS search speed at 10 knots, as this 
option provided both the best performance and least mission cost. As these recommenda-
tions are based on the structure of the study described within this report, there are further 
analyses that are recommended in the future. These studies could not be accomplished 
within the study’s constraints. 
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Figure 75.  Comparison of Normalized ACRS per O&S Cost for Baseline and Im-
proved LCS Configurations 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
As part of refining this Capstone scope and performing the analyses contained 
within this report, the MIW Team identified several areas for future studies. Some rec-
ommendations relate to expanding the limited MCM scenario considered, other recom-
mendations relate to potential model improvements for enhanced comparative analysis, 
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and additional recommendations relate to direct extensions of the research summarized in 
this study. 
1. Expanded Operational Scenario 
As discussed in Chapter V, the operational scenario considered in this report fo-
cused on clearing a SLOC of bottom mines in deep water. One of the biggest assumptions 
made was that all surface and near-surface mines had already been cleared. Given the dif-
ferences in the legacy and future systems as well as the way in which they are deployed, 
it is very possible that the performance versus cost evaluation of the legacy and future 
capabilities could be different in a scenario that includes surface mines. It is recommend-
ed that future studies include expanded MCM missions to gain a better assessment of 
how the legacy and future capabilities compare for different missions. 
In addition, the chosen scenario did not take into account the environmental fac-
tors or sea states. It is recommended that future studies take into account the environmen-
tal and sea state variables to obtain a more realistic result of the efficacy of the mine 
hunting operations. Additionally, the incorporation of different types of mines into the 
simulation would provide a much more realistic simulation of an actual MCM operation. 
Finally, investigating shallow water operations would provide another vantage point for 
evaluating the limitations and advantages of the current and planned MCM systems. 
2. Model Improvements 
The current models take as inputs a given number of mines and non-mines and 
goes about detecting, classifying, reacquiring, identifying, and neutralizing based on the 
probabilistic performance of the sensors and neutralizers until all known objects are cate-
gorized. The model does not continue based on a threshold number of objects contained 
in one category. It is recommended that the simulation be modified so that the minehunt-
ing operation will continue until the desired percent clearance is achieved. This is more 
representative of the actual MCM operation in that mine clearance activities will continue 
until the probability of residual mines is less than five percent. This scenario was not in-
cluded in this project due to the time constraints in which the study was conducted. 
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The current models only simulate a single LHD, MCM 1, and MH-53E for legacy 
configurations and a single LCS and MH-60S for the future configuration. To further rep-
resent the actual MCM operations, it is recommended that the models be modified to rep-
resent the entire task force for both the legacy and the future MCM systems. This would 
provide a more realistic perspective into the performance and the cost of the employment 
of multiple platforms in a mine clearance operation. Again, the time constraints under 
which this project was accomplished did not allow for the inclusion of the multiple plat-
forms. 
As discussed in Chapter IX, the cost estimates associated with the O&S and neu-
tralizer costs for each configuration were based on point estimates derived from 
VAMOSC and SME feedback. Had cost distribution data been readily available, the 
MIW Team could have incorporated a probabilistic analysis for how each configuration 
performs into the cost model and investigated which cost drivers are most impactful. Fu-
ture studies could improve the cost model to account for component cost distribution. 
3. Study Extensions 
An important element that was not addressed within this study is the impacts of 
the collection and transfer of intelligence data regarding the mining operations performed 
by the adversary. Including the factors associated with the intelligence would be an inter-
esting and informative augmentation to the study of the length of time and effectiveness 
of MCM operations. 
Another approach to this study that would be helpful to the MIW community is 
scenario-based analysis. For example, in many cases if a mine field is present the goal is 
to clear a path through the minefield for blue force shipping as soon as possible. For this 
type of scenario the minefield would be reconnoitered and its borders identified. Once the 
minefield borders are identified a narrow path would need to be cleared through the full 
length of the minefield. For example if the length and a width of the minefield is 10 NM 
by 10 NM respectively, a narrow path would need to be cleared, 100 meters wide by 10 
NM. The two key MOEs for MIW is ACRS and percent clearance, for this type of sce-
nario percent clearance would be the key metric to achieve. The initial goal would be to 
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clear the path through the minefield to a percent clearance of at least 0.95. Once this path 
is clear to a percent clearance of 0.95 blue force shipping can then transit through the 
minefield; once this goal is accomplished, the rest of the minefield can then be cleared to 
a percent clearance of 0.95. 
The MIW Team conducted the study described within this report to compare the 
minehunting capabilities of the legacy and future MCM systems. Based on the two MOEs 
selected, ACRS and percent clearance, and using the baseline parameter values, it was 
found that the legacy systems operating in a parallel hunt operation outperformed the 
other systems. The future system did outperform the legacy systems operating in a serial 
mode of operation. The costs and risks associated with operating the legacy and future 
systems showed that the future system has a lower O&S cost per mission than the legacy 
configurations. Based on the sensitivity analysis, several recommendations were then 
provided to increase the performance of the future, LCS, system with respect to the 
ACRS MOE. Finally, there are logical extensions to this study that would result in data 
and information that may be useful for the MIW community, such as analyzing the im-
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APPENDIX A.  SUMMARY OF MCM HISTORY 
This appendix contains an overview of the history of MCM. The details of this 
appendix were developed during the literature review conducted by the MIW Team. 
A. WAR OF INDEPENDENCE TO FIRST WORLD WAR (1777–1918) 
MIW initially developed as a means to protect shallow water channels. The U.S. 
first practiced MIW during the War of Independence and subsequently during the Ameri-
can Civil War. Even in these early years this included: free-floating contact mines; mines 
that could be attached directly to the hull of a ship; moored contact mines with positive 
buoyancy tethered to the seabed so as to lie under the surface of the water; and controlled 
mines remotely detonated by an observer. These types of mine threats still exist today. As 
with every other development in warfare, soon after mines became an effective means of 
waging war, methods of countering them were developed (Melia 1991). 
An early success in mine countermeasure took place during the American Civil 
War at Mobile Bay. Union Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut famously led his fleet 
through a minefield set by Confederate forces to defend the bay. Prior to this action, 
however, Admiral Farragut watched the Confederate minelayers’ activities closely, ena-
bling him to determine where new mines had been laid. He also dispatched his flag lieu-
tenant, Lieutenant John Crittenden Watson, to find a safe path through the field. Previous 
intelligence indicated that the mines tended to deactivate after long submersion, where 
“long” was on the order of the several months that most of these mines had been in place. 
Over many nights, Watson embarked on the task of sinking or untethering a sufficient 
number of mines to clear a safe path into the bay. Watson also retrieved several examples 
of the enemy mines for study. Lieutenant Watson’s slow, painstaking, and dangerous 
work was one of the earliest successful attempts at MCM operations, in particular, mine-
hunting. Even to the modern day, minehunting missions have many of the same elements 
as Watson’s approach. Observing the enemy, collecting intelligence on the capabilities 
and weaknesses of the weapons, locating the mines, and neutralizing the threat are all 
critical components of modern minehunting (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 
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1991). By the time Farragut uttered his oft-repeated order “Damn the torpedoes! Full 
speed ahead!” the route he intended to sail was clear of active mines (Melia 1991, 3). In 
fact, the only one of his ships to be damaged in transiting into the bay had sailed outside 
the lane Watson had marked. However, this order has come to haunt the U.S. Navy in 
terms of attitudes toward MCM. Farragut’s success, partially due to the underappreciated 
efforts of Lieutenant Watson and partially due to both the unreliability and poor employ-
ment of mines, led most naval planners largely to dismiss the mine threat. Only periodi-
cally, when a renewed mine threat has appeared in times of war, have attitudes changed 
(Melia 1991). The first of these changes came when moored contact mines were used in 
the mining of the entrance to Port Arthur, and mining in the open sea during the Russo-
Japanese war of 1904. Not only were these mines effective but the typical small mine-
sweeping vessels used to counter mines were also rendered useless because they could 
not be used in open seas. This prompted the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, on 
the eve of the First World War, to recommend “all Atlantic Fleet destroyers be fitted out 
for additional duty as minesweepers” (Melia 1991, 28). 
The First World War saw improvements in the technologies used to sweep mines 
with the speed of mine clearance being one of the important performance criteria. How-
ever, it also saw the introduction of counter-countermeasures to make mines more re-
sistant to the various sweeping techniques. For the U.S. Navy, the First World War also 
saw the introduction of dedicated MCM vessels:  
Attention to specific minesweeper construction began in the fall of 1916, 
when the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) recommend-
ed new construction of light draft minesweepers ‘to be seagoing and with 
sufficient speed to accompany the Fleet, with power enough to sweep at a 
speed of ten knots, and to be classified as Fleet Sweepers’. (Melia 1991, 
33–34) 
The extensive mining operations by the allies in the First World War led to the 
need to clear these minefields (as well as some of the enemy laid minefields) at the end of 
hostilities with a premium on safe and quick mine clearance. This was a significant un-
dertaking requiring a level of effort that was an order of magnitude greater than that re-
quired to lay the minefields. Mine clearance at the end of the First World War also saw 
 283
the first use of airborne MCM. The British used aircraft both to spot mines and to drop 
counter-mines on the minefields. Near the end of the First World War the British also de-
veloped the first influence mine. This type of mine was triggered when it “read” a ship’s 
magnetic signature; at that time it was thought to be “unsweepable.” However, it was not 
deployed in significant numbers (Melia 1991). 
B. BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS (1918–1938) 
In the U.S., following the end of mine clearance operations after the First World 
War, minesweepers were laid up and the crews were disbanded. As a result, little MCM 
expertise remained within the active officer corps of the U.S. Navy. In addition, plans for 
a new minesweeper that would have included greater speed, armament, and maneuvera-
bility, were shelved. This new minesweeper would have been employed with convoy and 
anti-submarine patrols. Instead, mines were once again relegated to the status of a sec-
ondary threat with the perception that they could be easily countered if and when the 
need arose. In the U.S. Navy, MIW was not a favored career field and the lack of MCM 
expertise perpetuated. By the eve of WWII the MCM capabilities within the U.S. Navy 
had atrophied severely – both in terms of MCM ships and MIW expertise. When MCM 
was included in exercises it was usually simulated, which perpetuated the belief that 
MCM was not an area of concern. Moreover, the U.S. Navy failed to keep abreast of ad-
vances in mines and clearance methods and appeared to have forgotten the lessons 
learned in the First World War (Melia 1991). 
C. SECOND WORLD WAR (1939–1945) 
In contrast to the U.S., the British maintained an active interest in MIW as a result 
of their significant losses of shipping due to mines. Not only did the British develop 
magnetic influence mines, which could be laid on the seabed and could not be swept by 
conventional methods, but they also developed improved MCM (Melia 1991, 44). The 
Germans also continued to develop mine capabilities and by the early part of the Second 
World War had developed combined magnetic-acoustic influence mines with ship count-
ing to confound influence-minesweeping techniques (Melia 1991, 46). The increasing 
sophistication of mines made intelligence a critical part of effective minesweeping. Alt-
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hough the U.S. had fallen behind in mine countermeasure capabilities, the Lend-Lease 
program provided a learning opportunity. Under this program, the U.S. provided mine-
sweepers to the British to meet their specific needs. This enabled the U.S. to learn from 
the experience of the British and, during the period 1939-1941, the U.S. Navy restruc-
tured its MIW program. However, this rapid expansion of MIW capability in the U.S. 
came about in a largely uncoordinated and sometimes uncooperative way. Due to the 
U.S. Navy’s decentralized organization, multiple agencies were involved in tackling dif-
ferent parts of the problem, or sometimes even competing in the same area. That signifi-
cant progress was made was due mostly to the initiative and efforts of two highly moti-
vated and competent desk officers in OPNAV—first Captain Alexander Sharp and then, 
in 1941, his successor Lieutenant Commander R. D. Hughes (Melia 1991, 50–51). Also, 
in 1942 the MIW Operational Research Group was established to study adversary tactics 
and develop effective MCM. The motivation to establish this group stemmed from the 
need to improve the interaction between civilian scientists studying MCM techniques and 
the naval personnel actually employing MCM methods (Melia 1991). 
Allied landings in the Mediterranean theater of operations only encountered con-
tact mines and simple magnetic influence mines that were easily countered. Nevertheless, 
even this MCM task caused many lessons from the First World War to be relearned in 
terms of planning, properly equipping the minesweepers, and controlling operations. The 
Normandy landings in 1944, however, exposed the allies to the pressure influence mine 
for the first time. The Germans had held this capability in reserve since 1940 and, while 
the Allies had general knowledge of the existence of this type of mine, the lack of specif-
ic intelligence meant that no effective countermeasures had been developed against it. 
Although there were significant losses due to mines during the Normandy landings on D-
Day, 6 June 1944, it was later discovered that it was only through good fortune that some 
large minefields had been completely missed by the invasion fleet. Nevertheless, the va-
riety of mines, including more sophisticated influence mines, had completely changed the 
nature of MCM requirements. No longer was it possible to sweep for a single type of 
mine. It was now necessary to locate mines and determine their exact characteristics—
minehunting was now the only effective way to deal with these new types of minefields. 
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The experiences of Normandy spurred research efforts to develop new sweep techniques 
to deal with sophisticated mines, as well as new minehunting techniques to detect these 
types of mines (Melia 1991). 
The lack of U.S. capability in MCM was apparent when, in June 1945, in prepara-
tion for the landings at Balikpapan, Dutch Borneo, U.S. minesweepers needed to clear 
U.S. and Allied influence mines. This was an unprecedented operation and, in the 16 days 
of the pre-assault sweep, the U.S. lost seven minesweepers. This was a clear indication 
that the U.S. was ill-prepared to deal with sophisticated mines, even those of its own 
making (Melia 1991). 
D. POST-SECOND WORLD WAR (1946–1949) 
Following the Second World War, as at the end of the First World War, there was 
a need to clear the Allies’ own minefields. There were 25,000 influence mines in Pacific 
waters. After about nine months, a combined U.S. and Japanese operation had accounted 
for about half of the mines. The Japanese then continued alone with a smaller fleet of 
minesweeping vessels but, after 25 years of mine clearance, it was estimated that approx-
imately 2,000 of the 25,000 influence mines still had not been cleared. Once again, as 
after the First World War, lessons went unlearned. Not only did the U.S. have considera-
ble difficulty in clearing its own minefields following the cessation of hostilities, but the 
U.S. had been highly dependent on the British for their MCM technology and tactics, and 
the success of MCM efforts was measured by outcomes that, as in the case of the D-Day 
landings, were often fortuitous and not an indication of sound MCM techniques; and. 
This was compounded by the post-WWII demobilization of nearly all of the officers who 
were experienced in MCM. MCM once again became the purview of a relatively small 
number of active duty personnel who retained a personal interest in MCM. However, the 
biggest lesson missed was the need to change from low technology minesweeping to the 
more complex minehunting techniques required to counter the threat of influence mines 
(Melia 1991, 58). This required a dedicated, long-term effort to determine methods to lo-
cate and identify such mines as well as the techniques to clear them. Unfortunately, the 
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immediate post-war period saw the demise of plans for a new non-magnetic fleet mine-
sweeper and there was little development in minehunting sonar capabilities (Melia 1991). 
E. KOREAN CONFLICT TO VIETNAMESE CONFLICT (1950–1964) 
Within five years of the end of WWII, concerns over Communist offensive min-
ing operations in Indochina led to increased interest in MCM at the highest levels in the 
U.S. Navy. In April 1950, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Forrest P. Sherman 
authorized increased MCM research and development when he approved the recommen-
dation from Navy planners for the implementation of a minehunting system. The plan-
ners’ report warned “the great danger is that if mine countermeasures continue to be ne-
glected, large wartime appropriations for countermeasures will be almost useless because 
the fundamental development will still have to be done first” (Melia 1991). Unfortunate-
ly, the initiative to improve MCM capabilities was once again beset by organizational 
challenges with disagreements between the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Ships. 
A Massachusetts Institute of Technology report indicated that MIW was being pursued in 
an “uncoordinated and unintegrated manner” and recommended the unification of MCM 
efforts under one organization (Melia 1991). 
At the time of the invasion of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) by the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) in June 1950, the U.S. Navy had very 
limited MCM assets at its disposal. In preparation for the amphibious landing at Wonsan 
the U.S. used “Mariner” patrol-bomber (PBM) aircraft as well as ship borne helicopters 
to help detect mines. Due to the known inadequacies of the U.S. MCM force, the MCM 
operations were augmented by 20 Japanese minesweepers. The Japanese MCM force was 
well practiced in dealing with influence mines as a result of their continuing efforts to 
clear mines from the waters around Japan that were planted during the Second World 
War. However, the MCM force as a whole was ill-prepared and under-equipped for the 
task (Melia 1991). 
The first attempt to clear a channel of mines at Wonsan was abandoned when a 
helicopter spotted five lines of mines of unknown type ahead of the MCM force. The next 
day an attempt to clear another channel, led by three steel-hulled fleet minesweepers, was 
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continued in spite of helicopter reports of three lines of mines ahead. Within a few 
minutes of entering the minefield one of the minesweepers was sunk by a mine, another 
damaged by a mine, and the third became inoperable due to engine failure. Since land 
forces had already reached Wonsan on the previous day, it was decided not to take any 
further risks in getting the troop transports into the harbor. As a result, it took a week be-
fore the U.S. Marines finally landed at Wonsan following careful and methodical 
measures to locate, identify, and clear sufficient mines. In addition to airborne spotting of 
mines, divers were used to hunt, mark, and clear the mines (Melia 1991). 
The extensive minefields comprised a carefully deployed selection of Soviet-
supplied contact, magnetic, and controlled mines that had been laid with the assistance of 
experienced Soviet MIW officers. In this mix of mines, the contact mines were of 1904 
vintage. This prompted Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith (Commander Amphibious Task 
Force) to inform Admiral Sherman, CNO, “[w]e have lost control of the seas to a nation 
without a Navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the 
time of the birth of Christ” (Melia 1991, 76). The conclusion drawn by the Navy from the 
Wonsan experience was that “adequate mine countermeasure forces with trained person-
nel and equipment should be provided in each fleet and should be ready for service” (Me-
lia 1991). This should include “a sufficient mix of MCM-specific surface vessels, assisted 
by helicopters to mine spot in the advance, divers to detonate mines, and advanced thea-
ter-level intelligence gathering” (Melia 1991). Although there was insufficient time to 
introduce new equipment for MCM during the remainder of the Korean conflict, lessons 
learned from operations in Wonsan were employed. This included the use of airborne re-
connaissance as well as increased intelligence gathering. In addition, some older MCM 
ships were re-commissioned and other platforms were adapted to support MCM opera-
tions. Finally, active coordination of airborne, surface, and subsurface minehunting forces 
was achieved (Melia 1991). 
The humiliation at Wonsan finally forced the Navy as a whole to take the mine 
threat seriously. The Navy developed requirements for an ocean minesweeper (MSO) that 
could handle the threat presented by magnetic influence mines. These requirements were 
realized in the wooden-hulled MSO. To maximize MCM flexibility the Navy also added 
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coastal minesweepers (MSC), the majority of which were transferred to North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, as well as dedicated coastal minehunters (AMCU). 
In addition, MCS were developed that could carry the smaller minesweeping boats 
(MSB) and minesweeping launches (MSL) for use in shallow waters. In 1952, the first 
tests were performed using helicopters to tow standard minesweeping gear. However, this 
investment in MCM spurred by the lessons of Wonsan was not sustained. Within a dec-
ade, MCM initiatives started to fall victim to a tighter Navy budget as well as to the 
greater priority assigned to mine research in preference to MCM. Although the primary 
center for MCM research and development was located at Panama City, Florida, other 
laboratories also developed MCM technology as an adjunct to their own missions. Even 
though the laboratories were aligned under a single Director of Naval Laboratories in 
1966, there was redundancy in some of the research, including the pursuit of approaches 
that had already failed in other laboratories (Melia 1991). 
F. VIETNAMESE CONFLICT (1965–1973) 
In the Vietnam conflict the emphasis of MCM moved to inland waterways. As a 
result, MCM was no longer viewed as a significant element of naval warfare. While sig-
nificant advances were made in riverine MCM, this was at the expense of the ocean 
MCM capabilities. Indeed the MSOs had been delegated to perform the collateral task of 
coastal patrol and by the late 1960s were in considerable disrepair. Furthermore, the costs 
of the Vietnam conflict left no funds available for a plan to replace the MSOs. Attempts 
to refurbish and modernize the MSOs ran into financial problems with work completed 
on only 20% of the ships. This increased the interest in AMCM using helicopters to 
sweep for mines to protect the surface MCM vessels. Unlike a surface MCM vessel, the 
helicopter would not be vulnerable to sensitive mines. However, helicopters were not a 
panacea. They required considerable support, not just of the helicopters themselves but 
also the surface component – the sweep sled – towed by the helicopter. There were also 
operating restrictions on the helicopters, including weather and atmospheric conditions, 
as well as problems such as rotor noise triggering sensitive mines. Early helicopters in the 
AMCM role also suffered from overheating due to the nature of their operations (Melia 
1991). 
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Nevertheless, shortly after Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt became CNO in 1970, he 
decided to scrap the surface MCM capability, seeing it as financially unsupportable, and 
to replace it exclusively with an AMCM capability using helicopters. This was in spite of 
the lessons learned at Wonsan, which had shaped the surface MCM capability, and in 
spite of the fact that the exclusive use of helicopters in an AMCM role was still in the de-
velopmental phase. Nevertheless, plans proceeded and the AMCM capability was fielded 
and put to the test. The first test was the clearing of U.S. mines in North Vietnamese wa-
ters following the signing of the Cease-Fire Protocol in Paris in January 1973. However, 
these AMCM sweeps were primarily “check” sweeps. Before mining North Vietnamese 
waters, the U.S. knew it would ultimately have to make the mines safe. Therefore, fea-
tures were built into the majority of the mines either to self-destruct or to go inert after a 
specified time. Also, only magnetic influence mines were used and their settings were 
known. Therefore, this exercise cannot be considered representative of what would be 
required to sweep a minefield laid by an adversary. Only one mine was triggered by the 
AMCM sweeps during this mine clearing operation. Perhaps of more significance, this 
operation was only possible with the support of surface MCM vessels, amphibious moth-
er ships, and a strong logistics chain. The second test was the clearing of the Suez Canal 
following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In this effort, AMCM assets swept 120 
square miles of the Suez Canal in just over a month but did not activate a single mine. In 
comparison, a U.S.-led multi-national EOD team cleared 8,500 pieces of underwater ord-
nance in eight months. As in North Vietnam, the Navy declared the AMCM effort in the 
Suez Canal a resounding success although, once again, considerable resources were re-
quired to support the operation and its real effectiveness was unknown. The one aspect of 
Admiral Zumalt’s initiative that does appear to have been extremely successful was the 
coordination of the operations that now fell under a single two-star commander, Com-
mander MIW Force (COMINEWARFOR) who was in charge of all MCM assets (Melia 
1991). 
G. POST-VIETNAMESE CONFLICT (1974–1983) 
Ironically, in the new position of COMINEWARFOR, Admiral McCauley recog-
nized the limitations of AMCM and recommended the pursuit of a balanced surface and 
 290
air MCM fleet supported by an MCM research program. However, the impression in the 
U.S. was that the surface MCM capability had been completely replaced by AMCM so 
Admiral McCauley’s recommendation never gained traction. By 1975, as a result of Ad-
miral Zumwalt’s decision to move to an exclusive AMCM capability, the surface MCM 
capability was decimated. With the loss of the surface capability, many officer billets and 
the MCM career structure also vanished. The only real benefit of Admiral Zumwalt’s 
change – a unified command structure for MCM – did not survive his successor, Admiral 
Holloway. The MCM responsibilities were distributed to the various fleet and force 
commanders and the position of COMINEWARFOR was replaced by Commander MIW 
Command (COMINEWARCOM) that performed an advisory and liaison role. The MCM 
capabilities that remained in the Navy after 1975 were fractured and dispersed and the 
Navy would be forced to improvise if faced with a serious MCM challenge. So, as in pre-
vious eras, a period was entered during which MCM capabilities would stagnate while 
advances continued to be made in mine capabilities. These advances in mine technologies 
occurred both in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. The Soviets not only developed new 
influence mine actuating systems but also used microprocessors to make mines more se-
lective of their targets and they changed the appearance of mines to make them more dif-
ficult to detect visually in shallow water. Soviet rising mines moved the threat of mines 
into deeper water. The U.S. also developed a deep-water mine in the form of a moored 
mine that would release a homing torpedo (Melia 1991). 
By 1976, the threat of deep-water mines led to the approval for the design of a 
steel-hulled, deep-MSO-hunter that would complement the shallow-water capability of 
the AMCM helicopters; however, political delays killed the program. The next recom-
mendation went in the other direction with the move to an amphibious mother ship that 
would carry MSBs and MSLs. However, this too was not achieved. Each of these initia-
tives covered only a part of the required MCM spectrum that had been identified follow-
ing the lessons learned from Wonsan. By 1979 the CNO, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, 
called for “integrated minehunting and clearance systems on a number of different plat-
forms at much lower cost and size” (Melia 1991). This would include a deep-ocean MCS 
that would replace the almost 30-year old MSOs. The MCM would include an autono-
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mous MNS in the form of a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) for minehunting. To com-
plement the MCMs, a smaller coastal minesweeper hunter (MSH) was also proposed. 
While waiting for decisions on this proposal, Admiral Hayward instructed COM-
MINEWARCOM to develop the Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP). This would use 
shrimp boats that were configured for deep-water trawling, but re-equipped to operate the 
influence minesweeping equipment from the decommissioned MSOs and the mechanical 
sweep equipment from former MSCs. The COOP program would provide a reserve har-
bor defense program for home ports (Melia 1991). 
In 1981 the Navy finally committed to a new shipbuilding program to re-equip the 
surface MCM forces. This would include the Avenger class deep-water MCM ships and 
the Cardinal class MSH ships. Unfortunately, the Navy had fallen behind its NATO allies 
both in fiberglass ship building technology and small-boat minesweeping systems. 
France, in particular, had developed sophisticated minehunting and mine-neutralizing 
ROVs. Nevertheless, U.S. industry had developed ROVs for the offshore oil industry. 
The MNS proposed for the MCM 1 ships would draw on this domestic and foreign tech-
nology to use sonar and video sensors to locate, classify, and neutralize mines. The MCM 
1 would be capable of deep-water mechanical minesweeping and would also have the 
minehunting capabilities provided by the MNS. This would be supplemented by ad-
vanced minehunting sonar, precise integrated navigation system (PINS), and high-
definition surface-search radar. The MCM 1 would be of wood-laminate design encased 
in fiberglass. In contrast, the Cardinal class MSH would be a fiberglass surface-effect 
ship using air-cushion technology for minehunting and minesweeping in coastal waters. 
Because the techniques for constructing MCM ships had been lost in the U.S. during the 
thirty years since the last major MCM ship construction program, many techniques had to 
be relearned and advances in fiberglass construction needed to be taken from allied na-
tions as well as from U.S. industry. The MCM 1 ships experienced significant production 
delays and development of the Cardinal class MSH was eventually abandoned due to hull 
delamination problems. In place of the Cardinal class MSH the Navy settled on the Os-
prey class coastal minehunter (MHC), based on the design of an existing Italian MCM 
ship, Lerici. Once again, the lack of continuity of the U.S. MCM program led to the need 
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for reinvention and progress in a series of revolutionary steps rather than following a con-
tinuous process of evolution. At the same time that the MCM 1 and Osprey class MCH 
programs were getting underway, the AMCM helicopter capability was being maintained. 
However, this program still lacked a dedicated support ship and this made it difficult to 
provide training for the AMCM crews (Melia 1991). 
The move to use a balanced surface and airborne MCM capability was supported 
by an EOD capability. The role of the EOD MCM detachments was critical in rendering 
mines safe and recovering them for disassembly and evaluation. This was a short turn 
around operation to provide information to the MCM commander to counter the mine-
field in question (especially if minesweeping was to be conducted with surface vessels). 
EOD MCM detachments also had the capability to use explosives to disable mines (Na-
val Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 1991). 
H. MIDDLE EAST (1984–1990) 
Before the new MCM and MHC ships came on line, the Middle East again be-
came the focus of attention. In the summer of 1984 more than a dozen merchant vessels 
were crippled by underwater explosions in the Gulf of Suez. As part of the international 
response, the U.S. provided AMCM helicopters supported by amphibious transport docks 
(LPDs). The detachment that deployed to the Red Sea performed the first operational de-
ployment of the towed AN/AQS-14 minehunting sonar. No mines were located so, with-
out ground truth, the performance of the minehunting sonar was inconclusive. Repeated 
sweeps by the AMCM helicopters showed that the area was free of mines. However, oth-
er elements of the international forces found and cleared mines. The mines, believed to 
have been laid by the Libyans, included at least one type of an advanced influence mine 
based on a Soviet design. The ease with which this mining operation had occurred made 
MCM a matter of international concern. Not only were lessons relearned regarding the 
importance of national airborne, surface, and subsurface MCM forces, but this operation 
also highlighted the importance of coordinating international MCM forces. Throughout 
the 1980s, with the continuing war between Iran and Iraq, the Persian Gulf became lit-
tered with mines. Many of these were North Korean manufactured M-08 contact mines 
 293
from a 1908 Russian design, of which a significant number broke free of their moorings 
and threatened to destroy U.S. warships (Melia 1991). 
To protect commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, half of Kuwait’s tanker fleet 
was reflagged under the American flag to enable them to be escorted by the U.S. military. 
On 24 July 1987, the first such convoy was steaming toward Kuwait when the supertank-
er SS Bridgeton hit an M-08 mine. With advanced knowledge of the route and timing of 
the convoy, the Iranians had mined the path. In response, the U.S. diverted considerable 
MCM assets to the Persian Gulf including a detachment of eight RH-53D AMCM heli-
copters. The AMCM helicopters were supported by a couple of amphibious assault ships 
(LPHs) but these ships were hard pressed to accommodate them due to the large amount 
of deck space required for the support equipment. Four MSBs that were also deployed to 
clear mines were unsuccessful in their task. However, six of the limited number of MSOs 
still remaining in the U.S. Navy were deployed to the Persian Gulf and were successful. 
Their operational use matched the role for which they had been designed—minehunting 
and minesweeping of established convoy routes. Minehunting was performed using sonar 
and industrial ROVs were used with limited success to identify MLCs. However, mine 
neutralization relied on EOD divers. During these operations, the MSOs only found con-
tact mines. Nevertheless, these operations provided an opportunity for the operational 
testing of several minehunting and mine identification MCM initiatives. The operations 
also allowed an organizational structure to be put in place to coordinate both U.S. and 
international MCM operations. Once again, the Navy relearned the vulnerability of ships 
to mines and the value of properly coordinated operations. However, even with the lim-
ited use of mines employed by the Iranians, all of the Navy’s MCM assets were occupied. 
This period of MCM activity also showed the value of preventing mine laying in the Per-
sian Gulf, with this being both an all-Navy and joint service combat operation. Without 
this approach, the number of mines that needed to be cleared would have been considera-
bly larger (Melia 1991). 
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I. OPERATION DESERT STORM (1991) 
To provide MCM support for Operation Desert Shield, following the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait in August 1990, the first of the MCM 1 ships together with three of the 
remaining MSOs, were sealifted to the Persian Gulf. Once Operation Desert Storm com-
menced in January 1991, the U.S. MCM forces cleared a channel toward Kuwait in prep-
aration for the amphibious assault force. However, on 18 February 1991, mines damaged 
two U.S. Navy warships supporting the MCM operations. The amphibious carrier Tripoli 
(LPH-10) struck a moored contact mine while the guided-missile cruiser Princeton (CG-
59) detonated an influence mine under her keel. That these two warships had encountered 
mines in waters believed to be free of mines, underscored the lack of MCM capability 
(Melia 1991). 
J. AFTER OPERATION DESERT STORM (1992–2014) 
The period following Operation Desert Storm also coincided with the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The nature of the threat faced by the U.S. 
changed significantly from a stand-off against another super power to a proliferation of 
smaller, but worldwide, threats that would need to be countered. In the abstract to his pa-
per Lluy (1995) states  
NATO's capability to meet these challenges will depend largely on its 
ability to reorient its focus toward the requirements necessary to train and 
maintain a first-rate MCM rapid deployment force. As a leader within 
NATO, the United States Navy must assume the lead in forging multina-
tional transatlantic MCM forces capable of dealing with any global mining 
contingency. (1) 
Following Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps produced a 
series of MIW Plans (DON 2000). The first edition was published in 1992 and was a di-
rect response to lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm. In particular, develop-
ment efforts to improve shallow water MCM operations were emphasized. In 1994 the 
second edition not only outlined developments in mine surveillance and reconnaissance, 
but also developments in remote MCM. In the third edition in 1997 the status of the pre-
vious development efforts were updated but this edition also introduced the MIW “Con-
cept of Operations and the architecture upon which the future mine warfare capability 
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would be built” (4). The fourth edition of the MIW Plan published in 2000 continued to 
provide updates on both mining and MCM developments but went much further by build-
ing on the 1998 “Concept for Future Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection” 
(Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Naval Doctrine Command 1998), a 
concept document looking at the 2010-2015 time frame. As a result, the fourth edition of 
the MIW Plan also highlighted “the shift towards an organic, in-stride MCM capability” 
and the “Fleet Engagement Strategy, which will establish the culture needed to create the 
awareness, knowledge, and proficiency required to successfully ‘mainstream’ mine war-
fare and prepare for the uncertainties of the future” (DON 2000, 4). The fourth edition of 
the MIW plan claims to represent “a revolution in the naval operational art of Mine War-
fare for the new millennium” (DON 2000, 4). 
Nevertheless, no new surface MCM ships have been introduced into the U.S. Na-
vy during this time period. Although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to measure 
how the U.S. naval MCM capabilities have changed in absolute terms, the history pre-
sented by Melia (1991) provides evidence for a subjective assessment of how MCM ca-
pabilities relative to the threat have evolved that would look something like the graph 
shown in Figure 77.  
 
Figure 76.  Change in U.S. MCM Capability Over Time (after Melia 1991) 
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Although Melia (1991) indicates that capabilities have generally increased during 
times of conflict and then decayed during time of peace, it seems that the U.S. capabili-
ties reached a peak in the decade following the Korean War, both in terms of MCM sys-
tems and operational capability. The focus on riverine MCM during the Vietnam conflict 
and subsequent neglect of a surface MCM capability during the 1970s resulted in a sig-
nificant decline in capability. Even though this trend was reversed, to some extent, with 
the introduction of the MCM 1 at the end of the 1980s—the first new MCS since the 
1950s (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 1991)—that capability is now aging. 
The U.S. Navy will need a replacement system, currently envisioned as the LCS with the 
MCM Mission Package, before its MCM capability can expect to improve. 
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APPENDIX B. OVERVIEW OF MANA AND EXTENDSIM 
This appendix presents details of MANA and ExtendSim, as evaluated by the 
MIW Team for use in this study. An overview and description of both modeling packages 
can be found in Chapter IV. This appendix includes the MIW Team’s assessment of the 
utility of MANA and ExtendSim for this particular study (including both advantages and 
disadvantages), as well as recommendations for the usage of ExtendSim with respect to 
this study. 
A. MANA OVERVIEW 
This section describes the MANA software tool. It includes the advantages and 
disadvantages for the use of this tool in this Capstone project. 
1. Evaluation for Utility in Capstone Study 
The MANA software was evaluated for its utility in the capstone study at the start 
of the Modeling and Simulation phase. The MIW Team initially planned to use Ex-
tendSim (Diamond 2007) based on previous experience with ExtendSim during the Ca-
pabilities Engineering course but was made aware of MANA as a possible alternative. 
The evaluation was relatively informal with no particular metrics. Several members of 
the team examined the tool, looking primarily for characteristics like applicability to the 
problem, ability to support probabilistic modeling, ease-of-use, ease-of-learning, and 
completeness of the documentation. Several advantages and disadvantages were identi-
fied and compiled regarding MANA and its suitability for use in the development and 
execution of the planned modeling activities, both in absolute terms and in comparison to 
ExtendSim. The review was based primarily on the available user documentation because 
the limited time that could be devoted to selecting the modeling tool precluded an exten-
sive review including the construction of models in MANA and ExtendSim for direct 
comparison. 
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2. Advantages of MANA 
MANA’s greatest strengths lie in the visual aspects of the program. By default, a 
graphical representation of the model output is produced that can be viewed as the model 
executes to check for anomalous behavior to ensure the model has been built correctly. In 
particular, the graphical representations in MANA include icons moving on a map that 
facilitate an understanding of the model behavior, not just for the users of the model but 
also for communicating the results to stakeholders. Although ExtendSim has a 3-
dimensional (3-D) animation capability, this has to be coded into the model and the team 
has no prior experience with this feature. 
Human decision-making is an interesting feature of MANA. The model can even 
permit the entities involved to make mistakes or choose sub-optimal responses to stimuli. 
This would be invaluable in capturing the human element of MCM, in training, personali-
ty, and psychological states; however, this is not the focus of the study, and was therefore 
deemed not of significant value. 
The genetic algorithms in MANA can help determine an optimal response to a 
situation, though the lack of an automated stop feature means the simulation must con-
stantly be monitored. MANA can also model force-on-force operational scenarios in 
which MCM plays a role to evaluate the contributions of MCM to an overall naval opera-
tional situation; however, as neither of these are the focus of the study, they are consid-
ered of limited utility. 
More useful is MANA’s ability to model communications and share situational 
awareness between entities and units. Much of MCM relies on transferring information 
about mine locations and status to the different systems that operate in subsequent stages 
of the minehunting and minesweeping operations. Due to the focus of this study being on 
just the LCS and its assets as compared to the MCM 1 and its assets, this is likely to be a 
secondary concern; however, it would be extremely useful in modeling MCM operations 
in a group with other types of ships, for example, when clearing a lane for merchants or 
other members of a group to pass. 
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The MANA software also handles expendables, such as fuel and ammunition. 
These can also be used as stand-ins for other expendables, such as food, spare parts, 
alertness levels / fatigue, etc., although doing so requires using the model in ways it was 
not originally intended. This can be done just as easily and more explicitly in ExtendSim, 
however, so this benefit of MANA does not provide an advantage over ExtendSim. 
3. Disadvantages of MANA 
There are many areas in which MANA was found to be insufficient for use in this 
M&S project. First, and most significant, is the uncertainty in the underlying models and 
algorithms. Without confidence in the mechanics programmed into the tool, unexpected 
results occur, which further damages confidence. The documentation, which is of a dif-
ferent version than the program itself, also warns about unexpected behaviors due to 
problems peculiar to the model. This coupled with the lack of experience of the MIW 
Team increases the risk of undesirable behaviors.  
To obtain the desired behaviors, it is often necessary to “trick” the model. That is, 
to use a parameter for an unintended use while completely ignorant of the underlying 
model, or to experiment with factors until the desired results emerge, without really 
knowing what other factor changes will do to the validity of that result. In contrast, with-
in ExtendSim, the user constructs a specific model from primitive components to explic-
itly define behavior rather than manipulating the behavior of an existing model by chang-
ing model parameters. 
Executing a DOE is also difficult in MANA. Although it has a multi-run capabil-
ity that can be set to vary certain variables, this capability is limited, and does not allow 
for importing a DOE for execution. Due to the limited information on actual system per-
formance parameters available for the study, the model being created would rely on using 
ranges of factors and identifying critical points and factors of relatively large statistical 
significance to come to conclusions. Therefore, MANA’s limited ability to effectively 
ingest a DOE for execution is considered a critical failing. 
MANA utilizes a single built-in MOE for its modeling. This MOE is run length, 
which can be controlled to some extent by setting one of a number of stop criteria. Be-
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cause these stop criteria are also preexisting, this leads to inadequate control of the MOE. 
Although the primary MOE of the MIW study was clearance time, which seems compati-
ble with the MANA run length MOE, without the ability to make more refined choices 
about the identity and definition of the MOE and any criteria for triggering it, MANA is 
unsuitable for use. 
Probabilistics in the MANA simulation are rudimentary. Using advanced mode 
settings; some probability distributions can be defined, such as probabilities of detecting 
targets at particular ranges. However, for more complicated statistics, the user cannot 
simply specify a distribution and the parameters that define it. The user could calculate 
the probabilities at each range that describe the distribution desired, so the problem is not 
insurmountable, but it is an inconvenience. Additionally, it is impossible to add condi-
tionals to the probability distributions, which decreases the sensitivity and flexibility of 
the MANA model. 
The construct of MANA is set and has predetermined steps, functions, stages, and 
order of these; therefore, it is not possible to insert new functions or steps. Most critically 
for this assessment, MANA only provides the detect and classify steps, but there is no 
identification step. MCM goes through several stages of detecting, classifying, identify-
ing, reacquiring as needed, selecting appropriate responses based on the results of each 
stage. While it may be possible to force some behaviors into the MANA construct, it is 
not likely to be able to accommodate all of them. 
Motion is modeled via a stair-step in MANA, with adjustments to speed to com-
pensate for the difference between modeled track and intended track. The track itself is 
modeled via probabilistic methods not fully described. Additionally, there is uncertainty 
in the location of the players, which may be relatively small or large depending on the 
total size of each grid square. Maximum grid size is 1000 by 1000 squares, which means 
that for a mission clearing an area 20 NM by 20 NM, each square is 0.02 NM or about 
40.5 yards on a side. Given probable detection and detonation ranges for many mines, 
this is likely inadequate resolution. For a smaller area, the problem is less pronounced, 
however one of the key problems in MCM is clearing large volumes of water with un-
known numbers of mines. MANA appears limited in its ability to handle this problem. 
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Finally, the team had never handled MANA at the start of the project, so there 
was a learning curve that had to be addressed. While relatively simple and straightfor-
ward, the lack of familiarity and the required learning time made MANA less preferred 
when compared to known tools such as Excel or ExtendSim. 
4. Recommendations for MANA Use 
MANA was not chosen for use in this project as the primary modeling program. 
There were numerous technical drawbacks and the lack of user familiarity impacted the 
ability to work around these issues. 
Despite these drawbacks, MANA does have some significant benefits, especially 
in communication with stakeholders and advisors. Therefore, it was recommended that a 
few members of the team work on attaining some level of familiarity with it to be able to 
spot-check certain results and create visualizations of critical findings for communication 
to interested parties as the study progressed. 
B. EXTENDSIM DESCRIPTION 
This section describes the ExtendSim software package. It also provides the re-
sults of the evaluation conducted by the MIW Team for use in this Capstone project. The 
detailed overview of the software is included in Chapter IV. 
1. Evaluation for Utility in Capstone Study 
ExtendSim is a software tool for modeling. It uses a GUI and control boxes to al-
low users to build simulations without having to learn any programming languages. It 
enables users to create simulations of some complexity, involving various pre-built func-
tions and behaviors commonly used in modeling, such as queuing, selections, and com-
putations. Many functions are mathematical or logical functions, allowing it to be applied 
to many potential modeling problems. It can implement either time-based or event-based 
modeling. 
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2. Advantages of ExtendSim 
The advantages for using ExtendSim are primarily a result of the flexibility in 
configuration that this package allows. Many variables can be defined and included 
through the use of databases that allow the user to develop the values associated with 
each variable off-line and then copied into the input databases. This allows for more effi-
cient running of the simulation in a batch mode, in which the values of the input parame-
ters (variables) for every simulation run are preloaded into the database. This permits 
many runs to be completed without further user interaction. This feature allowed for the 
extensive analysis that used the factor levels defined through the DOE process. 
ExtendSim also allows users to pass the model input parameters, which may be 
deterministic or probabilistic in nature. This was a critical feature in tool selection, due to 
the limitations in the source data imposed by natural variations and the classification of 
the real-world data. This capability in ExtendSim enabled modeling within ranges of pa-
rameters deemed reasonable by the team and the SMEs. 
Additional critical capabilities of ExtendSim were the abilities to accept and out-
put tabular data. Model parameters that traced their existence back to the physical and 
functional decompositions of the MCM process DOE combinations to be fed into the 
model through its built in database tables. The model was designed to output certain cal-
culations of interest, particularly for performance measures, but also for troubleshooting 
and verification and validation (V&V) purposes. ExtendSim allows outputs to be written 
into data tables inside its database, which additionally makes such outputs easily import-
able to Minitab for statistical analysis. 
3. Disadvantages of ExtendSim 
ExtendSim does not have very much graphical capability. The GUI is comprised 
mostly of function blocks, with options to turn on an indicator that shows entities moving 
through processes, which is mostly used for error checking and examination of data 
flows. It can also generate graphical reports on results much like Excel charts. Beyond 
this, however, it lacks the graphical or iconic depictions that might make it more compre-
hensive to stakeholders or the casual user. 
 303
The MIW Team determined that ExtendSim is not specific to the types of prob-
lems it can solve; however, many more steps may be involved in producing a model that 
a more naval warfare-centric tool could produce natively. By contrast, this also enabled 
creative approaches to problem solving and a large amount of tailoring of the model to 
focus on specific study questions, rather than using some other tool and modifying it to 
suit the purposes of this study. 
4. Recommendations for ExtendSim Use 
ExtendSim was selected as the modeling tool for this project due primarily to the 
flexible way that the input parameters could be varied. Additionally, the prior experience 
of the MIW Team with this tool made the learning curve much more palatable, which 
was extremely important given that the project’s timeline did not leave much time for the 
MIW Team to learn to use a new tool. 
C. SIMULATION TOOL RECOMMENDATION 
After a review of both simulation development tools, ExtendSim was selected 
over MANA for use in this project. There are beneficial features of MANA that do not 
exist within ExtendSim that may prove useful for additional MCM studies, but these did 
not exceed the benefits of using ExtendSim within this study. 
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APPENDIX C. SIMULATION OVERVIEW 
This appendix provides details on how to properly run the models and includes an 
overview of the input tables. Details are also provided on how to configure the models for 
particular legacy configurations, as well as how to configure the models for different 
types of simulations (repeated runs or multiple runs with varied inputs). 
The model has been built using ExtendSim Version 8 and this is the version of 
ExtendSim that should be used to execute simulation runs. The simulation runs are set up 
and executed from the options under the Run menu within ExtendSim, the top portion of 
the Run menu is shown in Figure 78. The simulation is executed by selecting Run Simu-
lation (the first option on the Run menu) but before this is done it is important to make 
sure the simulation is set up correctly. This is done by selecting the “Simulation Setup…” 
option from the Run menu, shown in the red box of Figure 78. 
 
Figure 77.  ExtendSim Run Menu 
Under the Simulation Setup option, the Setup tab should be selected and this will 
appear as shown in Figure 79. Care should be taken to make sure that the data fields are 
set correctly, in particular; Start time, End time, Runs, and Global time units. Each of 
these is described in this section. 
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Figure 78.  ExtendSim Simulation Setup Table 
 Start time: This should be left at its default value of zero 
 End time: This should be set to a large enough value to permit all of the 
targets (mines and non-mines) to be processed by the MCM systems. 
Some combinations of input parameter values may lead to very inefficient 
progress through the target area and the end time of the simulation may be 
reached before all of the targets in the target area have been processed. For 
example, this could happen with very low transit or search speeds or a 
high number of tracks per nautical mile, but other parameters may also 
have an effect. The Hunt Effectiveness output data table should be exam-
ined after running the simulation to make sure that all of the targets have 
been accounted for in the eleven possible output categories. The total 
number of mines and non-mines across the different output categories (six 
categories for mines and five categories for non-mines) should match the 
total number of mines and non-mines specified by the input parameters 
(note: the values of these input parameters are also written to the Hunt Ef-
fectiveness output data table). 
 Runs: This should be set to the total number of runs desired. In the case of 
repeated runs in which the same input parameters are used for every run, 
this setting will determine how many times that simulation run is repeated. 
The model may also be used to execute multiple stacked runs where each 
successive run reads in the next successive row of data in the input data 
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tables. This would be used in a DOE in which input parameters are varied 
from one run to the next. For these types of simulation runs it is impera-
tive that the number of runs specified in the runs field is matched by the 
equal number of rows in the input data tables. 
 Global time units: For these models the global time units should be set to 
“Hours.” 
Depending whether an ExtendSim model is going to be used for a set of repeated 
runs, or whether it is going to be used to execute a set of multiple different runs as part of 
a DOE, the model needs to be configured differently. In other words, these different run 
options cannot be controlled from the ExtendSim run menu, but require modifications 
within the model itself to structure how the input data are read into the model. For both 
the legacy MCM model and the future LCS model, all of the modifications occur within 
the block labeled Set Initial Conditions at the top-level of the model. The structure of the 
Set Initial Conditions block is the same for both the legacy MCM model and the future 
MCM model and is shown in Figure 80. 
 
Figure 79.  Structure of the Set Initial Conditions Block 
Within the set initial conditions block, all the modifications occur within the Cre-
ate Targets block. Again, the structure of this block is the same for both the legacy MCM 
model and the future MCM model and is shown in Figure 80. Within the create targets 
block, changes are necessary within the create non-mines, create mines, and assign at-
tributes blocks. The configuration of these blocks for the different types of simulation 
will be described in the following sections. It was decided to maintain two versions of the 
legacy MCM model and two versions of the future MCM model. In each case one model 
is configured for single or repeated runs while the other is configured for DOE. The mod-
els that are configured for DOE runs include “DOE” in the model name. 
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Figure 80.  Structure of Create Targets Block 
A. SINGLE AND REPEATED RUNS 
 Configuration of Assign Attributes Block: For single and repeated runs the 
read data tab should be configured to always read the first record (first 
row) of the input data tables, as shown in the highlighted area of Figure 
82. 
 
Figure 81.  Assign Attributes Block, Read Data Tab—Single or Repeated Runs 
 Configuration of Create Non-mines and Create Mines Blocks: Within both 
the create non-mines and the create mines blocks, the first component is 
an ExtendSim read block that is used to read in the number of non-mines 
and the number of mines, respectively, from the input data tables. For sin-
gle and repeated runs the number of non-mines and mines only needs to be 
read in once. Therefore, on the options tab, the check-box “Record index 
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is equal to run number” should not be checked—see highlighted area in 
Figure 83. 
 
Figure 82.  Read Block, Options Tab—Single or Repeated Runs 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS OR MULTIPLE RUNS 
 Configuration of Assign Attributes Block: For DOE runs the read data tab 
should be configured to always read the record (row) of the input data ta-
bles corresponding to the current run number, as shown in the highlighted 
area of Figure 84. For DOE runs it is also imperative that the number of 
runs specified in the simulation setup option of the run menu is matched 
by the same number of rows in the input data tables. 
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Figure 83.  Assign Attributes Block, Read Data Tab—Multiple or DOE Runs 
 Configuration of Create Non-mines and Create Mines Blocks: Within both 
the create non-mines and the create mines blocks, the first component is 
an ExtendSim read block that is used to read in the number of non-mines 
and the number of mines, respectively, from the input data tables. For 
DOE runs the number of non-mines and mines should be read in for each 
run. Therefore, on the options tab, the check-box “Record index is equal to 
run number” should be checked—see highlighted area in Figure 85. 
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Figure 84.  Read Block, Options Tab—Multiple or DOE Runs 
C. SELECTING LEGACY MCM MODEL CONFIGURATIONS 
Two of the input parameters are used to configure the model of the legacy MCM 
1 system to represent the four possible configurations. The setting of these parameters for 
each of the configurations is shown in Table 67. The input parameter “A_Neutralizer” is 
in the Blue Airborne Force input data table and the input parameter “S_SeaFox” is in the 
Blue Surface Force input data table. These settings need to be present in every record 
(row) in the input data tables. 
Table 67.   Parameter Settings to Select Legacy MCM Configurations 
Configuration Description A_Neutralizer S_SeaFox 
1A Serial Hunt - SLQ-48 0 0 
1B Serial Hunt - SeaFox 0 1 
2A Parallel Hunt - SLQ-48 1 0 
2B Parallel Hunt - SeaFox 1 1 
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APPENDIX D. SOFTWARE DESIGN DOCUMENT 
As part of the model development, a SDD was written. This appendix provides 
the table of contents from that document. The purpose of the SDD is to provide details 
about how the models are configured to allow developers to make modifications to sup-
port future analysis efforts. Users of the models may also find the SDD useful to under-
stand the underlying structure. 
A. CONTACT INFORMATION 
Those interested in receiving a copy of the ExtendSim Models and SDD should 
contact one of the following personnel: 
1. Dr. Eugene Paulo 
 Professor 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 E-mail: eppaulo@nps.edu 
 Voice: 831-998-2912 
 
2. Paul Beery 
 Professor 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 E-mail: ptbeery@nps.edu 
 Voice: 831-656-2956 
As the SDD was intended to be a standalone document that describes the models, 
it includes information contained within Chapter VI and Appendix C, but expands the 
details to include the underlying structure and code of the models. The table of contents 
from the SDD is below. 
B. SDD TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction 
II. Description of Models 
A. Model of Legacy MCM Systems 
1. Concept of Operations 
a. First Phase of Operations 
b. Second Phase of Operations 
2. Model Design 
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3. Model Implementation 
a. Model Hierarchy 
b. Module Descriptions 
c. ModL Source Code Listings 
B. Model of Future MCM Systems 
1. Concept of Operations 
2. Model Design 
3. Model Implementation 
a. Model Hierarchy 
b. Module Descriptions 
c. ModL Source Code Listings 
III. Modeling Assumptions 
IV. Model Inputs 
A. Blue Surface Force Data Table 
B. Blue Airborne Force Data Table 
C. Search Area Data Table 
D. Red Force Data Table 
V. Model Internal Variables 
A. Attributes 
1. Legacy MCM System Model 
2. Future MCM System Model 
B. Local Variables 
1. Legacy MCM System Model 
2. Future MCM System Model 
C. Global Variables 
1. General Use Global Variables 
a. Legacy MCM System Model 
b. Future MCM System Model 
2. User-Defined Global Arrays 
a. Legacy MCM System Model 
b. Future MCM System Model 
D. Connector Values 
1. Legacy MCM System Model 
2. Future MCM System Model 
E. System Variables 
1. Legacy MCM System Model 
2. Future MCM System Model 
VI. Model Outputs 
A. Hunt Effectiveness Data Table 
B. Target Outputs Data Table 
C. History Blocks 
VII. Running the Simulation 
A. Single and Repeated Runs 
B. Design of Experiments or Multiple Runs 
C. Selecting Legacy MCM Model Configurations 
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